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POLICY CONFERENCES OF MAJOR PARTIES IN CANADA AS INNOVATING AGENCIES

by

CHARLES JOSEPH CLARK

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled Policy Conferences of Major Parties in Canada as Innovating Agencies

submitted by Charles Joseph Clark

in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Date Aug 17 1971

"This is the price we pay for having lost the last election."

The comment of a delegate to the National Conference on Canadian Goals, on hearing the opening address, by Professor Marshall McLuhan.

ABSTRACT

This paper considers five national policy conferences held in Opposition by the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties of Canada, and their service as instruments of innovation in those parties and, consequently, in the Canadian political system. Innovation is defined as deliberate self-conscious adaptation to new circumstances, and is distinguished from invention. It is argued that innovation is in the nature of Canadian national parties which, as competitors, have the incentive to seek change and, as institutions, have the power to make change legitimate, and that this dual function of the parties is particularly important in Canada because no other agencies perform them consistently nationwide. Policy conferences have been extraordinary instruments of innovation, which have emerged when ordinary instruments have failed. They are considered here as symbols of the regular process, valuable because their genesis and function can be isolated and examined. It is notable that none of the conferences contested the right of the parliamentary caucus to decide policy, or

otherwise sought to displace existing internal party institutions. A major conclusion is that a recurrent important effect of the conferences was to make the host party itself function effectively as an innovative instrument in the larger political system.

PREFACE

Nobody much likes major parties. They are put up with, like work or weather, but most people wouldn't want their daughter to join one. The glamour is in movements, or "third parties", especially if they're "new". The defence of major parties--when it occurs--usually describes dull workmanlike things that they do--they "organize" the electorate, or "unite" the country, or do some other dogwork. Most of all, the major parties are supposed to have no new ideas, except those they steal from "movements" or "third parties." So goes the calumny.

Yet, through its 104 years, Canada has been governed exclusively by two major parties. And things have happened--the CPR, the CBC, the Canada Council, medicare, ARDA, the Official Languages Bill, even the rediscovery of mainland China. Was this all due to accident--or theft? Would it all have happened in 1905, if only a "movement" had won in 1904?

The major parties are full of faults--obviously. But so is the casual slander of their critics. While professional students of parties are usually more objective, I think that on this subject, many of them work within the context of

prevailing public prejudice. If that is so, our understanding of the whole Canadian political system suffers. And even if objectivity abounds, it has not focussed enough on the innovative functions of the major Canadian parties.

My own prejudices are known. I am active in one of the parties studied, the Progressive Conservative, which is a major party in history and aspiration, if not always in behaviour. This paper will reflect that association, at least in its reliance upon information and impressions that came to me as a participant in Progressive Conservative affairs and were not so directly available concerning the Liberal party. In addition, I think the self-advertised virtues of "third parties" or "movements" are accepted far too uncritically, by professional and lay observers. However, with a little help from my advisors, I have tried to correct my own extravagances.

Nonetheless, the paper rests on the assumption that a concern for policy and change is evident in the processes and results of the major parties. This paper examines one means by which major parties innovate--the policy conference, held in Opposition. There are several other instruments, many of them more productive than the policy conference. This was chosen because I had the

good fortune to participate directly in the organization of two of the conferences, at Fredericton and Niagara Falls, and to have access to the records or recollection of persons active in each conference. Very helpful information and advice were provided by the Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, the Honourable Robert L. Stanfield, Mr. N. K. Atkins, Mr. Robert Bedard, the Honourable Richard A. Bell, Mr. Dalton Camp, the Honourable Donald M. Fleming, the Honourable E. Davie Fulton, the Honourable Walter L. Gordon, Miss Flora Macdonald, Mr. Lowell Murray, and Professor T. H. B. Symons. The national headquarters of the Progressive Conservative Party and the office of the national leader of the Progressive Conservative Party made available all their official records of the conferences at Port Hope, Fredericton, Montmorency and Niagara Falls. Further records concerning Fredericton were provided by the office of Mr. Dalton Camp. The Honourable Walter Gordon provided extensive specific information, including some records, concerning the Kingston conference. Newspaper comment was acquired mainly through the library of the House of Commons and the office of Mr. Camp.

The department of Political Science of the University of Alberta has attended the gestation of this thesis with

uncommon patience. I am indebted to Dr. Richard Baird and Dr. Peter Meekison, who were both briefly involved as supervisors, and particularly to Dr. F. C. Engelmann, upon whom that burden ultimately fell. Dr. Engelmann made several important suggestions that are incorporated in the final work, as did Dr. Edwin R. Black of the department of Political Studies at Queens University. However, I did not always take their advice, and neither should be blamed for what follows.

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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

In September, 1942, several prominent members of the Conservative Party of Canada met at Trinity School in Port Hope, Ontario, to discuss various questions of national policy. There were no Members of Parliament present, and only one Senator and one member of a provincial legislature. The organizers of the conference had been careful to emphasise that the deliberations were "unofficial" and did not necessarily reflect the views of the parliamentary or official leadership of what was then, in terms of parliamentary seats and popular vote, the nation's "second" party. That Port Hope conference was the first of five national policy conferences held by the major Opposition party in the period 1942 to 1969. The others were the Kingston conference of the Liberal Party at Queens University in 1960, and the conferences of the Progressive Conservative Party at the University of New Brunswick in 1964, Maison Montmorency in 1967, and Niagara Falls in 1969. This paper will consider certain characteristics common to each conference, including the functions each performed in the party and the party system.

The general hypothesis is that the major political parties have a significant role as innovators in the Canadian political system; more particularly, the paper will argue that each policy conference was an important agent of innovation within a party then in Opposition, and enabled the party more effectively to perform its own innovative role in the larger system. Although the subject is relatively specific, its consideration involves several assumptions about the Canadian political and party systems; there is an attempt to justify those assumptions when necessary. The paper will describe, in general terms, the organization and composition of each conference and indicate the conditions under which each met. However it is not intended to be a history of policy conferences. The consideration is analytical and selective, not chronological nor complete.

Various other policy activities of the major parties have been excluded from consideration. They include policy discussions of elected caucuses, of constituent groups of national party associations such as youth or women's groups or policy advisory committees, of provincial parties, and of national annual meetings. That should not be interpreted to suggest that these other media of policy discussion are

unimportant. In fact, by the nature of the parliamentary system, the elected caucus is probably the single most important locus of policy discussion and decision. In recent years particularly, the complexity and range of public business has forced parties to rely extensively on smaller groups with a particular interest or competence in policy questions. The caucus, and advisory or constituent groups, tend to influence party policy privately and regularly. They are of a species different from public conferences, held occasionally.

The annual meeting is excluded for other reasons. While policy may be the dominant concern of some delegates to an annual meeting, most delegates are more interested in meeting old friends, exchanging party gossip, and becoming "insiders" again. In Canada, the annual meeting of a national party is best regarded as a family reunion, drawing together scattered members to recall and reaffirm their affinity and identity. Officers are elected and resolutions passed, but the essential function of the annual meeting has been to remind partisans that their common cause is alive and more important than factional, regional, personal or policy preoccupations. That is by no means a trivial function; it is one of the most important a party performs in a centrifugal country. A policy conference, on the other

hand, has a specific focus to which family gossip and general business are secondary. Policy-related matters are at the core of a policy conference and on the edge of an annual meeting. Clearly the policy aspect of annual meetings is not barren of significance, and it may be that this aspect is more important recently than previously. But policy sessions at annual meetings, in the period considered here, have been sufficiently different in nature from policy conferences to warrant exclusion from this study.

In addition, two policy conferences which might have been considered were not examined: the study conference held in 1933 by the Liberal Party at Port Hope under the chairmanship of the late Right Honourable Vincent Massey, and the Liberal Party meeting at Harrison Hot Springs, British Columbia in November 1969. As well as having claim to be the first instance of a major party resorting, in Opposition, to a policy conference as a means of rejuvenation, the Liberal conference at Port Hope was an initiative of lay partisans about which the leadership was skeptical.[1] In addition, the experience of that first conference influenced the later decision of the Right Honourable Lester Pearson to convene the Kingston conference.[2] It is omitted because

1. Vincent Massey, Whats Past Is Prologue: The Memoirs of Vincent Massey, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., Toronto, 1963, pp. 211-213.

2. "...we naturally studied very carefully the organization and proceedings of, and the reaction to, the earlier Liberal Study Conference in the 30s at Port Hope of which Mr. Vincent Massey was chairman." Mr. Pearson to the writer, January 25, 1971.

information is scarce, and in the knowledge that every limitation is arbitrary. The meeting at Harrison Hot Springs was convened by a Liberal party in power. Policy conferences by government parties deserve examination, but are treated here as a different species with a different inspiration and effect than those held in Opposition.

A further limitation is the exclusion from consideration of policy activities of Canadian "third" parties, including the CCF/NDP. That too is arbitrary. However, "third" parties, and particularly the CCF/NDP, conventionally are assumed to encourage innovation internally and in the political system. That assumption deserves close examination. Relatively less attention has been paid the innovative capacity and performance of the major parties whose influence upon national policy has been direct, as governments. It is important to examine whether innovation is in fact a function of a particular kind of party, or of the Canadian political system. Consequently the focus here is upon one instrument of innovation which has worked within the two parties which consistently have constituted the government and alternative government of Canada.

The second chapter will consider the concept of innovation. The third chapter will discuss certain institutional

influences upon innovation in Canada, including the influence of federalism and the parliamentary system. The fourth chapter will deal with the genesis and other aspects of each of the five policy conferences. Chapter five will examine various functions of policy conferences, both functions intended and functions performed. The sixth chapter considers two substantive examples of the innovative role of policy conferences: the change in the official attitude of the Progressive Conservative Party to issues concerning Confederation and the development within the Progressive Conservative Party of a commitment to a national minimum annual income program. The final chapter states certain conclusions about policy conferences and innovation, and includes a note on the new limitations on the Official Opposition in the Canadian political system.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE CONCEPT OF INNOVATION

Certain basic functions are shared by parties in all Western democratic systems, including Canada, although the peculiarities of each system naturally affect party functions. Broadly speaking, the Canadian parties organize public opinion, narrowing options so citizens can choose; educate, or at least inform, individual citizens so that some citizens at least are able to give reasons for their political behaviour; provide a responsive connecting link between government and public, so the citizen can feel he participates in, and at times can, in fact, control the government acting in his name; and regularly bring forward leaders, with whom the citizen can identify, and to whom he can delegate much of his active political responsibility. Those roles sound passive and mechanical, and at times they are. The system is itself dynamic, full of conflicting opinion and changing circumstance, and the party is a little like a gear box, responding to stimuli in predetermined ways. There is this difference: this gear box has a mind of its own, and while it responds mechanically to some basic stimuli, it evaluates others, ignoring some that seem strong, responding to others that seem feeble, and at times creating stimuli of its own.

"Mind" is misleading, suggesting a single mentality; "minds" is more apt, indicating that several different mentalities evaluate or create stimuli; the point is that the parties are mechanical and more, with an independent ability to move or stay static. This paper will consider one aspect of that "independent" ability--the capacity for innovation, as revealed in formal national policy conferences.

Innovation is not a "separate" function of parties so much as an incident of the elemental function of organizing opinion. Ideas that become "innovative" in the hands of parties are usually lying around somewhere in the polity, awaiting discovery. Often, however, they are far from view and would not appear in the normal balancing of strong interests or opinions. An example is the minimum annual income proposal, in 1967-68. At other times, they are an interest to which a particular party has not been in the habit of responding. An example is the claim of French Canada to which, between 1963 and 1967, the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party had deliberately not responded. Something causes the party to change to espouse interests which that party, or the system, had ignored before. Whatever the causes of that change, its result is "innovation".

The concept of innovation derives from the observation that, in any organization, there are some forces which encourage change and other forces which prefer a static state; the forces of change are called "innovative", the static forces "consolidative", and an organization is deemed to be healthy when the two forces, innovation and consolidation, are in rough balance. The concept has been applied extensively to the study of organizations outside "politics", and is obviously relevant to political institutions and systems.

Theodore Lowi has written:

> All stable organizations are in a continual process of adaptation. Innovation is that part of the process which is deliberate, self-conscious adaptation. Activities are innovative if they are attempts to change the organization and its environment in keeping with policies thought out in advance of the attempt. Innovation is not to be confused with liberalism or reform. The antonym for innovation is "consolidation", not conservatism. Liberalism and conservatism are postures towards the kinds of change required. To have no policy at all for changing things or to have a policy against changing things is to be neither liberal nor conservative; it is to be non-innovative or consolidative.[3]

3. Theodore Lowi, "Towards Functionalism in Political Science: the Case of Innovation in Party Systems", American Political Science Review, September 1963, p. 570.

Lowis definition adequately describes the concept as it will be used here, although the adjectives "deliberate, self-conscious" should not be read too strictly. In the case of policy conferences at least it is not necessary that all of the participants, or even all the organizers, are aware of or intend an innovative role; the conference can achieve change even if some or all of the participants or organizers do not want or intend it to. Also there should be no suggestion that innovation requires an exact knowledge of the result in advance by anyone involved in the process. However the characteristic stands that an innovative influence is not accidental, and that it is set in motion by advocates of change.

It should also be clear that innovation is not invention: "Invention implies bringing something new into being; innovation implies bringing something new into use."[4] That is a distinction of particular importance in considering the innovative role of the political party. The party generally becomes engaged in the innovative process only after an invention--whether a new "thing", idea or attitude--has gained a momentum of its own. The party responds to

4. Lawrence B. Mohr, "Determinants of Innovation in Organization", American Political Science Review, March 1969, p. 112.

pressures generated elsewhere, either because influential partisans respect the invention or because they are concerned to incorporate the "new" thing into the system before the pressures become too strong for the system to bear. That response occurs in various ways, any of which can be called innovative. That the focus here is on something as concrete as a conference should not obscure the fact that innovation is a process, not necessarily an act.

In any system of dynamism, innovation is always going on. It is not necessarily dramatic. It is a particularly central process in a dynamic political system, which by definition involves a continuous balancing of demands and responses. Several agencies perform innovative functions within a dynamic political system. Probably the three most important in Canada are the formal government bureaucracy, interest groups[5] and political parties. Innovation is not necessarily "discovery". The operative word in Lowi's definition is "adaptation". While a social organization

5. What slight evidence is available at the moment suggests that interest groups are much less influential in Canada than in the United States. Limiting the effectiveness of interest groups in Canada are, among other factors: the more strict tradition of a professional public service; the more centralized nature of parties in a parliamentary system; the consequently weaker tradition of independent action by the individual legislator; the relative sparseness and unsophistication of organized interest group activity on the national level; and the allocation in Canada to provincial governments of relatively extensive powers which require interest groups to deploy scant resources among several strong governments.

also requires agencies which raise problems, and agencies which propose solutions, innovation concerns the adaptation of existing structure to take account of new reality, including new problems and new responses, whether newly emerged or merely newly defined. It follows that innovating agents must have access to the means to modify the whole system in which the adaptation must be made; and, to be "innovating", they must have the incentive to change. As indicated before, the national political parties are major instruments of adaptation because they have both the incentive to accept change, as a means of seeking or keeping power, and they have the ability to make change legitimate.

CHAPTER THREE:

INNOVATION AND THE CANADIAN PARTY SYSTEM.

In a sense, it is the distinguishing role of Canadian parties to innovate. As well as functioning within the formal structure of Government and Parliament, and among the mass of interests and attitudes which seek occasionally to draw a response from the formal institutions, the party occupies the isthmus between. The party is the connection. More particularly, that is the role of the politician, but in Canada the politician still[6] works largely within a party, and not as an "independent". Of course, other agencies also "connect". But "connecting" is a larger part of the role of the party than of any other institution of politics; and the party is both more diverse and more permanent than the interest groups and issues which erupt irregularly from the public into Parliament or Government. Indeed, "connecting" is the vital life-giving role of the party; it is the one function of the party that, on the record, no other agency can perform as well.

The legislature, public service or other formal agent is usually very slow to respond to new public pressures or demands. If it is concerned with action, it is more

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6. We should not assume either that the present close relation between party and politician will persist, or that it is necessary to parliamentary democracy.

concerned with process and is usually slow to establish new channels. Interest groups are much more responsive to new pressures, but they have the right only to go to the door of the institutions from which action can issue. There must be something which exists permanently on both sides of the institutional door, some agent with the incentive to seek out new demands and the right to bring them in to the institutions for action. That agent is the party. It may happen that some of the functions traditionally associated with the party will either be performed by other agents[7] or become irrelevant.[8] But there is no evidence so far that the "connecting" function can be performed by any other agent. Moreover, there is suggestive evidence in Canadian experience that when a party stops "connecting" it becomes something else--an adjunct of the public service,[9] an instrument of propaganda[10] or just another interest group.[11]

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7. For example, the party role in "public education" is diminishing with the concurrent growth of pervasive media and propaganda agencies like Information Canada.

8. The "organization of the electorate", in Tammany terms, has been outmoded by the sophistication and scope of both the media and the population in much of the metropolitan United States, and the process is beginning here. In fact, it is already technically possible to eliminate legislatures and govern by computer referendum, in which case "organization of the electorate" would be left to interest groups or no one.

9. The St. Laurent Liberals, for example.

10. The Progressive Conservatives, under Diefenbaker and Grosart, for example.

11. The Creditistes, for example.

Conditions of Innovation.

Lowi argues that "in a party system, innovation is a function of the minority party."[12] He does not exclude the majority party absolutely from an innovative role, but argues that innovation is more likely to come from the "out" party, provided that party is close enough to being "in" to think experiment might win office yet not so close as to fear experiment would lose it. The logic is evident. Parties "in" office, and therefore themselves part of the societal status quo, will not be inclined naturally to heed or harbour people who would change an equilibrium of which the parties are part; and parties trying to change the status quo at least to the point of replacing an incumbent government with themselves should be more attracted to, or at least less repelled by, proponents of change in society at large.

The first proposition--that incumbency "consolidates"--is easy to accept. Even then, however, certain parties might be innovative in office longer than others; for example, a British Labour government, both because of its long experience in Opposition and its relative (and related?) attractiveness to radical or reform elements, is

12. Lowi, op cit, p. 571.

more likely to be more "naturally" innovative than a Tory government.[13] In addition, we are now in a phase, which might prove prolonged, in which groups which consider themselves disadvantaged are bringing public pressure for change upon government, thus making consolidation more difficult.

The second proposition is more tenuous. Lowi himself suggests two conditions in which a two-party system--and more particularly the minority party--will not be innovative: when the party doesn't have to be, or when it thinks it can't afford to be. The first condition occurs when the "parties rest heavily upon an earlier but now outmoded set of cleavages"[14]--in other words, a system where party competition is determined by the cleavages remaining from former political generations may offer no option or appeal to a contemporary electorate. Lowi argues that, in such situations, real conflict tends to bypass the parties and seek other routes of access to

13. After a little more time has passed, it will be useful to test this assumption against the performance of the Heath government. Innovation is not ideological--eg. it is as innovative to denationalize as to nationalize. If one takes at face value the statements of Mr. Heath and his ministers, they intend a great many changes. Their early action confirms their statements. If the Heath government does prove innovative that will suggest (a) that innovation owes more to a party's experience in Opposition than it owes to party structure, origin or reputed orientation, or (b) that innovation begets counter-innovation.

14. Lowi, op cit, p. 573.

authority or resolution. That would create a particularly disruptive potential if other access routes did not exist or were underveloped. For example, in a political system where organized interest groups are known to be effective and held to be legitimate, as in the United States of America, demands which can find no expression in the party system can seek and reasonably expect expression as an organized interest group. Similarly, in a system with a sophisticated and respected media, as in Great Britain, demands shut out by the parties can be expressed effectively in the press.[15] In Canada, neither the media nor interest groups possess the legitimacy or the influence to serve as effective alternate routes of access to authority or resolution. Where the parties are unable[16] or unwilling[17] to accommodate new demands, those demands find expression outside the system.[18]

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15. It would be interesting to compare the campaign of the opponents of the Common Market in Britain, whose spokesmen include The New Statesman, among other influential journals, with the campaign of opponents of Bilingualism and Biculturalism, who found little media support beyond Flesherton.

16. As appears to be the condition of the Progressive Conservative and New Democratic parties in Quebec.

17. As appears to be the condition of the federal Liberal party in Quebec.

18. Once in the Creditistes, now in the Parti Quebecois, or the Front de Liberation Quebecois.

The second condition prejudicial to innovation occurs when the parties are

> too well balanced.... When party leaders think their party is within a few percentage points of victory, they are likely to see their rational strategy as one of intensification of existing commitments, tightening of ranks, activation of existing followings. In a sense....there is no incentive for great risk if all that is needed is just a small marginal gain.[19]

A third condition prejudicial to innovation may be suggested. It occurs when significant elements in the minority party don't want to win. It differs from the first condition in that there is here a significant internal disagreement about the appropriate course of the party. The common assumption is that most partisans want to win. There is evidence to suggest that this is not necessarily true in Canada. For one thing, the Canadian party system has been influenced heavily by so-called "parties of principle", some of whose members, however they play the political game, tend to define it in terms of morality rather than power. In addition, one suspects that the strength of sectionalism, and the relative weakness of nationalism in Canada encourage the belief among some partisans that the expression of a sectional view is

19. Ibid., p. 575.

purpose enough for a so-called "national" party.[20] Moreover, in any party there is always the possibility that the party establishment, which is not always synonomous or sympathetic with the party leadership, will be unwilling to risk the personal prerogatives and prominence which they know might be lost in the changes associated with victory.[21] In any event, "out" parties which are within striking distance of office but prefer opposition have no incentive to innovate.

Lowi concludes that innovation is most likely with

> an alternative modified one-party system ...where the second party is a clear minority for several elections...but has a chance...of becoming the majority party and always promises to become so again after eight to twelve years.[22]

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20. That is most clearly the case with the present Creditistes. It is difficult to understand what other view might have motivated some members of the PC federal caucus when they prolonged the flag debate and on some other occasions. While it might have been unconscious, that seems to have been the assumption of the federal Conservative caucus of 1942, from which J. S. Roy, MP for Gaspe, resigned, saying a French-Canadian in the Conservative Party "is and always will be a poor relation."

21. This can happen in at least three ways. The first is a result of federalism and an example, described by E. R. Black in "Federal Strains Within A Canadian Party", Dalhousie Review, Vol. 45, 1965, p. 310, was the Progressive Conservative Party of British Columbia, whose provincial

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED.

leaders were in coalition with a Liberal provincial government while the national leaders vigorously opposed a Liberal national government. The second case can be stated hypothetically, since no researched example comes to mind. It would occur when prominent members of a minority party in a province drew their livelihood or other prerogatives, in whole or in part, from an association with a government to which their party presumably was opposed. The third, and most common, case results from the practice, endemic in parties, of leaving moribund local organizations in the control of demonstrated political incompetents, who are proud to carry the party name but unable to carry it far. Often their most signal contribution to the party would be to leave it.

22. op cit., p. 575.

Lowi explicitly limits his analysis to "the American[23] variant" of party systems. However he adds an obiter dictum: "To include multiple party systems I would probably broaden the formulation to 'the minority second party'."[24] That suggests that party competition is the decisive source of innovation in the party system, in Canada as in the United States. While party competition is an undoubtedly significant factor, the special nature of Canadian political institutions and the Canadian national community provide extra incentives for innovation in and by Canadian parties. In particular, the parliamentary system accentuates the "out" status of the minority party, thereby creating a mentality more conducive to innovation; and the weakness of other "nationalizing" agencies in Canada forces the parties to be more responsive to pressures for change than parties need to be in more integrated communities.

Innovation and the Parliamentary System.

The traditions of the parliamentary system require Canadian Opposition parties to oppose virtually every initiative the Government takes. In the United States,

23. by which he presumably means "United States".

24. op cit, p. 571 fn.

while party divisions are plentiful, there is more cross-party co-operation, and less institutional pressure on the individual legislator to oppose every measure introduced by a member of another party. Indeed, the separation of powers means that the conflict induced by formal institutions is conflict between branches of government, whereas in Canada the confinement of conflict to one institution tends to make conflict partisan. Moreover, in the United States it is possible, in an important sense, for both parties to be "in" government at the same time--one controlling the Presidency, one the Congress. In such circumstances influential leaders of both parties, as architects of current national policy, develop a commitment to that policy and a consequent suspicion of its critics. Whether or not power corrupts, it certainly consolidates. In Canada, some members of a party that is in opposition nationally hold office in a province; that situation has some equivalents in the United States. Naturally that establishes some connection with a status quo and against innovation[25] as, more powerfully, do other socio-economic influences on parties or partisans. Nonetheless the exclusion of the minority

25. It can have the opposite effect. Provincial and federal wings of the same national party have disagreed dramatically in Canada, and a successful provincial party may keep its federal counterpart at arm's length and therefore uninfected by the assumptions of government. E. R. Black, op cit, p. 311, describes that condition as "federal-provincial schizophrenia."

party from authority is an independent influence on innovation, present in Canada, absent from the United States. The participation of the United States minority party in policy-making predisposes that party against innovation from non-official sources. In Canada, the institutional influence is the reverse. The minority Canadian party has nothing to do with official policy except to oppose it. Except in unusual circumstances, of strong personal relations, it is denied the free and frank access to public service collaboration that is available to minority party leaders in the United States. It does not become committed to current policy or assumptions even by the osmosis of friendship nor does it have the prejudicing burden of "insider" information.[26] As a matter of practice it is the role of the Opposition party in Canada to be "against" established policy. That is more than a stance in Parliament; it becomes a habit of mind. Instead of consorting with exponents of existing policy, leaders of Canadian minority parties tend to talk to its critics. Instead of enlisting their

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26. This exclusion from "official" assumptions is mitigated somewhat when a national party in Opposition recruits senior former federal civil servants, as has been the practice of the Liberal party, or provincial premiers, as has been the practice of the Progressive Conservative Party.

intellect in defense of a policy, they direct their attention to its weaknesses. Such parties, when they come to power or when they speak frankly about policy[27] tend not only to be free of many of the assumptions of existing policy, but to be suspicious of them. Their attitude, if not innovative, is at least anti-consolidative.

The initiatives of the Diefenbaker government deserve examination in light of this argument. The critics of that government argue, correctly, that the oppositionist cast of mind of Mr. Diefenbaker and some of his principal colleages and advisors was so strong and persistent that it became arid and destructive, particularly near the end. But the Diefenbaker government undoubtedly changed the country much more than most governments. The Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Act, the emphasis on regional development, the emphasis on social justice in pensions and medicare, the recognition of multi-ethnicity and even the invocation of Canadian identity involved not only a change from existing policy but a challenge of existing assumptions. What was the

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27. That is the case particularly when such parties speak outside Parliament or on Opposition days in Parliament. Regular parliamentary debate is controlled and structured by the government, who determine the order of presentation and, now, the duration of debate of legislation. One consequence is that parliamentary debate tends to focus on the details of disagreement and leave assumptions unexamined.

influence of the Opposition experience upon the inclination to challenge so many ruling governmental assumptions? Would a minority party in the United States, having shared power and therefor its assumptions, have been as inclined to change? Perhaps. Certainly the program adopted in 1933 by the Democratic Party under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt reflected important innovative influences; it was, however, a response to the deepening crisis of Depression[28] which, late the next year, broke the pattern of innovation in Canada too, inspiring an incumbent Prime Minister to turn around his own administration with the "Bennett New Deal." The response to the Depression might indicate that, in Canada as well as in the United States, crisis inspires innovation. What is suggested here is a different implication that, in normal times, the experience of a minority party in parliamentary Opposition has an extra innovative influence that is independent of the stimulus of crisis. It would also be worthwhile to consider, in the context of

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28. Charles A. and Mary R. Beard suggest the New Deal was almost entirely imposed by "financial panic (which)...hit the country with the force of a cyclone" between Roosevelt's election and inauguration. They suggest that, while Roosevelt the campaigner had endorsed specific programs of relief for farmers, the poor and the unemployed, there was no commitment to major reform until crisis forced it. The Beards' New Basic History of the United States, Doubleday and Co., Inc., Garden City, New York, 1960, pp. 422-423.

innovation and consolidation, whether the resentment or surprise of the consolidators at seeing so many of their cherished assumptions rejected, or at least not honoured, rushed the defeat of the Diefenbaker government and the restoration of "normalcy".[29]

The case of the Trudeau government should also be considered in this light, since it is dominated by a single mentality to an even greater degree than was the Diefenbaker government. Such changes of policy the Trudeau government has sought to introduce--relating principally

29. So far, there has been only one serious examination of this theme. George Grant in Lament For A Nation, McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1965, argued (explicitly at page 8 but throughout) that "behind all the stories of arrogance and indecision (of Mr. Diefenbaker), there are conflicts--conflicts over principles. The man had a conception of Canada that threatened the dominant classes. This encounter is the central clue to the Diefenbaker administration." The writer's own conversations with men who were ministers in the Diefenbaker government suggest there was sometimes extraordinary opposition, amounting to obstruction, by senior public servants, when ministers decided to change policy. Certainly there is some significance in the fact that the group Mr. Pearson assembled to oppose and replace the Diefenbaker government drew so heavily upon former senior public servants.

to external, including military, affairs, the conscious development of a French Canadian "federal presence", and the reorganization of Government and Parliament in the name of "efficiency"[30]--are largely personal preferences of the Prime Minister, developed before he came to Parliament and when he considered himself an opponent of the majority party he now leads. It is to the point to speculate how much more widely his reforms might have extended had he been a product of Parliamentary Opposition, and thereby forced to scrutinize critically all aspects of Liberal party policy instead of only those which contested views he had already developed in areas of his personal interest. The outside critic imported into Government, whether a Moynihan or a Trudeau, has only his intellect to illuminate policies needing reform; the Opposition Parliamentarian has, in addition, his institutional experience as a required critic of virtually everything. Balancing this to some degree is the fact that experience in politics and Parliament, like any experience, applies

30. This list excludes tax reform, which any government would have introduced, and the response to inflation and unemployment, the form of which reflects a narrow political experience.

its own blinkers[31] which may shut out a reality which is apparent to critics unencumbered by this institutional involvement.

National Integration and Innovation.

> In a country lacking a strong national political culture and the institutions fostering it, political parties have a special role to play as agencies for the creation of national symbols, experiences, memories, heroes and villains, not to mention national favours, benefits and concessions.... An absolutely critical latent function of the party system in Canada is...the role it plays in the development and fostering of a national political culture; it must play a vital role, in fact, in generating support for the regime. So few other institutions do so and, in any event, few are as well suited for this task as the parties.[32]

We should distinguish between "generating support for the regime" and forestalling serious attacks upon it. In Canada the parties do both, but in different ways. They "generate" support by operating nationwide, advancing national figures and (whenever possible) national myths, generally connecting the country. They forestall attack by seeking out discontent and expressing it within the system, leaving the aggrieved less cause to seek redress outside the system. In Canada, no other institution performs either function as consistently as the parties perform both.

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31. "...the (Progressive Conservative) party acted in government as if it were still in opposition." John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties", Party Politics in Canada, 2nd edition, edited by Hugh G. Thorburn, Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967, p. 38.

32. Meisel, op cit, p. 34.

Every community, to be effective, must have some means to remind its inhabitants regularly that they are part of a community. That is particularly important, and difficult, in a country that is geographically large and dissimilar, with scattered population, uneven economic conditions and more than one active language and conscious culture. Political parties in any country generally play some role as informal "nationalizing" agents. In other democracies, however, the party system is only one of several agents active in developing a sense of community--along with some or all of the media, national economic institutions, national universities and intelligentsia, a common sense of history, a common religion, a common language and other unifying forces. The parties are leading actors only occasionally as, for example, during elections. Otherwise the parties only augment the dominant nationalizing role of other dynamic institutions, or give life to inherently nationalizing institutions like legislatures or administrations. In Canada the other nationalizing institutions are weak relative to their counterparts in other countries; therefore the parties, which are unique institutions in being dynamic, decentralized and nationwide, assume an

unusually prominent and persistent role as nationalizing agents. Quite probably, the national political parties are the single most important active agent of national unity and purpose in Canada. In any event, the absence or incapacity of other normally nationalizing agents leave Canadian parties with a larger share of that role than parties in other democracies.

The problem is complicated in Canada by the fact that many of the agents which in other countries would perform a nationalizing function perform a regionalizing function in Canada. The reputation of Canadian "big business" as being concentrated and interested only in Toronto and Montreal has contributed significantly to regional resentments and therefore a feeling of "anti-national community" in Quebec, Western Canada and the Atlantic region. Virtually all Canadian newspapers are seriously parochial, some proudly so. With notable exceptions, the Canadian intellectual community, when it addresses public problems, is preoccupied with international questions or, as in Quebec, with the assertion of a particularism which is anti-national in its effect. Much popular culture is similarly anti-national, reflecting either continental standards which obscure or frustrate

distinctive Canadian expression, or separatist sentiment which attacks it. Indeed, one distinctive feature of the Canadian party system is the frequency and strength of regional parties, or regional caucuses within national parties, which foster and feed upon particularist anti-national feeling. It is, however, significant that the only regional parties to endure have been those which won power in a province, as did Social Credit and the Union Nationale, or consciously rejected a regional accent, as has the CCF/NDP.

That is because it is in the necessary nature of parties, as it is not in the necessary nature of other agencies, to seek the broadest possible active base. Parties exist to win power--that is their elemental organizing purpose--and if they are to achieve the goal of power, and keep it, political parties have to seek support all the time, in all the country--every region, culture and occupation. On the other hand, a business can find profit, an intelligentsia succour, a newspaper circulation, a public servant security and even challenge, with a much more specific clientele. Even if these other agencies have the capacity to be "national" they lack the incentive the parties have.

It must be added that the parties themselves do not always feel or respond to that incentive. When one party is firmly established, and its opponents are scattered or weak, the majority party tends to become indifferent to particular grievances and the minority parties find themselves, or are found, ineffective. In the long-run, once-established parties have been brought down as a consequence of grievances which, while they might have been articulated badly at their origin, accumulated against the Government party.[33] Imbalance has contained the seeds of its own correction, insofar as party alternation is concerned.[34] That is rather like acclaiming an operation to remove a lung by saying that the surgeon's cut has healed. The important test is the health of the organism, its capacity to continue. The removal of a lung is a doctor's last resort; he would prefer to diagnose the disease earlier and stop it immediately, because the later operation, while it may prolong life, nonetheless leaves the organism weakened. Persons concerned to improve or recast the

33. That seems to have been the case in New Brunswick in 1952 and 1970, Nova Scotia in 1956 and 1970, Canada in 1970.

34. That may change according to observers including Professor Meisel, (op cit, p. 36) who argue that enough groups with grievances are going around the parties that they are marking out an alternative path.

Canadian party system must recognize that the present system too often diagnoses too late, or is satisfied too easily that the wounds seem healed though the organism is weakened. However, the point this paper seeks to emphasise is that, however imperfectly the parties function, they are the only agencies which have it in their nature to seek out dis-ease in every part of the Canadian political system and to propose responses which would keep the system whole.

Innovation is the other side of the coin of that function. While some partisans innovate out of conviction, parties innovate out of necessity. As the medical profession would be nothing without illness, the political parties would be nothing without grievances. They need grievances to grow and perform best when they seek and express instances of neglect and injustice and proposals for improvement. The parties seldom originate either the grievances or the reform--innovation is not invention; their function is to carry grievance or reform from its source into the system. In Canada, where no other agency consistently shares that function and where the system is too fragile to survive ruptures of serious grievance, the innovative role of the party is particularly critical.

Misleading Foreign Models.

That characteristic has not been emphasised adequately by students of Canadian politics. Indeed, that reality has been obscured by the inclination to apply foreign models and descriptions to the Canadian party system. For example, the term "brokerage" might describe the function of the national parties in the United States, but that is a society with a remarkable and unusual tradition of self-assertion which encourages the statement of grievances, and a national perspective which causes the aggrieved to seek their response from Washington. It is far too passive a description of the Canadian process where national parties, when they function as parties, must go out and dig up the issues, or at least strive to identify them as deserving a national response. And the "missionary" of the "missionary" party is a Mormon, not a Jesuit; Canadian theology encompasses living with pagans. The application to Canada of the continental European distinction between "mass" and "cadre" parties is even more misleading.[35] Among other effects, it has drawn attention away from distinctive attributes of the Canadian party system which make that system unusually innovative.

FOOTNOTE

35. Professors F. C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz employ the "mass-cadre" distinction explicitly and carefully in Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure, Prentice-Hall of Canada Limited, 1967, pp. 133-136. The distinction as they use it is based on (a) a difference in source of funds, by which one type of party is said to rely almost exclusively upon membership contributions while the other also has significant contributions from other sources; (b) a difference in the role of party members, in which one type of party is said to generate and rely upon the extensive personal participation of members while the other relies upon professionals and party bureaucrats; and (c) the stated commitment of the CCF, Social Credit, Progressive and farmer parties to principles of mass or direct democracy.

To take each basis in turn: (a) Sources of party finance continue to be an area of mystery in Canadian politics. Collectors for the major parties insist on secrecy and critics of the major parties assume, or at least argue, that anything secret must be both improper and remunerative. There has been very little evidence of impropriety, despite diligent inquiry, and, in the experience of the writer, no evidence at all that this secret system pays. The Progressive Conservative Party, at least, lives in the red. By the same token, the NDP and Social Credit have long since abandoned an exclusive reliance upon voluntary contributions by members. The only factors which keep this "distinction" alive are the stubborn insistence on secrecy of major party collectors, and the suspicions or propaganda of their critics. (b) While all Canadian parties rely heavily on professionals there is no doubt that parties claimed to be of the "mass" type have been successful more consistently in mobilizing their supporters. That is more likely a function of campaign style than of party type. What excites membership activity is the prospect of change not the nature of party organization. The index of membership activity was probably as high in the Progressive Conservative party of 1958 and the Liberal party of 1968 as it was in the Saskatchewan CCF of 1944 or Social Credit in Alberta in 1935. Parties described as being of the "mass" type maintain a relatively high index because they state their electoral goals more dramatically and achieve them more rarely than other parties. Apart from that, in an era when professionals are in every party headquarters and democracy is in every

Non-parliamentary influences in Canadian parties have been strong since before Confederation; individuals and factors outside Parliament have been consistently influential upon all Canadian parties, whatever their particular origin or ideology. All Canadian national parties are "cadre" in that the influence of their parliamentary members and permanent employees occurs more frequently than the influence of groups or individuals for whom the party is not a full-time occupation; and all national parties are "mass membership" to the important degree that significant influences come regularly and transforming influences come occasionally from sources associated with the party but outside its

FOOTNOTE CONTINUED

party constitution, there is no significant distinction in the relative roles of members. (c) The stated commitment continues, and continues to beguile.

Professors Engelmann and Schwartz admit that "mass-party reality has suffered" (p. 136). The competitive Canadian parties are structurally much the same, despite different origins and advertisements.

parliamentary or staff personnel.[36]

The country is federal in law, which means that as many as ten other caucuses can intrude on the authority of the federal parliamentary caucus to act in the name of the party. That leaves aside the question of the authority, in theory and in fact, of defeated candidates, elected officers and other non-parliamentary officials of Canadian national parties who, as a class, show much less of the "deference" to leadership which Robert McKenzie describes as a source of power of parliamentary leadership in Britain.[37]

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36. The most dramatic recent example of a transforming influence was the decision of the annual meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada in 1966 to hold a leadership convention despite the evident reluctance of the incumbent to resign. As significant has been the persistent influence of groups which contest an official party position and draw their support if not their leadership from outside caucus--eg. the groups associated with Walter Gordon, Dalton Camp and Melville Watkins in the Liberal, Progressive Conservative and NDP parties respectively. When politics is competitive, parties in Canada are remarkably open. Witness the rise of Mr. Trudeau, the introduction of critical path planning into the office of the Premier of Alberta, the ability of Mrs. Walker-Sawka to contest the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative party, the ease with which anyone with a thousand friends can secure the federal or provincial nomination of a major party. There are not the characteristics of a closed system or a "cadre" party. They deserve more attention.

37. Robert McKenzie, British Political Parties, Heineman Group of Publishers, London, 1963, p. 638.

The country is also federal in fact which means that a much broader variety of interests must be served, and be seen to be served, than in a more homogenous community. In a pluralist country like Canada, with a small Parliament and an electoral system generally weighted against minorities, parties would wither if they listened only to their parliamentary caucus or the loyal constellations around caucus;[38] in fact, they have remained dynamic by extending consistently beyond the caucus.

All national parties have been most successful in holding or seeking power when they have appeared to be most broadly based, and least successful when they have withdrawn to their "cadre". Of the ten national leaders chosen by the three present national parties in the last three decades, only Mr. Meighen, Mr. Coldwell and Mr. Diefenbaker came principally from the parliamentary caucus. The three most recent Liberal Prime Ministers have all been drawn, more or less directly, from outside the long-established leadership "cadre" of the Liberal party, if not from outside the party itself.[39] During

38. Dalton Camp describes the gathering of limited counsel in chapter 11 of Gentlemen, Players and Politicians, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1970.

39. All of them served a period of apprenticeship, but with exalted status, and the persuasive epaulets were won by Mr. St. Laurent at the bar and in the province of Quebec, by Mr. Pearson in international public service and Mr. Trudeau at Cite Libre and in the academy. MacKenzie King, as someone said, was sui generis.

the last five decades the three prairie provinces have been governed by parties which began as "mass movements" and maintained the legitimacy of at least the idea of "direct democracy" by continuing to describe themselves as movements not parties;[40] in fact all the provinces outside the Atlantic region have been governed in their short history by parties which conceived, or advertised, themselves as rising "from the people".[41] Open national convention, not a "magic circle" has been the means since 1919 of selecting the national leader of the most successful national party, and since 1927 of its major competitor, and there is no evidence that these conventions have been bossed in the manner of United States presidential nominating conventions.[42] There have been bitter quarrels and frequent periods of coolness[43]

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40. In Alberta since 1921, the United Farmers of Alberta and Social Credit; in Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1964, the CCF; in Manitoba from 1922 to 1959, the Progressives and Liberal-Progressives, and now the NDP.

41. The United Farmers of Ontario governed Ontario from 1919 to 1923. The Union Nationale was markedly populist in its origins.

42. See Donald Smiley, "The National Party Leadership Conventions in Canada: A Preliminary Analysis", reprinted in The Canadian Political Process, Holt Rinehart and Winston of Canada Limited, 1970, edited by Orest Kruhlak, Richard Schultz and Sidney Pobihushchy.

43. See E. R. Black, "Federal Strains" etc., op cit.

between national and provincial leaders of the same party, and these differences are of more significance than in a federation with more parts; a provincial premier or leader has more authority as one of ten than he would as one of, say, fifty-one.

This is not the occasion to make the case that Canadian national parties in fact have not been controlled by a powerful parliamentary group, and do not fit the "cadre" party model. However, the above phenomena are prima facie evidence that Canadian national parties, as a type, are characteristically more open and responsive than "cadre" parties; that is a characteristic of all Canadian national parties and of the Canadian party system. The parliamentary party, as the only element professionally in national affairs, has taken most of the decisions in the case of every party; that is not as significant, however, as the fact that, on matters perceived to be important, the authority of the caucus, and the authority of the cadre when they are different, is always assailable, often successfully. The people who challenge the caucus or cadre sometimes possess their own prominence in the party, either as officials or personalities. However, research would almost certainly yield evidence of important challenges by people

previously anonymous in the party. Certainly there have been several cases where the challenge has been sustained only by the support of people without party office or reputation.[44] By itself, that reveals a disposition to challenge, an assumption that the established leadership can be both accessible and wrong. The strength of extra-parliamentary groups in every party is so established now in Canada that no parliamentary party can be confident it will prevail in a contest. No leadership can assume it can command support. That is significant not simply as a means of distinguishing the Canadian party system, but because that greater openness and responsiveness condition Canadian national parties to welcome innovation.

Professor Donald Smiley has suggested two more serviceable adjectives to distinguish between the two major types of party operating in Canada: an "inclusive" party seeks support everywhere; an "exclusive" party is more particular.[45] Obviously "inclusion" is not

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44. For example, the "reassessment" of the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party of 1966, the rejection of cabinet policy on welfare reform and foreign investment by the Liberal party conference of 1970, the "Waffle".

45. Donald Smiley "Consensus, Conflict and the Canadian Party System", Canadian Forum, v. 40, January 1961, pp. 223-224.

synonomous with innovation. There are kinds of inclusion--such as co-optation, where groups are adopted but their goals are abandoned--which are anti-innovative. A good example of consolidative inclusion was the practice of both major Canadian parties, for as long as it worked, of including French Canadians in high government office as a means to avoid responding to the country's cultural duality. To a degree, however, the very act of looking for conflicts and constituencies to "include" is innovative, because it forces an awareness of unfamiliar reality; in addition, once co-optation has occurred, the co-opted can change the nature of the party. Anywhere there is competition among inclusive parties, the constituent being wooed has leverage in demanding a change and resisting co-optation.

However, with "exclusion" and "inclusion" Professor Smiley is making the traditional sort of distinction which, read in terms of result rather than motive, is between parties of victory and parties of defeat. He notes:

> With few lapses, the successful leaders of our major parties have striven for tolerance and compromise when more "righteous" men (Brown, Bourassa, Meighen, Woodsworth) have tried to stimulate the divisive forces among us.[46]

46. Ibid., p. 224.

So the "exclusive" party could as well be called "the party which doesn't work". Perhaps if we must borrow foreign terms, we could call it the Edsel. The important question is whether the "exclusive" parties function to create a system which doesn't work. The current conventional wisdom is that multi-partyism is natural to the Canadian system, and is the only way to ensure representation of diversity. The conventional argument also runs that the CCF, for example, by its devotion to its mission, "forced" the adoption of goals that would otherwise have been ignored. In practice, that is not an argument but a canon, and deserves as much skeptical examination as any other article of faith.[47] Is it in fact aimless to speculate whether Mackenzie King might have been just as progressive without J. S. Woodsworth? How much more progressive might King have been had Woodsworth sat beside him in his cabinet, as an insistent colleague rather than an untrusted adversary? How much more responsive might the Government of Canada have been in the 1940s and 1950s had the CCF not split the vote against Mackenzie King? It is conventionally argued that the

47. There is a disturbing odour of self-justification about arguments that the multi-party model is natural and necessary in Canada. It is true that a multiplicity of parties has happened; it is far from certain whether this multiplicity has helped improve either politics or government, or whether it would survive without the defamation of the major parties by conventional and popular "authorities".

CCF brought conscience into politics, and thereby made morality irresistible. It can be argued, from the same facts, that by associating "conscience" with a permanent minority, the CCF made morality irrelevant. Indeed, anyone familiar with partisans knows that the surest way to give a good idea a bad name is to have it advocated by an opponent. It is not at all fanciful to suggest that the wearing of Charity like a banner by the CCF made the government more mean. At the least, the enemies of reform could disarm advocates of reform by accusing them of sympathy with socialism. If one accepts the possibility that the CCF, and the multi-party model, have made a negative contribution to the Canadian system, there is one other dimension to examine, the consequences of splitting the vote against the Government. Only in the general election of 1940 did the King-St. Laurent party win more than 50% of the popular vote. If most of the CCF and Social Credit vote was anyway anti-Liberal (and it probably wasn't) the third parties perpetuated Mackenzie King.[48] The matter is raised only because academic fealty to the multi-party model needs to be shaken before there can be a proper appreciation of the role and frequency of innovation in competitive major national parties.

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48. There was considerable assistance from the Progressive Conservatives of course, but that party might have become more progressive and competitive had it been the only beneficiary of grievances against the Liberals.

Innovation Within Parties

Before parties can propose innovations in the larger system, they often must approve them internally. As institutions, parties are probably more amenable to innovation than most organizations. They are open by nature. Samuel Eldersveld, after his study of parties in Michigan, argues that parties are "potential-clientele-conscious". At their base they are usually looking for recruits. And they are open to new people or proposals "at the higher levels also, indeed sometimes at the elite apex, if such a strategy will profit the party's power aspirations."[49] Innovation is a marginal concern of organizations with a limited clientele. It is the central concern of organizations, like parties, which must grow to survive; minority parties must grow to become majorities, and majority parties must grow to counter that attrition of support bases usually associated with holding office.

Just as the nature of the party role causes leaders to seek innovation, the nature of party membership probably makes party workers more inclined to accept innovation than are members of other organizations. For one thing, the party worker tends to share the party

49. Samuel Eldersveld, Political Parties; A Behavioral Analysis, Rand, McNally and Co., Chicago, 1964, p. 5.

leader's interest in victory, and to approve changes which seem directed towards that goal. As significant as this positive encouragement of innovation is a negative factor. Most partisans belong to other groups more salient or important to them than their party. James Q. Wilson has hypothesised that a "voluntary organization with broad diffuse goals (typically associated with relatively low salience) will adapt more readily to environmental changes than will organizations with narrow, precisely stated goals (typically associated with high salience)."[50] Partisans will accept quite major changes without much fuss because, in effect, they don't care enough to complain; besides, it might help defeat their opponents.[51] This hypothesis, if true, does of course raise important questions about the capacity for innovation of a party of "principles" where salience to members is probably higher and responsiveness or adaptation consequently more difficult.

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50. James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Towards a Theory", Approaches to Organizational Design, James D. Thompson, (ed.), University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1966, p. 210.

51. One remembers how few Progressive Conservatives became incensed when Mr. Diefenbaker grew suspicious of nuclear weapons, and how few Liberals when Mr. Pearson became fond of them.

Just as there are obstacles to innovation in the larger system, usually located in the institutions served or shaped by the status quo, so are there obstacles within the parties, often among their most institutionalized elements, including the parliamentary caucus. As argued above, a party will not be innovative when it thinks it does not have to be, or cannot afford to be, or when some of its influential members don't want to win. Generally, resistance to innovation is deliberate, not accidental. Eldersveld's study, among others, shows us that a party is not a monolith but a coalition of different people with different goals. Generally, although not always, they share the goal of wanting victory; even then there is a tension between that common goal and diverse competing goals of individual advantage, influence or ideology. Usually those conflicts can be resolved; politicians tend to be flexible because their work is conciliation and bargaining, although regionalism and ideology in Canada are factors which sometimes encourage inflexibility in some partisans. Even though they are flexible, politicians, like most people, react suspiciously towards anything that seems a personal threat, whether to their interests or values or those of their constituents. By its nature,

innovation often does seem such a threat, and so does the source of innovation. The source of innovation is a particular problem for Members of Parliament who tend to regard the proposal of party policy as an exclusive domain of those party members who have to defend what is proposed in Parliament or before the press or constituents. Reluctant to cede any part of that role to any other group, the initial inclination of Members of Parliament is sometimes to reject proposals which arise outside their ranks. Occasionally, since caucuses, like all groups, have factions, their first inclination is also to reject proposals of certain of their colleagues. Very often creative members of a party--even if they have managed to win public election--come to be regarded as eccentric by their colleagues. The people best able to propose innovation are often those least able to legitimize it. In the larger society, that legitimizing function can be performed by the parties, which are regarded as familiar, if not safe, by most of the elements suspicious of change.[52] The process of legitimizing

52. "Voters tend simply to follow their respective parties on policy positions as on other matters." Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, p. 272. As significantly, when parties don't embody objections to change those objections have rarely been influential.

innovative proposals within the party may well be more difficult; although the parties, as competitive bodies seeking power, have an incentive to welcome change which the larger society generally does not.

Innovation in the Larger System.

The "legitimizing" role is the major contribution of parties to the process of innovation in the larger society. As argued previously, parties occupy a busy isthmus, connecting the formal institutions with the mass of interests and individuals seeking attention. The parties have an obvious capacity to transmit a demand from the public directly to the center of an institution, and they have a constant incentive to use that capacity. Within the public, they enjoy a semi-institutional status, related directly to their capacity to get action on a demand more quickly than any other agent. It has been argued that there is a decline in the importance of the party in this process. Professor John Meisel has written:

> (Canadian party) policies have become extremely bland, so as to antagonize the smallest possible number of people... not only in the traditionally center parties but even among most of the more ideologically inclined and more extreme parties. As a result the task of formulating new ideas, creating institutional "homes" for their development and propagation is no longer being performed by the parties on

> the same scale as before. Innovation, in this sense, has become the business not even of minor parties but of youth groups, temporary ideological groups emerging in response to particular crisis, or pressure groups pursuing a particular interest. To the extent, therefore, that parties have formerly played an important role in the process of innovation, their role is being taken over by less partisan and often less permanent bodies.[53]

Whatever the consequences for the parties and the system of a movement away from ideology or towards timidity, it has not diminished, and certainly need not diminish, the role of the party as a legitimizer of innovation. Certainly other agencies exist, more plentifully than before. But their influence upon innovation is that they originate or popularize proposals for change; the part of social innovation which requires formal adaptation--the vital second stage of innovation--still relies heavily upon the public service and the parties, which are unique in the permanence and nature of their connection with the institutions capable of authorizing adaptation. Parties have rarely been the original source of proposals for change, or even of the pioneer pressures to change; those have almost always come from outside

53. Meisel, op cit, p. 36.

the parties, and the party role arose after invention had been done and attention had been won. The processes Professor Meisel notes are no doubt in train. Some of these new bodies may well develop a more-or-less formal capacity to force or channel adaptation; and all no doubt have some influence upon public opinion, and thus an indirect and informal influence on change. But it is premature to suggest that they have supplanted the role of the parties in achieving adaptation in the political system. The increased cry for change, rather than diminishing the role of the party as innovator, can as easily increase it; the party can achieve changes which "less partisan and often less permanent bodies" can only propose, and the parties are under the pressure of knowing that if they fail, without a substitute succeeding, the regime is endangered.

The Policy Conference Focus.

This study is especially concerned to consider one means by which innovation becomes effective within major Canadian national parties. The ideal means is to have an innovator as leader since the Canadian party leader possesses an institutional authority far

stronger than that of any other individual or formal position in the party. While national party leaders in Canada have been innovators far more often than not, they can turn their authority against innovation. Other sources are necessary, to augment the influence upon innovation of the leader in good times, to oppose it in bad. In practice, these other sources range from the habit of all parties to describe their own past as uniquely innovative through to dramatic ministerial resignation or insurrection. The greatest incidence of innovation is probably achieved by party professionals, whether oriented to policy or organization, who virtually constantly urge or cause the party to move to meet new opportunities; whether innovation from this source is as significant as it is frequent is an important question too large for this paper to pursue. The focus here is upon the phenomenon of party policy conferences, which have been undertaken by both the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties precisely to perform an innovative function, and which have no counterpart in any other party system. Policy conferences do not necessarily have more weight as innovators than other agents. The conference

phenomenon is chosen solely because it is a concrete and convenient example of the innovative function in the parties and, through the parties, in society.

Theoretically, policy conferences can be sources of innovation in a party in five ways. (1) The most direct would be for a conference to actually propose a specific new policy or change in policy in terms which the party could not ignore. (2) A second would be to turn public and party attention upon innovative people or points of view which had existed within the party but without adequate publicity. The role of the conference in such circumstances would be to strengthen the position of existing innovators inside the party. (3) A third would be to focus party and public attention upon innovative people or points of view which had developed outside the party. In such circumstances, the policy conference would be a bridge by which an issue would cross into a part of the system where authoritative responses are formed. (4) By bringing together individuals from such different realms as a parliamentary caucus and a University faculty, for example, a policy conference could encourage co-operation and understanding which would

be innovative subsequently. (5) Finally, a policy conference could serve as a sign of open-ness which could attract to party activity individuals whose experience or personality would make them innovators as partisans. As will be indicated, conferences in fact innovate in all five ways.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCES

This chapter will examine the organization of five policy conferences, those held by a group of Conservatives at Port Hope in 1942, by the National Liberal Federation at Kingston in 1960, and by the Progressive Conservative Association at Fredericton in 1964, Montmorency in 1967 and Niagara Falls in 1969. Each conference was an extraordinary function of the sponsoring party and each was dedicated exclusively to the consideration of national policy.

While they can be considered together, as policy conferences, each of the five meetings had significant distinctive characteristics. This study will consider only those differences which related to innovation. Clearly the conferences deserve more extensive treatment. Each, in its way, travelled uncharted ground and, taken together, they are a Canadian phenomenon, without root or counterpart in the United States federation or British parliamentary democracy. Regrettably, such full treatment is beyond the compass of this study which seeks only to illuminate the relation between the conferences and innovation in the sponsoring party. The descriptions below will emphasise the organization of each conference.

1942: Port Hope.

The conference at Port Hope, Ontario, September 5 to 7, 1942 was described as "A Round Table on Canadian Policy Convened by a Group of Conservatives."[54] It was attended by 159 persons from all provinces except Prince Edward Island, although more than half the delegates were from Ontario.[55] While most of those attending were known supporters of the Conservative party, there was a deliberate[56] and successful attempt to ensure the participation of representatives of

54. Major sources concerning Port Hope: Partial records of the Port Hope conference, including a list of participants, are in the library of the Progressive Conservative National Headquarters in Ottawa. In addition, Hon. J. M. Macdonnell, a moving spirit in the conference as in so much of the positive work of his party, wrote "Amateurs in Politics" The Queens Quarterly, volume 49, 1964, pp. 385-393. Hon. Richard A. Bell prepared a private memorandum "A Review of the 1942 Port Hope Conference" for the party library. There is also useful reference to the conference in Arthur Meighen: No Surrender, volume three of the biography by Roger Graham, Clarke Irwin and Co., Ltd., 1965 and The Politics of Survival, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967 by J. L. Granatstein. Valuable additional information was provided this writer in correspondence from Hon. Donald M. Fleming and Hon. Richard A. Bell. As well as providing factual information otherwise unavailable, these gentlemen provided a sense of the atmosphere in which the Port Hope Conference was called and held.

55. That was due to the cost of travel, which was borne by each participant, and to the restrictions of wartime. Mr. Bell has reminded the writer that airlines were unavailable for domestic travel and that "travel at that time at all...could only be for essential purposes."

56. "...if we are able, as we hope, to gather together say 150 men and women from across Canada, some of whom will have been active party workers in the past

agriculture, labour and the universities. There was also a deliberate involvement of younger people and others chosen with a view to future rather than past service to the party.[57] Most notably, it was decided by the committee planning the conference[58] that the presence of Conservative Members of Parliament or of the legislatures might give the impression that conference conclusions were official party policy,[59]

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and other men and women who are now for the first time taking an interest in politics...including among them leaders in agriculture and labour organizations...it will be a signal...that the Conservative Party stands for something that commands the allegiance of a wide diversity of people." Memorandum Covering the Aims of the Port Hope Meeting, September 1, 1942, by R. K. Finlayson, corresponding secretary, page 2.

57. Finlayson, Memorandum, op cit.

58. A representative national committee was struck comprising H. R. Milner from Alberta, R. H. Tupper from British Columbia, L. D. H. Baxter from Manitoba, Hugh Mackay from New Brunswick, J. M. Macdonnell from Ontario, W. Chester S. McClure from Prince Edward Island, J. C. H. Dussault from Quebec and Arthur Moxon from Saskatchewan, with R. K. Finlayson as organizer and secretary. Mr. Finlayson had been private secretary to Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett and had helped write the speeches proposing the Bennett New Deal. In fact, most of the decisions were taken by a working committee, based in Toronto, headed by Macdonnell, and consisting of Macdonnell, Finlayson, Donald Fleming, Roland Michener, Dana Porter, David J. Walker and, later, Cecil Frost and Fred Gardiner. The working committee members were identified by Mr. Fleming, in correspondence.

59. That was the official reason for excluding MPs. Another reason is suggested in a letter of August 28, 1942,

or otherwise inhibit the discussion. Only one senator[60], one member of a provincial legislature[61], and no Members of Parliament attended. Many of the delegates were prominent in party and public affairs in the various

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from Cecil Frost to George White, MP: "I am informed that none of the Dominion or Provincial members are being asked for the reason that although the convenors were most anxious to have the younger members, they were afraid to ask everyone."

60. Senator G. B. Jones, of New Brunswick, apparently invited because it was virtually inconceivable to New Brunswick Conservatives to hold any kind of conference without him. Mr. Bell describes the late Senator Jones as "the most politically-minded character I ever met" which, from that source, is fortissimo praise.

61. G. S. Thorvaldson, then MLA, of Winnipeg, was a confidante of both Rod Finlayson and Dr. Sidney Smith, then president of the University of Manitoba, who prepared the final conference report. There is also some indication that a second conference planning committee was established in Winnipeg, connecting through Finlayson with the Toronto group. The writer has been unable to verify this possibility, but if such a group existed, Thorvaldson would have been active in it.

provinces, and several subsequently became members of legislatures, Parliament, cabinet and other public bodies.

The conference occurred at a time when the Conservative party seemed as near to extinction as it ever has. The federal election of 1940 had been decisively lost. The only Conservative elected from a French-Canadian constituency in that election had quit the party to sit as an independent.[62] The Conservative party did not hold office in a single province. The Right Honourable Arthur Meighen had been defeated in his attempt to return to Parliament, in the by-election in South York. The uncertainty over the leadership and the virtual veto power of "traditionalists" in caucus and around Mr. Meighen immobilized reform elements in the parliamentary caucus.[63] The CCF, which had won the federal seat of South York was confident it would subsequently form

62. J. S. Roy, of Gaspe, said in Parliament a French Canadian in the Conservative party "...is at best a tolerated stranger...he is and always will be a poor relation." Quoted in Granatstein, op cit, p. 88.

63. Members of caucus knew "the Conservative party had to be reorganized and provided with new policies... (but) Meighen could control caucus and block or delay its attempts to draft new policies." Granatstein, op cit, p. 125.

the government of Ontario and become the principal alternative to the federal Liberal party of Mackenzie King. It was this very bleak prospect for the Conservative party which caused the Port Hope Conference to be called. A small group of private though prominent Toronto Conservatives[64] decided that some extraordinary measure was required to invigorate the party.[65] Since Port Hope was the seminal conference, it is worth inquiring why practical political men, facing crisis in their party, would choose a policy conference, and not some other instrument, as their means of response. In the view of the Honourable R. A. Bell

> ...Jim Macdonnell and the others... believed that the survival of the Party depended upon the enunciation of distinctive policies. The cult of leadership had been tried and found wanting. As well there was the natural revulsion during the war period to pinning the hopes of people upon leadership. Hitler and Mussolini were the reasons that we were fighting a war. If a political party was to

64. Macdonnell, Fleming, Michener, Porter and Walker. They became, respectively, a privy councillor and perhaps the most respected parliamentary Conservative of his day; the minister of finance and of justice for Canada and twice a candidate for the national leadership of his party; a Member of Parliament and Governor General; an MPP, Cabinet Minister and Chief Justice of Ontario; minister of public works for Canada and a member of the Senate.

65. "...the Party was in a state of decline following the shock of the crushing defeat of Arthur Meighen...

> survive it must survive by reason of its ideas and its philosophy... It must be remembered that (Macdonnell) had tried another technique of restoring the Party, namely of holding private meetings of financial groups in Montreal and Toronto in the previous year and a few dollars had been raised but little else accomplished...there was an upsurge at this particular period of belief in political philosophy as a melding force. The philosophies of communism and socialism were on the upgrade, internationally and domestically, and the belief clearly was that there ought to be enunciated a genuine philosophy of individual enterprise. On this basis it seemed that the only type of project which could be chosen would be a conference related primarily to policy and one which sprang from the reasonably intelligent rank and file rather than from the leaders.[66]

J. M. Macdonnell discussed the proposal with R. B. Hanson, the parliamentary house leader, and a group in Winnipeg as well as Toronto.[67] Only when the national committee was being established, and after the

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in February, 1942... Throughout the balance of the winter and the spring of 1942 we held regular weekly meetings, thinking through both questions of policy and matters relating to the future of the Party. We came to the conclusion that the survival of the Party was at stake. Gradually the idea took root that a National Conference was required..." Hon. Donald M. Fleming, correspondence with the writer.

66. Correspondence with the writer.

67. According to Granatstein, who interviewed Macdonnell, Macdonnell met in Winnipeg with Finlayson, E. G. Phipps Baker, Dr. Sidney Smith, G. S. Thorvaldson, all of Winnipeg, and H. R. Milner of Edmonton. Politics of Survival, op cit, p. 127.

decision had been firmly taken to organize a policy conference, was the matter raised with the party leader. Mr. Meighen agreed not to oppose the conference.[68] While the conference at no time claimed to speak for the party,[69] a memorandum to delegates expressed the expectation that the conference would "enunciate principles which will make clear to the public that those attending...are fully conscious of the problems of the world of 1942 and are prepared to meet them."[70]

68. Mr. Meighen wrote that Macdonnell "informed me only after some A1 men refused to take part unless it had my approval. I told him simply that I would raise no objection." Letter to T. R. Meighen, September 12, 1942, T. R. Meighen Papers, quoted in Graham, No Surrender, p. 140.

69. The foreword of the Report of the Round Table on Canadian Policy read: "This is not a platform. It is a statement of the aims and beliefs subscribed to by a group of Conservatives from coast to coast in unofficial conference at Port Hope...in an effort to formulate a present-day political philosophy in terms of modern needs and the best traditions of the Conservative Party; we accordingly recognize that we do not speak for the Party in any official sense." A copy of this document is in the library of Progressive Conservative National Headquarters.

70. Finlayson, Memorandum, op cit.

1960: Kingston.

The Kingston Conference of the Liberal Party was held September 6 - 12, 1960 at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.[71] Described as a "study conference" directed to Canadians who were liberal in aspiration if not necessarily in party affiliation,[72] it was organized at the request of the party leader, the Honourable Lester B. Pearson, by a committee under the chairmanship of Mitchell Sharp. Mr. Sharp had been an influential senior federal public servant under Liberal governments prior to his resignation after the election of 1958 and, in 1960, was vice-president of a major international corporation operating out of Toronto. Prior to his agreement to chair the Kingston Conference committee he had not been identified publicly as a supporter of any political party. His "sponsoring committee" included persons active in universities, the professions, publishing and business. None of the

71. Major sources concerning Kingston: Correspondence from the Right Hon. Lester B. Pearson and the Hon. Walter L. Gordon provided very helpful answers to questions raised by the writer. In addition the book, The Pearson Phenomenon, Duell, New York, 1964, by John Beal and Jean Marc Poliquin contains some useful references. Although the writer did not have the advantage of partisan association with the principals of this conference, as was the case with the others considered, their response to questions was full and apparently unreserved.

72. "We were anxious that the Conference not be exclusively partisan, with invitations restricted to

committee came from caucus, and none had held influential public position in the party when it formed a government. Some were identifiable as supporters of the Liberal Party but others had no previous party identification.[73] Like the Port Hope Conference, Kingston was neither asked for nor authorized by the National Liberal Federation and officers of the National Federation played as incidental a role in its organization as did officials of caucus. However the national leader, Mr. Pearson, involved himself actively in the Conference preparation. He chose the members of the "sponsoring committee" and, in conjunction with that committee, decided discussion topics, speakers and the selection of conference participants.[74] Participation was by invitation only

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members or supporters of the Party. This, among other things, would allow us to get viewpoints and ideas which were not influenced by partisan considerations." Mr. Pearson, to the writer, January 25, 1971.

73. Members of the "sponsoring committee" were: Geoffrey Andrew, Vancouver; Frank Covert, Halifax; Clifford Curtis, Kingston; Davidson Dunton, Ottawa; H. A. Dyde, Edmonton; Jean-Charles Falardeau, Quebec; Robert Fowler, Montreal; Walter Gordon, Toronto; William Kilbourn, Hamilton; Michael Mackenzie, Toronto (deputy chairman); William F. McLean, Toronto; Jean-Marie Nadeau, Montreal; Hilda Neatby, Saskatoon; Mitchell Sharp, Toronto (chairman); Victor Sifton, Winnipeg; Renauld St. Laurent, Quebec.

74. Mr. Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

and invitations were issued after consideration of particular party or regional factors. No formula of representation was followed. While there was an effort to attract university and labour leaders, the conference was not designed specifically to attract or represent any particular segment of the community. "The main objective was to select people with ideas."[75] Some of the speakers were known to be supporters of other parties[76] and some of the participants subsequently became prominent in another party.[77] The Conference was also the first occasion for public association with the Liberal Party of several of its subsequent leaders.[78] Of the formal speakers, only Mr. Pearson, the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill and Maurice Lamontagne[79] had been formally associated with the previous Liberal government.

Three years before Kingston, the Liberal Party had been defeated, for the first time in 22 years, in an

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75. Mr. Gordon.

76. Professor Frank Underhill, for example.

77. Alf Gleave, Dr. John Young, for example.

78. Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, Jack Davis, C. M. Drury, Otto Lang, Jean Marchand, Maurice Sauve, John Turner, for example.

79. A former advisor to Mr. St. Laurent.

election in which its reputation for arrogance and staleness was an important issue. That defeat was followed by a rout in 1958, in the first election under Mr. Pearson's leadership. By 1960, the parliamentary party was reasonably effective although reminiscent in argument and personnel of the rejected government.[80] Weaknesses had begun to appear in the Diefenbaker government. Those weaknesses combined with Mr. Pearson's strong personal reputation to help generate a limited renaissance in traditional sources of Liberal support in the media, universities and corporations. The conference was designed to demonstrate a vitality in the very fields in which the "old" party had seemed rigid, and to attract new people. "I had very much in mind new ideas, new men, new approaches as I began the process of rebuilding."[81]

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80. Its leading figures were the Hon. Paul Martin, the Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, the Hon. Lionel Chevrier, and Mr. Pearson.

81. Mr. Pearson, correspondence with the writer.

1964: Fredericton

The Fredericton Conference, formally entitled the National Conference on Canadian Goals, was held at Fredericton, New Brunswick, September 9 - 12, 1964.[82] It was organized in response to a unanimous resolution of the annual meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada calling for "A study conference in depth to develop a full and comprehensive program to present to the next Annual Meeting of the Association."[83] The resolution itself was the result of the initiative of various party activists,[84] who by and large were not members of the parliamentary caucus.

The Progressive Conservative party had recently re-entered Opposition after forming the government of Canada for six years, four of them with a commanding majority. The preceding two years had been marked by

82. Major sources concerning Fredericton: The writer was corresponding secretary of the conference and has had the benefit of correspondence with its chairman and organizer Dalton Camp, whose office also made records and clippings available.

83. Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Ottawa, 1964.

84. Several Progressive Conservatives disturbed about the direction and future of the party tended, at that time, to express their concern in policy terms. Some few delegates to the Annual Meeting that year were prepared to oppose the leader directly, but the great majority chose instead to demand a role in policy-making.

serious internal conflict, including the resignation from Cabinet or Parliament of five senior privy councillors[85] and frequent criticism of the leadership by spokesmen of French Canadian, urban and young Progressive Conservatives. It should be noted that at this time, the new president of the national association, Mr. Camp, had neither publicly criticised the leadership nor participated appreciably in internal conflicts concerning policy or personalities. In 1963, he had accepted the invitation of the national leader, Mr. Diefenbaker, to serve as national director of the federal general election campaign and, earlier in 1964 he had been elected unanimously association president.

Preliminary planning of the conference was by members of the executive committee of the Progressive Conservative Association, and subsequent planning by a working committee of eleven members. That committee

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The resolution was moved by E. A. Goodman, and also proposed prominently by Dalton Camp in his uncontested campaign for the Association presidency.

85. Hon. Donald Fleming, Hon. Davie Fulton, Hon. Douglas Harkness, Hon. George Hees, Hon. Pierre Sevigny.

included only one member of the parliamentary caucus, a Senator,[86] the executive secretary of the national headquarters[87] which was at that time an office directly responsible to the national leader[88] and five[89] of the eight executive officers of the national association, including the national president who served as chairman. An office was established in the Toronto business premises of the national president, although much of the physical work was shared with the national party headquarters in Ottawa.

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86. Senator Jacques Flynn, Opposition leader in the Senate.

87. Miss Flora Macdonald.

88. By a constitutional amendment requested by the national leader and approved by the annual meeting in 1969, the senior officer of the national headquarters, the national director, is no longer the personal appointment of the national leader alone, but is appointed by and is responsible to a committee consisting of the leader, the president of the national association, and the chairman of party organization. That was not the case in 1964.

89. Jacques Bouchard, Dalton Camp, Egan Chambers, Joe Clark, and Finlay MacDonald.

Although the money was raised by regular party fund-raisers, it is not clear whether the conference was financed from existing party funds.[90] After the decision to convene a conference had been firmly taken, the national leader was advised and invited to participate. Of the 200 delegates to be invited, a formula developed by the chairman and approved by the committee stipulated that eleven were to be designated by the parliamentary caucus from among their numbers, twelve by provincial caucuses on a basis reflecting population, 63 by various arms of the national association or by provincial associations, and 114 by the working committee.[91] In choosing that 114 an effort was made to draw from groups not normally associated with the Progressive Conservative party and to select party personnel on the basis of potential future rather than past contributions.

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90. Mr. Camp had requested support from regular sources, but was turned down. A group of party members associated with Mr. Camp then threatened to raise the funds themselves, at which news the regular fund-raisers changed heart. It is not known if a special collection was made.

91. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada, Toronto, April 11, 1964.

Throughout the selection of delegates and the development of the program, there was a particular exertion to attract good French-Canadian participants.

In announcing the conference, the national president specified that the originating resolution of the national association was not being interpreted in a literal sense.

> The Conference we are proposing will indeed be a study "in depth" of certain public issues, but this can lead to the development of a "full and comprehensive program" only to the degree that the study enlightens and informs those at the Conference to make their contribution more effective in future in the process of developing policy proposals for the consideration of the Annual Meeting and for the further consideration of the Parliamentary Party.[92]

92. Mr. Camp, statement announcing the National Conference on Canadian Goals.

1967: Montmorency

Unlike the other policy conferences, the policy discussion of the Progressive Conservative Party at Maison Montmorency, Courville, Quebec, August 6 - 10, 1967 was an adjunct to another formal undertaking of the party.[93] It was established to present recommendations to a policy committee of the Centennial Leadership Convention, which committee would itself submit policy recommendations to the full convention.[94] Montmorency was thus authorized indirectly by the

93. Major sources concerning Montmorency: Correspondence with Robert Bedard, director of organization of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, who was involved in organization of the Centennial convention. Some records are on file at the national headquarters of the party, and more information was gathered from newspaper reports and an article by Dalton Camp, "Reflections on the Montmorency Conference" in the Queen's Quarterly, Summer 1969, pp. 186-187.

94. This complicated procedure was designed to allow experts to recommend, and policy representatives from each constituency to consider, policy proposals at a convention that would be too pre-occupied with leadership to consider policy adequately. The minutes of the meeting of the Centennial Convention Committee of April 1, 2, 1967 read as follows: "...Mr. Goodman read a letter from the National President, Mr. Camp, suggesting that a Policy Advisory Committee be set up and hold a conference in late July or early August, preferably in Quebec City. This group would consist of 100 to 150 persons made up from members of the Caucus, academics and persons with special knowledge and expertise from the various fields in the business world...the deliberations of this group could then be turned over to a larger body called the Convention Policy Committee which would consist of one...

resolution of the Annual Meeting of the Progressive Conservative Association of Canada of November 1966 requiring a leadership convention which would also consider policy, and directly by the convention committee established by the national executive of the national association to organize a leadership convention. Letters inviting participation at Montmorency said:

> ...it is essential to the future success of this Party that we evolve an intelligent and comprehensive policy designed to meet needs of Canada and one that will merit the respect of all elements of our community.[95]

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constituency delegate from each riding, representatives of the students, Y.P.C. and Women's Associations. This latter group would total about 400 and would hold its deliberations on Tuesday and Wednesday prior to the opening of the full plenary sessions. Their report would be presented to the convention at large.

"Deliberations of the Convention Policy Committee would be open to the press and to any approved delegate. It was agreed that the report of the Convention Policy Committee would constitute a statement of fundamental principles and contemporary policies of the Conservative Party for the consideration of the Leader, the Caucus, the President and Executive Officers of the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada."

95. E. A. Goodman, Roger Regimbal, MP, standard letter of invitation to participate at Montmorency.

The conference was budgeted as part of the leadership convention and preparatory work was done in the convention offices in Toronto. The annual meeting which established the leadership convention, and consequently the Montmorency conference was the scene of a serious and public intra-party conflict in which the majority of members of the parliamentary caucus were on one side and the majority of voting members of the national association on the other. Although that antagonism was not forgotten, it had been suspended temporarily in the campaigning to elect a new national leader. A member of the parliamentary caucus, who had sided with the majority of caucus in November 1966, was co-chairman of the convention committee[96] and the organization of the Montmorency conference was left largely to a committee of party employees under the co-ordination of a university professor who had no previous association with the party.[97] The formal chairman was the Honourable William Davis.[98]

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96. Roger Regimbal, then Member of Parliament for Argenteuil-Deux Montagnes.

97. Professor Victor Valentine of Carleton University.

98. Then Ontario Education Minister. His responsibilities did not include organization, but related exclusively to conduct of proceedings at Montmorency.

Participation was by invitation of the conference committee[99] and was limited to 120[100] persons of whom 32 were Members of Parliament representing the parliamentary caucus. In addition the national leader was invited, as were declared candidates for the national leadership.[101] There was a deliberate attempt to attract participation by the Canadian academic community, particularly those who had shown some interest in the party, personally or professionally. A distinguishing feature of the conference was its emphasis upon the participation of persons already prominent either as partisans or specialists. This emphasis was made possible in part because a committee more representative of the party would receive the recommendations of Montmorency.

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99. The minutes of the planning committee reveal that the committee stipulated only that the conference should include representatives of caucus, constituency associations, party, women's or youth groups within the party and university and expert opinion outside the party. Mr. Bedard's recollection is that the particular decision as to invitations was made by the Convention co-chairmen, Messrs. Goodman and Regimbal, after consultation with members of caucus, the national association, the convention committee, and presidents of PC provincial associations.

100. 123 were listed as attending.

101. The leader and candidates for leadership were not invited for the whole conference, but each for one afternoon only. This procedure was designed to allow the candidates to meet the policy committee but not dominate or disrupt their proceedings.

1969: Niagara Falls

The Priorities for Canada Conference was held October 9 - 13, 1969 at Niagara Falls, Ontario.[102] While the Port Hope and Fredericton Conferences were designed in part to countervail positions taken by or ascribed to the party leader, and Montmorency was held in an inter-regnum, Niagara Falls, like Kingston, was requested by the national leader. It was organized by a committee under the chairmanship of the Honourable Robert Stanfield, and was held at all only because of his insistence.[103] A policy meeting had been requested and authorized by a vote of the party and association gathered in leadership convention in 1967 and in annual meeting in 1969. The initial announcement was issued by the president of the national association, Mr. Frank Moores, MP, acting in that capacity. The parliamentary caucus, the national association, and the national youth and women's associations were represented on the committee,

102. Major sources concerning Niagara Falls: The writer was active in the organisation of the Conference, and has had the benefit of correspondence or conversation with others actively involved, including principally Dr. E. R. Black and Robert Bedard.

103. Mr. Stanfield over-ruled the opinion that party finances and other priorities should cause postponement, and perhaps cancellation, of the policy conference.

which functioned in fact as the working committee. Funding was from regular party sources. Personnel and facilities of the national headquarters, the party research bureau and the parliamentary office of the leader were seconded to the conference, and a program staff was established at Trent University in Peterborough, Ontario, under the direction of the chairman of the Policy Advisory Committee, a position appointed by and responsible to the national leader directly.

Although the party had changed leaders, it had been defeated decisively in the federal general election of June 1968, and its representation in Parliament was from the same kind of constituencies, largely non-metropolitan and non-French-speaking, as before the leadership convention. It was the largest of the conferences, allowing participation by every member of caucus, and a delegate of every federal constituency[104] as well as delegates-at-large[105]

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104. Constituency associations were specifically requested to send delegates with a particular interest in policy.

105. There were to be 152 delegates-at-large, chosen on a rough population basis according to the following formula: five each from Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island, ten each from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, 40 each from Quebec and Ontario, and two from the Yukon and North West Territories. The president of the

and resource persons.[106] There was again a deliberate attempt to secure representation of groups not normally associated with the party, and a particularly energetic involvement of advisors from the academic community.

Inspiration and Organization of the Conferences

Three of the conferences were inspired by one individual or a small group of persons--in the case of Port Hope, J. M. Macdonnell; Kingston, Lester B. Pearson; Fredericton, a group, including prominently Dalton Camp, E. A. Goodman and the late George Hogan was instrumental in achieving a resolution calling for a "study conference" and Mr. Camp particularly proposed the kind of conference Fredericton became, with its emphasis on problems rather than resolutions. Montmorency was an incident of the leadership convention, and owed more to the public

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Progressive Conservative Association in each province and the representatives of each province on the national executive submitted a list containing 50 per cent more names than the number of delegates-at-large allotted that province. From that list, the policy co-ordinating committee made final selections.

106. They were selected and invited by the programme committee.

expectation that a party would consider policy than to a private conviction that, at that point in time, it must. The persons most influential in the genesis of the Montmorency conference appear to have been Dalton Camp and E. A. Goodman,[107] and it is significant that each had official responsibility for the over-all leadership convention, the former as association president, the latter as convention co-chairman. The Niagara Falls Conference was authorized originally by a Centennial Convention resolution, which probably should be seen as reflecting a concensus that policy conferences should be a regular activity of the party.[108] However, the direct decision to call the Niagara Falls Conference was made by Mr. Stanfield, against the advice of some party officials who believed that other priorities were more urgent at the time. In four cases, then, the conferences resulted from the initiatives of identifiable individual partisans-- J. M. Macdonnell, Lester B. Pearson, Dalton Camp, E. A. Goodman and Robert Stanfield. It would be

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107. Minutes of Centennial Convention Committee, April 1, 2, 1967.

108. That the status of "policy" should have changed so dramatically is itself significant.

interesting to examine the appreach to politics of each, for evidence of the nature and role of the "innovative personality"[109] in Canadian politics.

Representative national organization committees were struck in the case of each conference; each represented each region of Canada, and the general organization committees of the Fredericton, Montmorency and Niagara Falls conferences also represented the various official constituent groups of the sponsoring Association or party.[110] In each case, smaller working committees were established, usually located in one city, and responsible to the larger group. The working committee for Port Hope was based in Toronto, and linked to the national committee by the membership in both groups of J. M. Macdonnell and the corresponding secretary,

109. Students of innovation suggest certain characteristics recur in "the innovative personality." See Innovation: The Basis for Culture Change, Homer Barnett, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York, 1953; Theory of Social Change, E. Hagen, The Darsey Press, Homewood Illinois, 1962.

110. All three committees were drawn from the national officers of the Progressive Conservative Party. In the cases of Montmorency and Niagara Falls, special representatives of the parliamentary caucus were specifically included.

Rod Finlayson. The working committee for Kingston was based in Toronto, under the active supervision of Mitchell Sharp and Michael Mackenzie, chairman and co-chairman respectively of the national "Sponsoring Committee." The working committee for Fredericton was based principally in Toronto, in the offices and under the active supervision of the chairman of the general conference committee, Dalton Camp. The working committee for Montmorency was based principally in Toronto, in offices established for the organization of the Centennial Leadership Convention, and under the active supervision of the convention committee co-chairman, E. A. Goodman. In the case of Niagara Falls, the planning committee was based in Ottawa, in the national headquarters, the research office and the office of the party leader, Robert Stanfield, who was the active chairman of the general conference committee, and the programme committee was located at Trent University in Peterborough, under the direction of the chairman of the Policy Advisory Committee, Professor T. H. B. Symons, who was a member of the over-all committee and an official directly responsible to the national leader.

Format

The Port Hope Conference was divided into sub-committees, each concerned with an aspect of national policy. J. M. Macdonnell delivered a keynote address to the plenary conference. Rod Finlayson prepared position papers in advance to provide a basis for discussion, and the sub-committee reports were brought together in "The Port Hope Proposals" by Sidney Smith. This document was approved as a statement of the conference but great care was taken to emphasise that the conclusions were "proposals" and the group was unofficial. The sub-committee discussions were closed, but a press conference was held after each session.

The Kingston Conference was also divided according to subject matter. Papers by invited speakers provided the basis of discussion and "a very valuable factor was the informal discussion which went on outside of the formal sessions and well into the night."[111] There were no resolutions and, while journalists were present and some of the papers became public, the conference was intended primarily to be private and advisory. Mr. Pearson, as national leader, delivered a keynote address to the plenary conference.

The Fredericton Conference met entirely in plenary session, with a different aspect of national policy

111. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

considered on each day. The emphasis was upon exploration rather than resolution of new national problems, and discussion each day was generated by speakers reading papers or precis of papers prepared and circulated in advance. There was extensive informal discussion every evening. There was an opening address by the conference chairman, Mr. Camp, and an address by the national leader, Mr. Diefenbaker. No resolutions were taken.

The Montmorency Conference was divided into subcommittees, according to subject, each under the direction of co-chairmen designated by the planning committee. There were not major speakers or papers, although a compendium of existing relevant academic and other writing was circulated to conferees in advance. Each sub-committee prepared and approved recommendations for consideration by the policy committee of the Centennial Convention.

The Niagara Falls Conference was divided into eight streams, each concerning a broad aspect of national policy, each presided over by French-and English-speaking co-chairmen, designated by the conference chairman. Practice differed within each stream, with some adopting a seminar approach and others basing discussion on prepared papers. This was the most comprehensive conference and dealt,

sometimes in detail, with a very wide range of questions. There were no resolutions. Instead, the co-chairmen prepared, and the sub-committees approved, a statement of the "consensus" of each stream, and these statements were directed to the national leader, the national association president and the parliamentary caucus for subsequent consideration. As conference chairman and national leader, Mr. Stanfield delivered keynote and concluding addresses to the plenary conference.

Finance

There is no record of the source of funds or cost of the Port Hope Conference. Funding would not have been from regular party sources, since the conference was unofficial; in any event "There were no such sources, and the Party had no income of any kind as such during the year 1942."[112] J. M. Macdonnell had sought to raise money for the party earlier that year, with a series of small fund-raising dinners in Toronto and Montreal. There was some carry-over from that canvass, and Macdonnell apparently raised the rest. The educated guess of the Honourable R. A. Bell is "that the budget for Port Hope was probably less than $10,000 but I have no information at all about it."[113]

112. Hon. R. A. Bell, correspondence with the writer.

113. ibid.

Nor was an official estimate available of the costs of the Kingston Conference, although a special fund was established to raise the money.[114] The Fredericton Conference cost $35,000.[115] As indicated above, that money was raised by regular party fund-raisers, although it is not known whether they conducted a special collection. The Montmorency Conference was budgeted at $35,000 and cost $60,000.[116] The money was drawn from funds raised in connection with the Centennial Convention. The total cost of the Niagara Falls Conference was $82,000,[117] which was a draw upon regular party sources. It should not need emphasis that the cost of the last two conferences, at least, substantially limited the capacity of the party to undertake other activities.

Delegate Selection and Characteristics.

Delegates to the Port Hope Conference were invited by the conference working committee, on the basis of the recommendations of the provincial representatives on the national committee. Broadly speaking, participation was

114. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence.

115. Dalton Camp, correspondence.

116. Robert Bedard, correspondence.

117. ibid.

open to any "lay" Conservative--ie., anyone not a member of Parliament, the Senate or a provincial legislature--who wanted to come. The exception was Ontario, where there was a definite effort to avoid over-representation of that province, or of Toronto. A special effort was made to attract French-speaking Conservatives from Quebec. The two most important considerations were to attract people whom it was presumed would contribute actively to the party in years to come, and to ensure representation of farm, labour and other particular groups. "A balanced form of representation contributed to balanced thinking at the Conference."[118] However, invitations were restricted to people considered to be sympathetic to the Conservative point of view. The emphasis of the organizers of the Kingston Conference was to attract "new" people with ideas. Some regional representation was achieved, through consultation with regional party officials and with the sponsoring committee, which itself had representation from each region. Hon. Walter Gordon indicates there was no particular attempt to achieve regional, racial or geographic balance.[119] The authority to choose delegates rested exclusively with Mr. Pearson,

118. Hon. Donald Fleming, correspondence with the writer.

119. Hon. Walter Gordon, correspondence with the writer.

who sought the advice of the sponsoring committee. The presence at Kingston of so many people who subsequently became prominent in the party suggests the selectors at least knew the precincts where political interest or ambition might reside. It seems likely, indeed, that one function of the Kingston Conference was to formalize the entry into active partisanship of people who had been considering political careers for some time.

The organizers of the Fredericton Conference established a formula of representation[120] which specified that 114 "at-large" participants would be chosen by the committee. Those 114 were selected after consultation with provincial and national party officials, and others, including some persons unassociated with the Progressive Conservative Party at that time.[121] There was an attempt to attract

120. Nine delegates were to be appointed by each of the national student federation, YPC and women's associations, three by each of the provincial associations except Ontario and Quebec which would each appoint six, eleven by the federal caucus, two by each Progressive Conservative provincial caucus, (there were then six) and 114 by the working committee. Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Committee, PC Association of Canada, Toronto, April 11, 1964.

121. Primarily people in the Universities or communication.

younger people and to repair "the alienation between the Party and the academic community."[122] The most strenuous special effort was to attract strong participation from French-speaking Quebec. The conference chairman sought help initially from French-speaking Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament and the Senate and, when that proved unproductive, went himself to Montreal, where he secured the agreement of Claude Ryan and Marcel Faribault to participate.[123] The Montmorency Conference was designed to bring together active politicians and academic and other experts. That guided the selection of delegates, who were chosen either for activity in the party at the time or for an expertise desired at the Conference. The "experts" were often chosen without regard to partisan affiliation. Rough regional balance was sought, and it was hoped that French-Canadian participation would be one side-effect of locating the conference at Courville. Invitations were issued by the convention co-chairmen.

Invitations to participate in the Niagara Falls Conference were extended to every Progressive Conservative member of the House of Commons, Senate or a

122. Mr. Camp, correspondence with the writer.
123. Mr. Camp, correspondence with the writer.

provincial legislature, one delegate from each Progressive Conservative federal constituency association, representatives of the youth and women's associations, and 152 delegates-at-large.[124] In addition, the programme committee was empowered to invite an unspecified number of "resource people", usually from universities. Association with the Progressive Conservative party was not required of "resource people" although care was taken to avoid inviting persons associated with another political party. As indicated above, delegates-at-large were chosen by the organizing committee, from lists submitted by party officials in each province. It was specified that at least 25 per cent of the delegates-at-large from each province must be under 30 years of age, and at least 25 per cent must be women.[125]

It is difficult to generalize about the kind of people who participated in these policy conferences. Lists of participants at each conference are appended to this paper. They suggest that most participants brought to the conference some personal prominence,

124. Minutes of the 1969 Policy Conference Coordinating Committee, April 29, 1969, Ottawa.

125. ibid.

either in the party or in an area important to the party. They were "elite" groups in that sense, although the questions are open how or whether that affected the deliberations. There was a consistent endeavour, more pronounced in the case of some conferences, to achieve regional balance and representation of groups not normally associated with the sponsoring party. In one case, elected members of the party--the traditional "elite" in a parliamentary party system-- were virtually excluded, and in no conference were elected members dominant, either in number or influence. Some persons participated in more than one conference, which is not extraordinary considering that four of the conferences were in one party, three in a five-year period. It is interesting that at least two persons[126] attended both Liberal and Progressive Conservative conferences, while others[127] subsequently became prominent in parties other than the sponsor of the conference they attended.

Physical and Media Considerations.

Trinity College School was chosen for the Port Hope Conference because a school location provided

126. Professor Walter Kontak, Mr. Bruce Whitestone.

127. Marc Lalonde, James Renwick, Alf Gleave.

privacy, relatively inexpensive accommodation, and an atmosphere conducive to discussion. Sensitive to suspicions about "Bay Street", the organizers deliberately avoided a Toronto site, but wanted the conference near that city, from which so much of the planning emanated. In addition, it has been suggested that Mr. Macdonnell might have been better acquainted with Trinity than with other private school sites since he frequently visited his brother-in-law, Vincent Massey, at Port Hope. According to Walter Gordon, Kingston was chosen as site of the Liberal conference "because we were able to get accommodation at Queen's University." Presumably a University site was chosen for reasons relating to privacy, ease of accommodation and congenial atmosphere. Several sites were considered for the National Conference on Canadian Goals. The original criteria stipulated cities small enough that delegates wouldn't be distracted from the conference yet large enough to have adequate transportation access and media facilities. For reasons of cost, accommodation and congenial atmosphere, university campuses were preferred. Since party meetings were regularly held in Ottawa, and the party was ensconced in Queen's Park, it was decided to locate the conference outside Ontario.

Sites west of Ontario were rejected because of transportation costs and because the party did not lack identification with Western Canada. The difficulty in securing French-Canadian participation was encountered early, suggesting that organization of a conference in Quebec might involve special problems. Nonetheless, Laval University was seriously considered, and found unavailable. The advantages of Fredericton were its availability, its adjacence to the summer habitation of the conference chairman[128] and its presence in a province where the provincial Progressive Conservative Party was willing to assist materially in conference organization[129] and would benefit from the local publicity and good will a conference engenders. The Montmorency Conference was held at Courville because the organizers wanted a Quebec site and were

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128. "The fact that your...chairman was born sixty miles from here, has a summer cottage thirty miles from here, and graduated from this University, was not a significant factor in the decision." Dalton Camp, Opening Remarks to the National Conference on Canadian Goals, Fredericton, September 9, 1964.

129. A large part of the physical organization of the conference, at Fredericton, was done by Richard Hatfield, MLA.

confident the party position in Quebec had improved. While not a University, Maison Montmorency[130] offered the same advantages of inexpensive accommodation, meeting and media facilities, a contemplative atmosphere and some distance from distractions. The Niagara Falls site was chosen because transportation costs dictated a central Canadian site, it was desired to avoid a metropolis, and literally nothing else was available for so large a gathering. The conference was too large for small universities, and larger universities were already booked. The conference was held in two Sheraton hotels, which offered cut-rates for lodging.

Two factors of unusual importance in selecting sites were freedom from other distractions and, especially in the case of later conferences, convenience for the media, particularly television. National conferences in large cities always suffer some attrition because some delegates have never before been that close to Jarry Park or Jarvis Street.

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130. It is a retreat house, of the Dominican order, some of whose number provided spiritual ministration by tending bar for the conferring Conservatives.

That danger diminishes in smaller centers. Television exerts an opposite pull, towards major centers, which are better able to satisfy its requirement of extensive studio and transmission facilities. Opposition parties have noticed that, while camera crews might follow a Prime Minister into Siberia, the amount of coverage of an Opposition policy conference is related directly to the ease of coverage. The print press also has special requirements, particularly for adequate telegraph facilities. These all influence site selection.

The Fredericton and Niagara Falls Conferences were completely open to the press, although it was understood that journalists normally would not participate in the formal discussions. Most of the Montmorency Conference was open, although some sessions met in camera. Certain journalists were invited to participate in the Kingston Conference, although there was some limitation as to what was on the record. The Port Hope discussions were closed, but a press conference was held after each session.

Contemporary Objections to the Conferences.

Each conference had its critics. Donald Fleming recalls that Tommy Church, then a Toronto MP, spoke of "the bright young boys who went down to Port Hope and wrote a new Encyclopedia Britannica," and Walter Gordon reports "some scepticism on the part of the old guard in the caucus" about the Kingston Conference.[131] George Drew, as provincial party leader in Ontario, was openly hostile to some of the principal organizers of the Port Hope Conference.[132] Arthur Meighen saw "no harm" in the Port Hope initiative[133] but didn't expect it to come to much and, as noted before, the Progressive Conservative fund-raisers were sufficiently unexcited by the prospect of the Fredericton Conference that they at first refused funds for it. It is likely that there was sometimes intense opposition to the conferences, not just skepticism. However, in no case does there appear to have been a sustained attempt to prevent or frustrate a policy conference.

131. Correspondence with the writer.

132. Hon. Donald Fleming and Hon. R. A. Bell, correspondence with the writer.

133. Graham, No Surrender, op cit, p. 140, citing correspondence, Meighen to his son.

Summary.

Certain important circumstances were common to all five conferences. Each was held when the party was in opposition in the country. In each case, the conference was called or organized by persons concerned that other elements of the party in addition to the caucus must be influential and be seen to be influential, in order for the party to move out of opposition. With Port Hope, Fredericton and Montmorency the initiative for the conference came from persons outside the parliamentary caucus; with Kingston and Niagara Falls the initiative was from the leader who, while a member of caucus, was also responsive and responsible to other elements in the party. In the case of Port Hope, Fredericton and Montmorency, no authorization was sought from the leader or the caucus, although they were advised in each case. In both leader-sponsored conferences the caucus was advised and some caucus members were involved in planning, but it is important to emphasise that no authority was sought from caucus in the case of any of the five conferences. In principle, all conferences were deliberate attempts to attract or publicize elements not evidently associated with the parliamentary party. In practice, in all conferences, the program and discussion were dominated by non-caucus members of the party. By the same token, it was made clear in

every case that the conference could not commit the party--in no case was there an attempt to deny the formal authority of the leader and caucus to establish and state party policy.

In terms of informal power within the party two significant functions were performed consistently. While the power of the parliamentary party to establish policy was not challenged directly, the capacity of extra-parliamentary elements to influence policy was enhanced. In effect, the successful assertion of the principle that policy discussion belonged to the whole party meant that, in practice, in exercising its unquestioned right to decide, the parliamentary party would have to consider party opinions and public expectations generated outside the caucus. Second, the policy conference was usually significant as the instrument of one side in a factional conflict. This was particularly true in the case of the Port Hope and Fredericton conferences, which were conceived as means of expressing and exposing a range of party opinion different from, and even contrary to, that identified with the parliamentary caucus. Had there been no conflict, there would have been no conference. To a substantial degree, this was also true of the Kingston and Niagara Falls conferences. The difference was

that Port Hope and Fredericton were instruments against the constituted authority in the party, while the leader-sponsored conferences were instruments used by a newly-constituted authority to demonstrate the displacement of old styles. Whatever their other aspects, these were all conflicts in which innovation was a serious issue. In each case, innovators sought to expand or assert their influence by means of a policy conference. Even the Montmorency conference, which differed significantly from the other four, demonstrated an innovative spirit in a party whose recent behaviour defined it rather as consolidative.

CHAPTER FIVE:

FUNCTIONS OF THE CONFERENCES

Policy conferences are not called or held in a vaccuum. They occur in response to pressures, sometimes problems within the party, sometimes opportunities in the larger political system, often both. These pressures can relate directly to policy development, but frequently they concern publicity, organization, morale, or a contest for influence within the party or the polity. They affect the decision to call conferences, the nature of each conference, and the functions each in fact performs. In the conferences considered here, some of these pressures have recurred or otherwise been of unusual influence. This chapter will review the major motives that influenced the calling of conferences and the degree to which these motives were satisfied.

The Desire for Ideology.

There is frequently a demand, within parties and outside them, for some statement of philosophy or principles which would distinguish one party from its rivals. That occurs particularly when a party is engaged in re-assessment, as it usually is after fresh or frequent defeat, or whenever policy is being considered. The demand often comes from rank-and-file

members who may feel impelled to justify their partisanship in terms of "ideology", and from influential institutional critics of the parties, like newspaper editorialists.[134] Sometimes it is shared by persons organizing conferences, and usually it is recognized as a pressure requiring response. That desire for distinction was manifest in the official description of purpose of the Port Hope, Kingston and Fredericton conferences. Port Hope was conceived in part to begin the generation of a contemporary and viable alternative to "socialism".[135] Kingston was described by its organizers as a conference for "liberally-minded Canadians", emphasising identification with the attitude if not the party. One of the principal architects of the Fredericton

134. The Toronto Globe and Mail, which considers the Progressive Conservative Party its own except on election day, chose the morning of the opening of the Fredericton conference to urge it to "forget about policies and platforms and talk exclusively about principles and philosophies."

135. "The CCF is holding successful meetings because right or wrong they have a creed. The Conservative Party needs a creed and that is why I am anxious to see the Port Hope conference succeed." Letter of August 18, 1942 from Cecil Frost to Mr. A. D. McKenzie. In addition, the keynote address of J. M. Macdonnell emphasised the need for a response to "socialism". Granatstein reports (p. 131) "when the floor was opened to the delegates, speaker after speaker voiced an insistence on free enterprise...however, the speakers

conference, the late George Hogan,[136] argued strenously in committee for dedicating one day at Fredericton to the discussion of Conservative "principles". Responding to various influences, the chairman of the Fredericton conference did allow, as part of the program, a paper broadly concerned with philosophy[137] and referred in his own opening remarks to the need to "consider both ideas and principles together."[138] In all five conferences, contributions by delegates dealt rather frequently with different aspects of "principles" or "philosophy", and some of the formal papers set out goals couched in philosophic language.[139] However, in no conference was a statement of principle tabled, or even agreed upon. Only in the case of the Port Hope conference could the conclusions of the delegates be construed as a statement of a

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condemned the doctrinaire beliefs of the party elders and advocated a shift in party policy to a "middle way" course between the left and right extremes."

136. George Hogan wrote The Conservative in Canada, McClelland and Stewart, Toronto, 1963.

137. "The Responsibility of the Individual in Facing Political Questions" by Dr. Robert Clark of the University of British Columbia.

138. Dalton Camp, opening remarks, Fredericton, September 9, 1964.

139. For example, the Kingston paper of Tom Kent, which appeared subsequently as "Social Policy for Canada."

consistent approach to life or politics, and that was a product of a wartime atmosphere which tended to emphasise ideology. In considering the actual effect of the policy conferences, the functions they in fact performed, the definition of philosophy or ideology seems to have had but slight importance, either in terms of public perception or in terms of the satisfaction of persons concerned with ideology in that sense. However it is difficult, at this distance, to determine how much of the momentum of the Port Hope Conference was founded in a belief that new life had been given a previously-beleagured set of principles.

Some conferences did serve to develop a party statement or consensus on the principles which should guide policy on particular broad questions. That is a function different from developing an "ideology" since it addresses a specific question, not a view of life. The most obvious case concerns relations between French- and English-speaking Canadians, on which the organizers of the Fredericton Conference set out to develop a relevant contemporary position, which was achieved at Montmorency, and confirmed at Niagara Falls. It is significant beyond its own substantive importance as an example of a major

change in party attitude which consecutive policy conferences functioned to achieve. A somewhat more contentious illustration would concern the change in approach to welfare policy which, while due principally to other factors, was advanced at the Niagara Falls Conference.

In terms of attitude, there is no doubt that the discussion at each conference was more contemporary in tone than the approach to policy generally associated with the sponsoring party. Port Hope spoke in accents different from Mr. Meighen, Kingston in accents different from Mr. Howe or Mr. St. Laurent, Fredericton in accents different from Mr. Diefenbaker. The difference generally reflected a willingness to be more open to more options. What is significant, in terms of ideology, is the fact that the accents were also different from those of Edmund Burke or Adam Smith or, forthat matter, of George Hogan or Tom Kent. It is as hard to define Canadian party ideology as it is to discover it in practice; the policy conferences made the task no easier. What marked each conference was a desire to accord with contemporary attitudes rather than to return to fundamental principles.

The Desire for Decentralization.

A classic concern of liberal democrats is that their parties tend towards oligarchy, and a classical response has been to decentralize power, even if only to other elites. The desire to decentralize tends to be strongest in defeat, when oligarchy seems ineffective as well as wrong. It is likely that certain kinds of partisans will especially resent oligarchy, particularly if they are not part of it. Specifically, policy-oriented partisans are probably more antagonistic to oligarchy than those whose satisfaction comes from simple party identification or combat. Among some policy-oriented partisans, oligarchy offends basic notions of democracy. Perhaps more generally, policy-oriented partisans see oligarchy impeding the natural buoyancy of their own good ideas. When a party loses, its oligarchy becomes vulnerable; doubts erode deference. A partisan who feels strongly about an issue, and believes his own position is muted, distorted or betrayed by his party's official spokesmen will have extra incentive to change the spokesmen. That would suggest that policy-oriented activities are particularly well-adapted to breaking down the oligarchy of a party in opposition. That

factor was probably influential in inspiring the conferences at Port Hope and Fredericton and, in a different way, the Kingston and Niagara Falls Conferences. The organizers of Port Hope and Fredericton were in opposition in the party as well as in the country, and in a sense the policy conference was one of their weapons in an internal war. The leaders who inspired Kingston and Niagara Falls, while in formal command of their parties, were troubled still by oligarchies formed before their coming, and used the conferences as both instruments and evidence of change.

Policy conferences and decentralization are associated in another way. Parties in opposition need new supporters, and a policy conference demonstrates that there is room in the party for new people and new proposals. The Kingston Conference was a signal that the Liberal Party, recently removed from office as authoritarian and tired, was marching to a different drummer and looking for recruits. A similar signal had been sent out by the 1967 leadership convention of the Progressive Conservative Party, and the Niagara Falls conference was designed in part to demonstrate that this attitude of open-ness

had survived the election. The Port Hope, Fredericton and Montmorency conferences also indicated that different drummers were at least stirring in the party, and might begin a march.

It is difficult to assess whether parties which are ventilated by policy conferences remain "open" and, if they do, whether that is due to the policy conference or other factors. Yet it is an important question, if oligarchy is important. Techniques are now available which would let party managers give the appearance of membership participation while retaining tight oligarchic control.[140] Most of the paraphernalia of "participatory democracy" confirms the power of the oligarchy by disarming its opponents. Yet the policy conferences this paper considers gave real influence to the opponents and helped them change the direction of the party.

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140. Modern technology makes it relatively easy for a party or government with resources to circulate computer questionnaires, dispense "information", "visit" groups in mass meetings or individuals over television, and bestow honours or encouragement without paying the slightest heed to the substance of a representation or complaint. What is new is not the practice but the almost-total scale on which it is now possible.

The means in every case was to affirm the legitimacy of an elite other than the parliamentary caucus, an elite which had the right to disagree with official policy but not the power to change it. In effect, the policy conference constituted an impermanent "official opposition" within the party. Just as the Official Opposition in Parliament has more influence than the individual voter, the policy conference had more influence and more ability to effect change than the partisan invited to a banquet or consulted by computer at an annual meeting. The idea of an Official Opposition in Parliament is that its existence restrains the natural oligarchic tendency of the government. The question concerning policy conferences is whether they have impressed into the consciousness of the parties the idea that an alternative elite is legitimate.

As argued above, elites other than caucus have always had substantial influence, whether potential or exercised, in Canadian political parties. That is one characteristic distinguishing Canadian parties from the British, and it is unfortunate if a reliance upon British-based descriptions of the parliamentary process and parties has obscured that difference.

According to Robert McKenzie[141] "the distribution of power within British political parties is primarily a function of cabinet government and the British parliamentary system." In Canada, that distribution is also affected by the form of federalism and the forces of distance and diversity which make a federal system necessary. Consequently, the distribution of power is more diffuse. The policy conferences exemplified that distinction but did not create it.

It is important that another party elite is active discussing policy. Far more relevant is the fact that this "other" elite disavows any claim to declare a policy which would bind the parliamentary caucus. In fact, the real process of decision probably does lie largely outside the parliamentary caucus--with public servants and private advisors in the case of the Government party, and public opinion and private advisors in the case of Opposition parties. Professors Engelmann and Schwartz suggest[142] that the professionalization of policy-making concentrates the influence over decisions with the elected or parliamentary

141. McKenzie, op cit, p. 635

142. Engelmann and Schwartz, op cit, p. 251.

leaders. The very opposite may be the case. The practice of seeking external advice desanctifies the tradition of exclusive reliance on caucus. To an increasing degree parliamentary leaders rely upon initiatives suggested by outsiders, or professionals, and, in pursuing those initiatives rely largely upon information provided and alternatives framed by professionals. Even the power to choose the professionals provides only partial control. Moreover, the practice of seeking advice outside the parliamentary elite generates a momentum of its own. Once consulted on one question, activists or academics are more likely to volunteer advice without invitation; on the other side, parliamentarians who have found outside advice helpful in one instance will be inclined to seek more of it. New patterns emerge in the behaviour of both politicians and advisors.

As will be argued below, the exigencies of modern Opposition demand more expertise of Opposition parties, and therefor force open-ness upon their parliamentary elite.[143] This is not to suggest that parliamentary

143. Naturally enough the complexity and range of public business in a modern nation had its first impact on government parties. There are strong indications that elected politicians in government parties have virtually abandoned policy to the bureaucracy. One assumes that is one factor which accounts for the preoccupation with structures of the governments most recently elected in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. They want to put the elected politicians--in Canada, the cabinet, if not Parliament--back in control of policy direction.

leaders are powerless--or even that they must cede power--but rather to suggest their power should be defined more precisely as the power to legitimize. Parliamentary leaders retain the authority to state and legitimize a position, as they have done nearly always, whether directly on behalf of caucus, or indirectly through dominance of conventions and annual meetings concerned with resolutions and policy. Of course, many members of a parliamentary elite suggest and pursue initiatives, and the influence of a Member of Parliament at any stage in decision-making is enhanced by his status. The fact remains that the parliamentary caucus is more important as the locus rather than the inspiration of policy decisions. That has been the case for some time. Presumably, a radical decentralization would have challenged the caucus' exclusive power to legitimize, which, on the contrary, the policy conferences consistently and explicitly have confirmed.

The Desire for New Policy.

A strong and necessary motive for policy conferences is dissatisfaction with the existing or recent policy of the party, and a desire to change it. That is, there is an influential desire for new policy

per se, as well as new policy processes. In fact, as just argued, no policy conference has claimed the power or the title to declare official policy, new or old. Moreover there is evidence to suggest that many of the substantive recommendations of policy conferences would have come to the party in any event. For one example, the substantial and detailed recommendations of the Niagara Falls conference on tax reform were largely the result of the work of a committee of experts appointed by the national leader and working with the caucus well in advance of the conference. In anticipating public attitudes on tax matters, the committee also anticipated the attitude of conference delegates, and proposed substantial reforms acceptable to both the caucus and the conference. The proposal for a reform of welfare policy originated similarly, outside the conference and, indeed, a variation of the policy had been advocated in the 1968 party election program. The "social policy" proposals of Tom Kent were articulated at Kingston but could have followed other routes to acceptance by the party leader. Whether the organizers of the Montmorency Conference had a specific formula in mind, they went to the conference clearly intending to develop a constitutional position more acceptable

to French Canada. That intention was shared by all of those leadership candidates who were considered at the time of Montmorency and proved in the balloting to be serious contenders. Therefore a different constitutional position would have emerged in any event. The Fredericton conference did not come to conclusions that could fairly be called policy. The Port Hope "statement" reflected a consensus the existence of which, though articulated at conference, had in fact been the cause of convening in the first place.

It can be seen then that much of the organization and all of the authorization of party policy occurred elsewhere than in the conferences. Nonetheless, the conferences had a significant influence on the development of new policy. There was some origination, if not of themes, at least of details and approaches. The affirmation of support at recent Progressive Conservative conferences for a new approach to, for example, the constitution, taxation and welfare policy was strong enough to make it difficult for a caucus to refuse authorization. In every case there was a change in perception, both by the public and by party members, of the importance of policy to

the party; the party subsequently became more policy-oriented and more attractive to policy-oriented non-partisans. But the fact remains that the direct enunciation, or inspiration, of new policy was one of the least significant functions in fact performed by the policy conferences.

The Desire to Confirm Policy.

It was suggested earlier that, among other functions, policy conferences were the instrument of one side in an internal dispute. In every case under consideration, different attitudes to policy were involved in the dispute, although that probably need not be the general case. To some degree, the conferences were attempts to mobilize support for one side in a dispute about policy or the approach to policy. At Port Hope and Fredericton, the attitude of the conference organizers was "against" that of the parliamentary leadership. At Kingston and Niagara Falls, the conference was an instrument of new parliamentary leadership, "against" the re-assertion of attitudes rejected when the leadership was changed. Montmorency was a marginal case, reflecting an attitude which was opposed by the departing leadership but compatible with the newly-developing leadership.

The major discussion at Niagara Falls followed lines established in advance by the party leader. The most influential conclusion of the Montmorency conference, concerning the constitution, was consistent with reforms preferred by each of the serious new leadership candidates. The Port Hope conference reached conclusions, and the Fredericton conference had results, very close to those desired and foreseen by their respective organizers.

Confirmation of the policy or attitudes of their organizers is a recurrent function of policy conferences which the conferences generally perform effectively. Policy confirmation was most explicit at Niagara Falls, which was the only conference organized under the direct supervision of the leader; his positions on welfare reform, the constitution and tax reform were all adopted, although all were contentious. Does this imply that policy confirmation is a particularly significant function of leader-sponsored conferences? Possibly. It should, however, be noted that in the case of Niagara Falls leader-sponsorship of the conference did not stifle critics of the leader's position, particularly on welfare reform; neither did it inhibit discussion of contentious

questions such as drug use and foreign economic influence. However, it is logical to assume that conferences sponsored by the leader are unlikely to challenge positions of the leader. That raises questions about the viability of the kind of conference this paper considers if a leader is in firm control of the party and is inclined to distrust or dislike free discussion.

Publicity.

One motivation for conferences is their great news value, which far exceeds that of most other activities of an opposition party or of a group in opposition to party leadership. Among those prerogatives of power which confirm power, publicity is very important, and often groups seeking power first seek publicity. The very necessity of publicizing their existence probably was influential in leading the "Port Hopefuls" to the little-precedented step of meeting in conference to discuss and express views on which most of them were already agreed. The Fredericton conference was the most effective available means of demonstrating the existence within the Progressive Conservative Party of a progressive and contemporary elite, concerned about both the

party's leadership and the country's future. The Montmorency conference also sought to demonstrate that the Progressive Conservative party, as well as electing leaders and feuding internally, could agree on contemporary policy. The Kingston conference sought to demonstrate that the Liberal party, recently thrown out of office for being arrogant and stale, was now open to new and progressive influences. The Niagara Falls conference sought to demonstrate that the attitude of critic, bestowed by the parliamentary system on an Official Opposition, was balanced by a taste and talent for positive proposal.

Party Morale.

For a party or a group in opposition, publicity has two targets. One is the public, whose attitude it is desired to change; the other is the membership of the group itself, whose morale it is desired to improve or maintain. At both Port Hope and Fredericton one purpose of the conference was to demonstrate to partisans who shared their view that their movement was numerous and worth sustaining. The Kingston conference was designed to encourage the progressive members of the Liberal party who had been disappointed

by the late government's conduct as well as by its defeat. Morale was a motive of the organizers of the Niagara Falls conference to at least as great a degree. In losing the 1968 general election, the Progressive Conservative party also lost the public service of many of its outstanding men, and it was consequently and obviously thin in parliamentary debate. Old divisions in the party had been reopened by the voting on the Official Languages Bill and were persistently exaggerated by the media. Morale was further jeopardized by the continued good standing in the public opinion polls of the Liberal Prime Minister, particularly since his style was close to that Progressive Conservative traditionalists had admired in their own former leader. As a consequence of being in Opposition, the party had next to no control over national events and must simply wait for opportunity. Virtually the only national event it could arrange was a policy conference and that was done with an eye to the need, among others, to remind the party of its strengths and so to maintain morale. The factor of morale was of little influence in the Montmorency case.

Exposing An Unpublicized Elite.

James McCook, writing of the Fredericton conference, observed that: "Study conferences study men as well as...policies."[144] He was referring to the presence and performance there of men presumed interested in the national party leadership, should it ever become available. But if that was a special circumstance of Fredericton, it was a common characteristic of all the conferences that they revealed men as well as policies. A party in a parliamentary system and a scattered country is judged in terms of the handful of its men and women who are known to hold national office or local eminence. Many of its best people are simply unknown and they have neither the effective media and para-political organizations of the United States, nor Britain's size and practice of "finding" seats in Parliament[145] to help make them known as national figures. While other factors

144. James McCook, The Ottawa Journal, September 16, 1964.

145. The size of Britain's Parliament--more than double that of Canada's, more than triple if you count the Lords and Senate--also provides a significantly larger pool of trained, able and interested politicians with a national point of view and a potential national following. Except for rare individual cases, the status of a Canadian provincial legislator is not comparable to that of a British backbencher in terms of potential impact upon national affairs.

contribute to the notable influence of provincial party leaders in Canadian national politics, that is also a result of the almost institutional anonymity of non-parliamentarians active in national parties. That affects the perceptions of both the public and the partisan who tend to identify a party in terms of that minority of its actual elite who serve in Parliament. As argued earlier, the federal nature of the country and the necessity that the party respond dynamically to a wide variety of influences means that the Canadian party elite is unusually broad; therefore the public identification of the party solely with its small parliamentary elite is seriously misleading. Party annual meetings allow a certain exposure of this larger elite, but the annual meetings of the Liberal and Progressive Conservative Parties, at least, are oriented towards office-holders to a degree greater than the annual conferences of British parties or the presidential nominating conventions of the United States. In practice, one of the most significant functions of the policy conferences of the Progressive Conservative party has been as the best instrument available to the party to provide a public role and public

perception of able partisans who are otherwise anonymous. That was also an important function of the Kingston conference although the Liberal party, with its connections with the media, corporations and other institutions, has more alternative outlets. However important to the public at large, it is of critical importance to the members of the party to witness a demonstration of a wider range of party talents than is evident in Parliament. In addition, and perhaps most important, this experience in public national discussion increases the general capacity of leading non-parliamentary partisans to act in the party and in the name of the party. By becoming better known they become more effective, despite their exclusion from caucus and customary attention. Writing in The Toronto Star, Dalton Camp likened the names of the participants at Port Hope to "an illuminated scroll of the distinguished Conservatives of the 1950s and 1960s."[146] The Kingston Conference launched Walter Gordon, Mitchell Sharp, John Turner, Jack Davis, Otto Lang and others on their careers as public notables in the Liberal party. Party conferences were also the most important means by

146. Dalton Camp, The Toronto Star, February 23, 1964.

which the Progressive Conservative Party came to develop the influence of Mr. Camp himself, and of Marcel Faribault, to whom the party owed so much of its subsequent good credentials among previous non-supporters or alienated supporters in English- and French-speaking Canada respectively.

Recruitment.

As well as providing an otherwise unavailable means of exposure of non-parliamentary members of the party elite, policy conferences also function importantly in the recruitment of persons who might become members of the party elite, or simply supporters. Most of the people who come to policy conferences are already known to be interested in the party.[147] In some cases the conference is a watershed, which makes activists out of people who previously were only interested. That can be considered direct recruitment. It occurs at the conference. More significant is indirect recruitment, achieved by changing the perceptions of persons who had previously considered the party uncongenial. This kind of recruitment is not achieved at the conferences, but because of them. General publicity or specific

147. Prominent among the exceptions are experts whose advice is available to any party and academics present to observe the process.

proposals generated by the conference cause individuals to revise their personal picture of the party. This process can be seen to work among journalists.[148] The same process occurs among individuals, although it would be difficult to document. Probably the cumulative effect of individual re-assessments triggered by policy conferences is among the most important consequences of the conferences.

Generally the recruitment function has attracted persons who can be broadly characterised as: (1) "intellectuals" who are often expert in one or more specific fields but have an overall interest in the unison of ideas and effective action; (2) "experts" who have a specific competence they want to put to practical effect; and (3) "progressives" who want to help meet contemporary problems. While effective, policy conferences are not the only effective means of recruiting "intellectuals" or "experts". Such

148. Later citations in this paper demonstrate the conclusion of journalists, after Fredericton, that the Progressive Conservative attitude to French Canada was not only not monolithic, but contained strong strains of sympathy and understanding. Similarly, "Kingston" became the code-word for the "new" Pearson Liberalism. Other examples could be cited.

persons are usually visible, and can be invited by party leaders to assist directly in considering specific problems.[149] The important function of the policy conference is to help create a perception of the party which will encourage "visible" potential converts to respond to invitations, and "invisible" potential converts to recognize a congeniality which might ripen into support.

The New Public Perception.

Probably the most important single effect of the policy conferences on the system was that they caused a change in the public perception of the major Opposition party. They revealed the interest of the party in an electorate and a range of issues

149. The policy conference, while new as a form, was not the first or only instance of direct recourse to "experts" or "intellectuals" outside Parliament. Indeed Canadian political parties have been remarkably open to the participation of "outside" specialists; whether these specialists have been influential is another question. Of the existing parties the CCF-NDP was mid-wifed and sustained by "intellectuals"; Social Credit fought its first and formative campaign on the promise to bring in technicians whose expertise would solve problems mere people and politicians couldn't comprehend; the Liberal Party, for some time and successfully, regarded the establishment universities of central Canada as a sort of seminary, from which it could draw properly instructed assistants and advice; and even the Progressive Conservative Party directed some of its limited funds to the maintenance of a research office before 1956, when it was supplanted by Allister Grosart and, perhaps consequently, Government.

broader than were currently perceived to concern it. That made the party attractive to some people--whether potential voters or advisors--who had previously considered it inhospitable to their attitudes or aspirations. It became a kind of self-fulfilling perception, breaking old caricatures and creating new opportunities for the party to expand. In a sense, the policy conferences are means by which the party changes its image. It is more than imagery of course, because the image must accord with reality or it will not endure. But the balance between innovative and consolidative forces in a party is always shifting, and the infusion of innovators, attracted by the conference image, can change the reality; it can make the innovative attitude dominant in a party previously consolidative. While not expressed in these terms, that was the central motive of the persons calling the conferences of Port Hope, Fredericton, Kingston and Niagara Falls. It is more difficult to judge how effectively each realized that intention. But three years after Kingston, the Liberal party was restored to office, and three years after Fredericton, a candidate who embodied the attitude of that conference was elected national leader of the

Progressive Conservative party. The Port Hope conference was followed by fifteen years of familiar defeat in federal politics. However, it is worth conjecturing whether the federal party would have survived at all without the encouragement and incentive Port Hope gave the people and attitudes represented there.[150] Port Hope also had a direct and positive effect on the momentum of the Ontario Conservative Party which the next year formed a government which has yet

150. Mr. Meighen asked Mr. Milner, the chairman of Port Hope to chair the Winnipeg leadership convention in 1942 in the hope that this would indicate to Premier John Bracken "that the spirit of Port Hope was very much to the fore and not just a peculiar aberration from the Conservative norm, that it was, indeed, a progressive Conservative party he was being asked to lead." Roger Graham, No Surrender, op cit, p. 141. A remarkable number of the participants at Port Hope subsequently became leading Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament, including: Richard A. Bell, Donald M. Fleming, Hugh John Flemming, J. M. Macdonnell, D. R. Michener, Dr. Sidney Smith, Frank Stanfield, W. H. A. Thomas, and David J. Walker. Several others sought election unsuccessfully.

to be defeated.[151] Obviously the party's strength in Ontario contributed to its survival nationally. The Montmorency Conference had other motives more dominant than exposing the changed nature of the party, and the Niagara Falls conference is, at this writing and by this writer, too close to assess.

151. Such Port Hope participants as Dana Porter, Kelso Roberts, Cecil Frost and A. D. McKenzie played critical roles in the establishment of a Conservative government and organization in Ontario. According to a letter of October 5, 1942, from Frost to Finlayson, the "Port Hope report was received with enthusiasm" by the Ontario Conservative executive and "we have decided to republish it and send thousands of copies out among the Conservative organization throughout Ontario" as a basis for provincial policy discussion. It is also suggested, by the Hon. R. A. Bell, that the Ontario party's success owed something to the impact upon rural Ontario of the new national leader, Mr. Bracken, who might not have come to the national party without the evidence Port Hope provided of an influential contemporary mentality. "If you plot (Bracken's) voyages of discovery as a new Party leader and the results of the 1943 Provincial election you will be able to establish a definite connection." Letter to the writer.

CHAPTER SIX:

TWO EXAMPLES OF THE INNOVATIVE ROLE OF CONFERENCES.

This chapter will treat two instances of policy change and indicate the influence of the policy conference in each case. The first concerns the attitude of the Progressive Conservative party to the role of French Canada in Confederation. This is an instance of an innovation which arose in opposition to the party leadership and found both expression and a thrust towards adoption in a policy conference. The second concerns the response of the party to welfare reform, and specifically to the proposal of a national minimum annual income program. This is an instance of an innovation which was proposed by the party leadership and recommended to the larger party by discussion at a policy conference, among other means. Two disclaimers: first, neither case is typical, but both demonstrate a role conferences play in the process of innovation; second, the fact that each instance concerns a specific policy change should

not suggest that conferences are innovative only when associated with specific policy change. Innovation is a process of which a changed policy is only one part; indeed, changes in individual and collective attitude might be more significant, but are more difficult to document. This chapter is intended to illustrate that innovation by conference has some concrete effects, and is not simply a theoretical construct.

It is difficult to determine precisely what the Diefenbaker government's attitude towards French Canada was in fact when it took office in 1957. Few of the new ministers had much exposure to French Canada before entering the cabinet. Very few spoke or read French, and all were pre-occupied by the unaccustomed responsibilities of office. The consignment of Leon Balcer to a minor portfolio was retrospectively regarded as an act of malice[152] but was as likely due to Mr. Diefenbaker's recollection of Mr. Balcer's

152. Peter Newman expressed, and perhaps created, that consensus. Renegade in Power, McClelland and Stewart, 1963, p. 287.

convention opposition, or a simple under-assessment of the importance of a "Quebec lieutenant", as the phrase then was, or a belief that someone better than Mr. Balcer would arise in the imminent next election. The attention of the country, and apparently of the Progressive Conservative Quebec caucus, focussed on other issues until the double deaths of Premiers Maurice Duplessis and Paul Sauve, the defeat of the Union Nationale and the beginning of the "Quiet Revolution." One tangible previous indication of the attitude of the Diefenbaker government to French Canada was the working out, by Premier Sauve and Donald Fleming, of a university grants agreement that had eluded the St. Laurent government. Another, later, was the Fulton formula for constitutional amendment, which briefly won the agreement of the Lesage Liberal government of Quebec. The Lesage election caused a certain panic within the Progressive Conservative Quebec caucus[153] but not many specific responses

153. Private correspondence with the writer.

were proposed. The Diefenbaker government's introduction of bilingual cheques and simultaneous translation have been retrospectively decried as tokenism but, without further evidence, it would be wrong to interpret that as the motive of their sponsors. Certainly some ministers, and some Progressive Conservatives outside Parliament, were urging a more extensive recognition of the "French fact" by the Diefenbaker government. It remains an open question whether the failure to respond more adequately was due to malice, as is fashionably assumed, or simply to an ignorance of French Canada which, though not excusable in a national government, was widespread among English-speaking Canadians at the time, and had been as evident in the St. Laurent government.

Whatever the reasons, the Progressive Conservative party soon renewed a reputation

of lacking much sympathy for French Canada;[154] by the time of the general election defeat of 1963 a reputation for hostility was firmly re-established. The reputation is itself important. It influenced the response to the party, positive and negative, of voters in English-and French-speaking Canada; and it became one of the cliches which the media assumed into its coverage of the Progressive

154. The extent of that reputation is evident most graphically in the 1962 election results in Quebec, where the Progressive Conservative party fell from 50 seats to 14, lost votes in every constituency, and saw their proportion of the vote in Quebec province fall from 49.5 per cent to 30 per cent. Figures are taken from "The Election in the Province of Quebec", by Leon Dion; Papers on the 1962 Election, edited by John Meisel, University of Toronto Press, 1964.

Conservative party.[155] Perhaps most important, it informed the view the party took of itself; many Progressive Conservatives were partisans for reasons quite unrelated to French Canada, and, having no particular personal opinion on the questions that issue involved, were as susceptible to public and media definitions as

155. The bias of the media is often not intentional. Although some journalists deliberately distort the motives or actions of a party, most of the bias derives from the nature of journalism, which requires writing without adequate research, and an unusual reliance upon "accepted" assumptions. Once it became popularly assumed, among the media, that the Progressive Conservative party was hostile to French Canada, facts were sifted and presented selectively to support that assumption, not necessarily out of malice, but because a journalist needs some basic assumptions to give coherence to his report, and hasn't the time to assay the truth of each assumption. Often the assumptions are accurate. They might have been in this case. Nonetheless, journalists began to treat as "significant" the relatively junior status of Quebec ministers in the Diefenbaker cabinet, and as "insignificant" the very open and sympathetic attitude to French Canada of ministers as influential and different as Davie Fulton and Alvin Hamilton. And the media, being in the business of communication, implanted their assumption in the public mind, where it fit into conventional wisdom about the Progressive Conservative party and French Canada.

any other innocents. Thus the reputation became the reality, as partisans increasingly comported themselves, and voters assigned their support, in response to what they understood to be the attitudes of the party.

Reputation was only one source of the position developed within the Progressive Conservative party towards French speaking Canada and Confederation. Of the other sources, four were particularly important. One was the simple rush of the "Quiet Revolution", which would have raised problems for any federal government; the difficulty was probably intensified by the absence of any intimate connection between the Progressive Conservative government and the architects of the "Quiet Revolution."[156] A second source was the lack of sympathy for French Canada, amounting to suspicion and prejudice, and the willingness in Opposition to exploit racial tension for partisan gain. But the balancing two sources--which in time combined to become innovative--

156. Indeed, if one accepts the account of the Hon. Pierre Sevigny, This Game of Politics, McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1965, pp. 190-197, there was not much connection between the federal government and the leadership of the Union Nationale, and little or no attempt to establish an effective federal Progressive Conservative organization in Quebec Province.

were the awareness that hostility to French-speaking Canada was simply not viable policy for a national party, and the persisting empathy with French-speaking Canada of influential members of the party outside Quebec. This latter factor is particularly important. The recognition of the dual nature of Canada was not a transformation or a turnabout of the party; there have usually been influential Progressive Conservatives prepared to support whatever arrangements were considered feasible in their time to maintain a viable French-speaking community in Canada, and this attitude simply became ascendent again.[157] The policy conferences, Montmorency and particularly Fredericton, played an important role in this process. But they did not create the policy; they were simply

157. Certainly, that attitude prevailed when the party was formed, by Macdonald and Cartier, and later it was reflected in the election of Balcer as association president, the bilingualism of the two other candidates in the 1956 convention (Fleming and Fulton), the close friendship between some English-speaking Conservatives and some Quebec bleus. Evidence is difficult to gather retrospectively when it concerns private attitudes not public acts. The writer knows no "documentation" of this attitude but has encountered it full-grown and assumes it had some parentage. Documentation would be valuable, particularly against the backdrop of known hostility or indifference to French-speaking Canada, as an illustration that Canadian parties are seldom monolithic.

instruments for its expression. Indeed, this case suggests that innovation is instrumental, not substantial, and that agents of innovation are most effective in concert with other forces.

That return to ascendancy was gradual and the Fredericton Conference was only one point along the route. After it came the dispute over the Fulton-Favreau formula;[158] the resignation of Leon Balcer; the campaign attacks of 1965 upon Guy Favreau, Maurice Lamontagne, Rene Tremblay, and Lucien Rivard; the defeat of the Liberal Lesage government and the election as Prime Minister of Quebec of the Canadien bleu Daniel Johnson; the public initiative on behalf of reform and fraternity by the Progressive Conservative Prime Minister of Ontario, John Robarts; the public adoption of a "flexible" approach to the constitution and French Canada by the four leading

158. In late 1964 a memorandum to Mr. Diefenbaker from Mr. Fulton was leaked to the press; Fulton, recently Justice Minister, asserted that the Pearson government proposal for repatriation of the constitution, which Diefenbaker was opposing, was in essence the same as that the Progressive Conservative government had itself recently proposed.

contenders for the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative party;[159] the recommendation of Montmorency; and finally the election and conduct as national leader of Robert Stanfield. The movement began before the Fredericton conference. It was evident in the Diefenbaker government, which extended to the French language more recognition than previous governments and briefly secured agreement on repatriation. Some French-and some English-speaking Quebecers were critical of the leadership's response to French Canada almost from the moment the "Quiet Revolution" began, and that criticism increased as the general elections of 1962 and 1963 approached.[160] After April, 1963, there was growing concern about the isolation and humiliation of Leon Balcer in the Progressive Conservative caucus and the nature of the Official Opposition attack upon Prime Minister Pearson's

159. Robert Stanfield, Duff Roblin, Davie Fulton, George Hees.

160. Chapter 20 of Renegade in Power, and Sevigny's This Game of Politics, though written from different vantages, both indicate the estrangement between Mr. Diefenbaker and some of his colleagues and advisors in Quebec province.

constitutional policies and French-speaking colleagues. Late in 1963, Davie Fulton began a series of speeches on "The Canadian Union", in which he discussed French Canada and Confederation in terms notably different from those adopted by Mr. Diefenbaker.[161] While not able to contest the national leader directly, the four Progressive Conservative provincial premiers[162] set themselves apart from his position on the Canada Pension Plan, opting out, the Fulton-Favreau formula, the flag, and bilingualism federally and, in Manitoba and Ontario, within their own jurisdiction. Three of the premiers, at least,[163] went out of their way, in public speeches, to advocate a more flexible approach to French Canada.

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161. There were four main speeches, at Saskatoon, Quebec City, Toronto and Vancouver.

162. Duff Roblin of Manitoba; John Robarts of Ontario; Walter Shaw of Prince Edward Island; Robert Stanfield of Nova Scotia.

163. In late June, 1965, Roblin, Robarts and Stanfield, as well as other leading Progressive Conservatives, addressed eight simultaneous banquets, on the Confederation theme, in a program organized by the Progressive Conservative Student Federation to commemorate the 150th anniversary year of the birth of Sir John A. Macdonald.

As suggested above, the Fredericton conference was conceived, in part, to appeal to potential Progressive Conservatives who could not support the general interpretation of the party as then expressed in Parliament. Naturally, in 1964, many of this group were particularly concerned about the attitude of the parliamentary leadership to French speaking Canada and Confederation. One of the four days of the conference was dedicated entirely to discussion of the problems of Confederation. There was an extensive and energetic attempt to attract French-speaking participation of a high quality. It is a significant comment on the reputation of the party in French speaking Canada at the time that the response was so slight from French speaking Canadians from Quebec, whether prominent or not. Only 16 attended, out of a conference total of 205; this figure included one Member of Parliament and two Senators, an employee of the party and three formal speakers or resource people.[164] However, if the French-speaking participation was slight numerically, some of those who

164. Proportionately, participation from French-speaking Canada outside Quebec was much stronger, with six francophone delegates from the Atlantic region and two from the prairies.

came were highly articulate and able[165] and, more significantly, their point of view was understood and seemed to be shared. This was the substantive issue on which the differences between the caucus and the conference were most clear.

The newspaper commentary on the conference is instructive.

> ...the closing day of the conference ...was devoted largely to exposition of Quebec's complaints about Confederation and discussion of what must be done to preserve the union. With hardly a hesitation, the majority of delegates accepted the view that the Constitution must be revised or rewritten to implement the French Canadian claim to equality in the partnership. They applauded the explicit rejection of the Diefenbaker theory that Canada can be governed without significant representation from Quebec.[166]

And

> While an observer at the conference had the curious feeling that French Quebec was under-represented, he also had the feeling that despite the great variety of topics under discussion, French Canada was topic number one.

165. Hon. Leon Balcer, Marcel Faribault, Hon. Jacques Flynn, Marc Lalonde, Claude Ryan.

166. Toronto Globe and Mail, editorial, September 14, 1964.

It showed in many little ways; in the immediate, and interested, speculation that Marcel Faribault, president of the Trust General du Canada, was offering himself as a potential candidate when he remarked that men with the ability should give ten of their most productive years to politics.

The impact he made on many of the English-speaking delegates, particularly those who have little contact with French Canadians, was profound. Every time he gave a French Canadian approach to a subject in his highly literate and precise style, he had the conference buzzing.

A comment by Gordon Fairweather, 41-year old MP for Royal, was an indication of the fact that French Canada was the main topic and that the reform group has given a new direction to at least part of the party.... There was an immediate and prolonged burst of applause when, in discussing the philosophy of conservatism, he said:

"It may be, as some tell us, numerically possible to govern Canada without strong representation from Quebec. But, I suggest, it is an objective unworthy of the attempt."

Interest might have been expected to lag after three long days of conferences on a variety of often profound subjects. Yet fully 150 of the 200 delegates stayed on Saturday morning mainly to hear Claude Ryan...and Marc Lalonde.... There were still 100 interested listeners for the afternoon discussion on their outlines and to hear a closing statement from Mr. Faribault.

> Egan Chambers captured the mood of the majority when he said that English Canada would be well advised to begin negotiating a new constitution with moderates such as the panel members before they were forced to negotiate with extremists.[167]

And

> First and foremost, a sharp turn of direction was signalled in the widespread demand that the party should at least try to restore good relations with French Canada. This bubbled up spontaneously throughout the whole four days....
>
> The spontaneous demand for better relations with French Canada at this conference can mean a vitally important gain for all Canada. Whether it succeeds or fails in producing any entente between the Conservative party and Quebec opinion, it is likely to influence the party leadership. It reduces the likelihood of a drive for power based openly or implicitly on reaction in the rest of the country against "Liberal pandering to Quebec.[168]

The question of the approach to the constitution was innovatively important in a symbolic, as well as a substantive, way. Quite apart from the motives of empathy and strategy, many of the Fredericton conferees, and other partisans who didn't attend the conference but were impressed by it, wanted to demonstrate their difference from the parliamentary

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167. Max McMahon, editorial report in The Montreal Star, September 14, 1964.

168. John Bird, The Toronto Star, September 14, 1964.

party. In that summer of the flag debate, when the parliamentary party seemed to be isolating itself deliberately in rural older English Canada, the Confederation question was the natural ground of dissent. This is not simply to suggest that many partisans adopted a "flexible" constitutional position for extraneous reasons; of course they did, as many partisans on the other side had come to an "inflexible" position for extraneous reasons, as some partisans of all positions always do. What should be emphasised is that the instinct to change was abroad in the party, and that instinct emerged at the Fredericton conference, and focussed on the Confederation question. The conference did not create the innovative impulse but was, in a sense, created by it. However, simply by happening, the conference gave coherence and momentum to innovation, most specifically on the issues of Confederation.

The attitude of the conference did not change the policy of the leader, nor of the caucus. Only three months after the conference, Claude Ryan wrote in Le Devoir:

> La conférence de Fredericton, tenue en septembre dernier, a confirmé l' existence, à l'intérieur du parti, d'un important noyau d'hommes ouverte à une compréhension généreuse des réalités canadiennes d'aujourd'hui. L'accueil réservé à Marcel Faribault et à d'autres porte-parole du Québec n'était pas un accueil de façade. Il fut chaleureux, et suivi d'ailleurs de multiples contacts privés, d'une abondante correspondance avec les intéressés et d'articles publiés dans la presse d'à peu prés tout le pays.
>
> ".... Mais les mois ont passé et, sauf quelques rares interventions individuelles qui tranchaient sur les déclarations du chef, la ligne 'dure' de M. Diefenbaker a paru reprendre son emprise sur le parti.... On ne saurait conclure, malgré ces apparences, que 'l'esprit de Fredericton' soit déjà enterré."[169]

That obituary was premature. The underlining of the differences between caucus and conference on this fundamental question speeded the confrontation on the leadership. More significant for the purpose of this paper, is the very real probability that persons who wanted Mr. Diefenbaker to retire equated a change in leadership with a change in party policy towards French Canada. That equation, if not inspired by the Fredericton conference, was fortified by it. Consequently, once it was decided to call a leadership convention, the decision to adopt a different approach to French Canada followed naturally, and virtually without debate. Montmorency discussed

169. Le Devoir, December 22, 1964.

details, and produced a resolution,[170] but the new consensus had already been established, in a process in which the Fredericton conference played an important role.

That was the process of change within the party. It might seem not to have had much consequence for the larger political system. The change in policy did not improve the electoral position of the party, least of all in Quebec. Nor might it appear to have reduced cultural tensions in the country. In fact it did both. There was a short season, after the Progressive Conservative leadership convention and before the Liberal, when Mr. Stanfield, speaking about Confederation, in the spirit of Fredericton and the name of the Progressive Conservative party seemed to be successful in reconciling English Canadians to the prospect of change in national constitutional and cultural arrangements. That was his expressed intention and there are reasons it should have worked, principally the fact that no instrument

170. "That Canada is and should be a federal state. That Canada is composed of two founding peoples (deux nations) with historic rights who have been joined by people from many lands. That the Constitution should be such as to permit and encourage their full and harmonious growth and development in equality throughout Canada."

is better able to quiet suspicions than one which has served recently to arouse them. That atmosphere ended with the general election of 1968.

In electoral terms, the Progressive Conservative proportion of the vote in Quebec Province in 1968 was down only very slightly from the party's 1965 proportion. In 1965 Progressive Conservative candidates received 21.3 percent of the total vote; in 1968, 21.1 percent. Studies of the motive and pattern of voting in Quebec in those two elections have not yet been published. However, it seems logical to assume that the incentive for French-speaking Canadians to vote for the Liberal party was much higher in 1968 when such a vote would mean a French-speaking Prime Minister. Of more significance is the strong prima facie evidence that English-speaking Quebecers found in Mr. Trudeau's candidacy and position, an extraordinary incentive to vote Liberal in 1968. Rough evidence, drawn from vote totals in Quebec constituencies with a high or predominant English-speaking vote, suggest that Mr. Trudeau's party won almost all the English-speaking Quebec vote in 1968, a good portion of which had been won in

1965 by Mr. Diefenbaker's party. The Liberal proportion of the vote in predominantly English-speaking Westmount rose from 55.4 percent in 1965 to 78.4 percent in 1968; in predominantly English-speaking Notre Dame de Grace from 39.8 percent in 1965 to 78.4 peroent in 1968; in largely English-speaking Mount Royal, from 57.3 percent in 1965 to 90.7 percent in 1968; with the same Liberal candidates running, against respectable opponents. At least two Progressive Conservative incumbents, who had traditionally won a good share of the English-speaking vote in their constituencies, lost their seats to what they believe was an English-speaking shift.[171] If there was in fact a massive English shift to the Liberals in Quebec in 1968, the fact that the Progressive Conservative proportion of the total remained virtually unchanged suggests that the Progressive Conservative Party won a larger proportion of the French-speaking vote in Quebec in 1968, even against Mr. Trudeau. In any event, the Progressive Conservative party was the only Opposition party to hold its own proportion of the total vote in Quebec against the

171. Heward Grafftey in Missisquoi and Roger Regimbal in Argenteuil.

Trudeau Liberals in 1968. The NDP fell from 12 percent to 8 percent, and the Social Credit and others from 21.2 percent in 1965 to 17.6 percent in 1968. That suggests that a process in which policy conferences played a central role was on the very brink of changing one of the most significant and stubborn features of the Canadian political system, the dominance in Quebec of a single federal party and the consequent absence of a federal option there. Had the federal Progressive Conservative party not faced Trudeau it might have buried Riel.[172] That would have been an innovation of incalculable consequence. It is arguable whether the emergence of Mr. Trudeau was a consolidative response to innovative influences engendered in the political system at Fredericton and elsewhere; as it is arguable whether this innovation has now spent its force. Clearly, however, within the smaller system of the Progressive Conservative Party, a significant change did occur in the policy towards Confederation, and policy

172. It is possible that some of the Progressive Conservative support in 1968 in French-speaking Quebec was due directly to a reaction against Mr. Trudeau, since his views on federalism were regarded as so inflexible and wrong by some leading then-moderate French-speaking Canadians that they would actively support the party that seemed best able to oppose him. Even given their opposition to the Trudeau doctrine, however, it is likely they would not have joined the Progressive Conservative party

conferences contributed importantly to the change.

There is an important historic division within the Progressive Conservative Party about the extent and nature of government involvement in social services. Prior to the 1956 leadership convention, the party had the reputation of opposing the elaboration, if not the principles, of the welfare state. Changing that reputation was among the most dramatic and immediate changes wrought by Mr. Diefenbaker's leadership. The Liberal government became "the six buck boys"[173] and the Progressive Conservative leader campaigned on a platform of "social justice." As the national government, the Progressive Conservatives substantially extended pensions and unemployment insurance, introduced Winter Works, the Atlantic Provinces Adjustment grants, and ARDA to combat unemployment and regional depression, and established the Hall Royal Commission which recommended medicare. However

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without the changes associated with the Fredericton and Montmorency conferences.

173. That was Mr. Diefenbaker's campaign response to the 1957 Liberal government proposal to increase old-age pensions by $6 a year.

contentious other aspects of his legacy, Mr. Diefenbaker's commitment and contribution to social reform is generally acknowledged. Clearly, however, not all members of his own party approved that commitment and critics of the party assumed that, when Mr. Diefenbaker was gone, they could re-apply the old stereotype.

In fact, the commitment to social issues in the party extended well beyond Mr. Diefenbaker. That was due partly to the influence of the new constituency Mr. Diefenbaker had won for the party, partly to the process of self-fulfilling perceptions discussed above, and partly to the general inaccuracy of the reactionary caricature. Of the leading candidates to succeed Mr. Diefenbaker, at least three[174] were clearly in the progressive tradition. Mr. Stanfield[175] in his major address as a candidate to the convention said explicitly:

. . .

174. Robert Stanfield, Duff Roblin, Alvin Hamilton.

175. As well as having been premier of a province preoccupied with poverty and disparity, Mr. Stanfield had been minister of education, where he had become impressed by the inadequacy of manpower retraining programs; although less publicized than the proposed income guarantee, reform of retraining was a twin pillar of the proposal for welfare reform.

> In my opinion, whatever cause we serve, we have a responsibility to the disadvantaged and the poor. As a Nova Scotian and a Maritimer, I have known something of the problems created by chronic poverty...we in Eastern Canada have no monopoly on this aspect of the Canadian society. Education and technology and the rush of change are making two communities within Canada, one is comfortable and secure, and the other is not. I cannot conceive of a political party, whose purpose must be to make democracy a meaningful expression, that would not view with concern the growing separation within Canada of those with opportunity and those without it.[176]

So when the leadership changed, the commitment remained. Mr. Stanfield recognized, however, the need to re-assert the commitment, partly to head off internal critics of the policy, but mainly to prevent external critics of the party from re-applying the Bay Street stigma.

Other factors contributed to the determination to identify the Progressive Conservative party with a strong and positive response to poverty in Canada. The situation offered a unique opportunity to unite behind one platform both party progressives, who wanted to extend social justice, and traditionalists, who wanted to change a welfare

176. Progressive Conservative Centennial Convention, September 8, 1967.

system they considered inefficient and too expensive. There was a growing public consciousness of poverty and a concern to attack it. However, the issue was not a priority of the Liberal government. In addition, it appeared in late 1967 and early 1968 that the economy was going to be the issue on which the Progressive Conservatives would win the impending general election; a Progressive Conservative party, campaigning on its superior capacity for economic management would be particularly susceptible to caricature as reactionary, so the determination to attack poverty would have to be explicit. Finally, even before Mr. Trudeau's selection as Liberal leader, Mr. Stanfield hoped to avoid a campaign which would focus on Confederation questions; he believed such a focus would disrupt the consensus then developing in English-speaking Canada and hoped an emphasis on the economy, including an attack on poverty, would deflect debate from Confederation and the constitution.

The explicit proposal for a minimum annual income had two specific sources, beyond the general concern to respond to poverty and reform

the welfare system. The most substantial was research being done by the Canadian Welfare Council, whose officials had proposed a variant of the negative income tax. Also influential was research, and particularly debate, occurring in the United States; the fact that the concept of a minimum income was acceptable for public discussion in the United States encouraged the Progressive Conservative leadership to raise the question in Canada. After consultations with the Canadian Welfare Council, and others, Mr. Stanfield proposed:

> ...to set out, consciously and deliberately and in good faith, to eliminate poverty and provide the means and the incentive for all Canadians to live full lives. ...There are certain steps which it makes sense to take as a start. For instance, it is sensible and just to pay a guaranteed annual income to that group of Canadians who need help and are unable to earn an income of their own... and who today live below the poverty line. This is our firm objective although it cannot be accomplished immediately.[177]

177. Speech to the Western Ontario Progressive Conservative Association, London, Ontario, May 4, 1968. Delivering the speech in London had the incidental advantage of directly notifying one of the most traditional centers of the federal party of the determination to maintain a progressive stance in social policy.

Almost immediately party canvassers reported a strong reaction against the adjective "guaranteed". The party was by that time engaged in a losing semantic argument on another front[178] and did not need to cultivate confusion about the meaning of "guaranteed" as well. The issue was pressed in only one other major speech in the campaign,[179] and then in the context of general welfare reform.

That was a tactical withdrawal because the proposal was too unfamiliar to broach in an election campaign and required explanation and discussion in calmer atmosphere.[180] When it was decided to convene the Niagara Falls Conference, the organizers determined to emphasise two policy areas particularly: tax reform, because a government white paper was imminent; and poverty. By that time, Parliament had granted funds to establish a small Official Opposition research bureau, whose first

178. About the meaning of "deux nations".

179. Edmonton, June 11, 1968.

180. It is perhaps historically interesting that Mr. Trudeau served early notice of his concept of rational debate when, in response to the Stanfield proposal, he promised to "cut out the free stuff."

major assignment was to prepare a minimum income proposal, for discussion purposes only. During the month before the Niagara Falls Conference, for which this proposal was published in advance, Mr. Stanfield again discussed the issue in public speeches.[181] While he deliberately did not advocate a particular form of program, he stated, as leader of the party, the goals he believed welfare reform should achieve.[182] He imposed the issue, but not the response. That was also the effect of specifying that one of the eight discussion "streams" at Niagara Falls would discuss poverty, yet arranging in the program that more than one possible policy

181. That was the theme of speeches to the "Life After Birth" Conference of the Young Progressive Conservatives and the Progressive Conservative Student Federation, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, August 23, 1969, and a meeting of PC constituency associations of Vegreville, Battle River, Battleford-Kindersley and Meadow Lake constituencies, Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, September 8, 1969.

182. "...any good welfare program must work toward three objectives. First, it must try to see that every Canadian will have the opportunity of a decent standard of living. Second, it must make sure that public welfare funds are not given away to people who don't need help. Third, it must incorporate a system of incentives, a plan that positively encourages a man to get out and work as soon and as much as possible." Lloydminster, Saskatchewan, September 8, 1969.

response would be considered. The "stream" was divided into five half-day sessions, two of which were virtually unstructured and encouraged extensive discussion. No formal vote was taken, since the conference had no authority to make policy, but the consensus expressed by the co-chairman[183] was subject to discussion and amendment in a morning session the last day of the conference. In the event, her consensus was accepted, although there had been extensive debate and disagreement. In his own closing remarks, Mr. Stanfield announced that the agreed consensus would be referred to a policy committee within the caucus.[184] That has been done, and the committee has adopted the practice of regularly inviting participation of non-parliamentarians. Mr. Anthony Westell, a newspaper columnist, syndicated, wrote that this result was a major defeat for Mr. Stanfield.[185] What it meant instead was that

183. In this case the active co-chairman was Mrs. Jean Wadds, former Member of Parliament. Her co-chairman was Fernand Alie, then president of the Progressive Conservative Association of Quebec.

184. Speech to conclude the Niagara Falls Conference, October 13, 1969.

185. The original column ran in The Toronto Star, October 13, 1969. Its significance is only that Mr. Westell's professional preference for drama over fact encouraged a public impression that was the opposite of what happened. However, the impression of a column is as ephemeral as the opinion of a columnist.

a contentious proposal originated by the leadership and which the rank-and-file at first reacted against, has been discussed and embraced by a representative body of the whole party. Since it was not, by mid-1971, official party policy and the sponsoring party had not, by mid-1971, formed the government, the innovative effect on the larger political system cannot be clearly assessed. However, at the least, the process had a high educative value. Most of the discussion was public, occurring in a way that would inform partisans and non-partisans about the proposal, and thereby reduce to some degree the suspicions which might deter an innovative response to poverty. If some form of minimum annual income proposal is adopted, the innovative impact of this process on the system will be even more pronounced.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

CONCLUSIONS.

This paper has considered five national party policy conferences, in the context of the requirement and performance of innovation in the Canadian political system. Certain general conclusions can be stated;

1. The Party as Innovator.

Although there is dispute about their effectiveness, parties are generally acknowledged to play an important innovative role in systems which feature active party competition. At the least, when competition exists, parties make it possible periodically to change the personnel of government. Usually they do more. When it faces criticism and the prospect of displacement by an alternative party, the majority party tends to stay responsive to public attitudes. A minority party tends to embrace new people and proposals as a necessary means to win office. The unique function of the party is to provide a dynamic connection between the citizens and the state; the party is the isthmus on which public institutions and private attitudes most regularly meet. Consequently one innovative function of parties is to reflect changes in public attitude and

thereby contribute to changes in public policy. That happens most dramatically when one party replaces another in government, but the process is more regular than that.

It should be emphasised that the critical change discussed here is change in attitude, rather than in the detail of policy. The concept of "policy-making" is misleading. Parties are competent only to deal with the general direction of a policy. Its specific detail must be worked out by other agents in another atmosphere. Leon Epstein correctly observes that "parties, given their electoral functions, are not especially well qualified to assume the additional functions of policy-making."[186] Supporting that observation is extensive evidence, which it would be perverse to interpret simply as proof of bad faith, of specific proposals made in opposition and modified or abandoned in office. The significance of "party policy" is not its substance or sophistication but rather the degree to which it represents new attitudes which will be acted on. The element of "action" is crucial. It is what

186. Leon D. Epstein, Political Parties in Western Democracies, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1957, p. 269.

distinguishes the party from the seminar. The function of the party is not to give ideas birth, but to give them effect. Even then, in formal terms, the party is only an intermediary, whose power consists in its capacity to force the formal institutions to respond.

2. The Particular Need for Party Innovation in Canada.

Party innovation is particularly important in Canada where it is necessary not simply to maintain the socio-political system, but also to maintain an awareness of the national community. In other countries geography, culture or history relieve national institutions of some of the burden of uniting the nation. In Canada, that role rests more exclusively with institutions, which must more frequently prove the relevance of the whole system to each of its parts. To an unusual degree, the Canadian national state must be active to survive. Nations stronger in history or homogeneity can rely on those strengths to resist particularist internal attacks and to respond to expensive national challenges. Canada cannot, and is further disadvantaged by the weakness of many agencies which in other societies play uniting and innovating roles. By default, the burden of that role falls disproportionately upon the national

political parties, which alone among national agencies combine both the incentive to propose change and the ability to legitimize its implementation.

Canadian national unity depends upon political innovation. As in every country new grievances constantly emerge. In Canada if a grievance goes without response, there is the danger that the anger of the aggrieved will focus on the regime, not just the government of the day. If inaction is attributed to regional or racial or other persistent prejudice there is no Canadian myth strong enough to protect the regime. Virtually the only way to maintain the regime is to make it responsive. That is the function of the parties--and a function which no other national agency performs so consistently and broadly.

The formal policy conference is not necessarily the most important instrument of innovation in a national party, but it is symbolic of the process. Indeed the conference phenomenon indicates that innovation is so central a function of parties that if existing agencies fail to perform it, new agencies will be created. Policy conferences developed when traditional instruments of innovation stopped innovating, as in the cases of Port Hope and

Fredericton, or needed help, as in the cases of Kingston and Niagara Falls. The conference form was chosen precisely because of its capacity for innovation. It is important to emphasise that only the form of the conferences was new; the function is traditional and elemental to a competitive party. The participation in policy discussion of partisans from outside caucus was well-established before the conferences, and every conference explicitly respected the exclusive power of the caucus to legitimize policy. In traditional fashion again, the policy conferences adopted proposals for change but did not "originate" them. As with the party in the larger social system, the function of policy conferences is not to pull ideas new-born from the womb and slap them into life but, after they have gained a little strength, to propose them for adoption by un-natural parents. Even then, the policy conference cannot sign the papers to authorize adoption; that remains a prerogative of the parliamentary leadership. The conference can, however, indicate whether the child would be welcome.

It could be argued that conferences in fact stifle innovation, by deflecting innovators into a side room where they can rejoice in one another's company, perhaps add some numbers to the total occupancy of the party house, but still command only the room, not the house. This may have been the sort of view taken of the Port Hope and Fredericton conferences by Mr. Meighen and Mr. Diefenbaker respectively. Mr. Meighen thought Port Hope "did no harm or very little"[187] and Mr. Diefenbaker used the occasion of his speech at Fredericton both to lambast the Liberals and observe that he didn't really need the Beatle wig proposed by Daniel Cappon, a McLuhanite, as a means of identifying with the "new" electorate. The evidence indicates, however, that the conferences served to bring the innovators into the main rooms of the party house, and made the party itself more competitive in the larger system.

3. Innovation and Independence.

It would be highly contentious, and virtually impossible, to attempt to rank the policy conferences in terms of their importance as innovative instruments.

187. Roger Graham, No Surrender, op cit, p. 140, citing correspondence, Meighen to his son.

One would be involved in trading card computations: one Dalton Camp for two Tom Kents, "deux nations" for economic continentalism. However it is possible, and useful, to distinguish among the conferences in terms of the independence of their innovative function. Three categories seem reasonable: (1) conferences which were independent sources of innovation; (2) conferences which were part of a larger process of innovation; and (3) conferences largely unrelated to innovation.

The conference held by the Liberal party at Harrison Hot Springs belongs in the last category. It was sponsored by a party which was not only in government but firmly and relatively freshly there. Ministers were prominent and proselytizing at and before the conference and, in at least one case,[188] the author of a conference paper which disputed a government policy was called to Ottawa for advance dissuasion. The Harrison Hot Springs experience is interesting because, while it was described as a policy conference, it was conducted in an atmosphere very much more like that of resolutions

188. Mel Hurtig, chairman of the conference foreign relations subcommittee.

sessions of annual meetings of the two major parties. It is customary, at those meetings, to encourage the appearance of passionate discussion while carefully avoiding the embarrassment of disagreement with the leadership. Given the diverse and centrifugal nature of the nation, annual meetings are generally designed to reinforce the feeling of family in a party; while discussion is encouraged, disagreement is not. Their general purpose has been to consolidate, not innovate. Such meetings are of course legitimate, as education programs in parties of ideology are legitimate, but they conflict as directly with free or innovative policy discussion.

To a degree that same criticism applies to the Montmorency conference, which was more interested in unity than enquiry. Montmorency occurred, however, during an inter-regnum, and there was no established leadership to articulate or enforce a party line. The contribution of Montmorency was explicitly to extend to policy the innovative thrust inevitably associated with a change in leadership, particularly a forced change. Montmorency was an incidental result of innovative forces already in motion, and it belongs just inside the door of the second

category of conference, those which are part of a process of innovation. In the center of that category are the two leader-sponsored conferences, Kingston and Niagara Falls. In both cases, the leader-sponsors were innovators and chose the conference as one instrument, among others; these conferences were instruments of innovation, while Montmorency was an incident of the changes associated with the leadership convention. In conferences of this second category, discussion is less fettered, but not completely free. While discussion is not forced to follow lines favored by the leader-sponsor, it is encouraged to. That would logically apply also to conferences sponsored by innovators who were not party leaders; there would be an inclination for the direction of discussion to conform with the direction of innovation.

The Port Hope and Fredericton conferences are in the category of independent sources of innovation. They occurred because something had to or the system (in this case, the party) would break down. In a sense, they were the purest or freest agents of innovation because, while their participants and organizers knew what kind of consolidative forces

they were "against", they were not bound by an existing direction of innovation. That was particularly so at Fredericton which, with Marshall McLuhan as its theme speaker, ranged more widely in its discussion than any other conference. Port Hope did operate within a semantic framework of developing a viable "free enterprise" alternative to "socialism", but in fact discussion was not canalized in advance. Port Hope occurred during a time preoccupied with ideology. A lot was allowed in the name of "free enterprise", including ideas which many "socialists" of the day could espouse and which some "free enterprisers" found anathema.

In effect, these three categories reflect three different conditions of freedom of discussion: at Harrison Hot Springs there was not much freedom; at Port Hope and Fredericton, virtually no limitation; and in the middle category an implicit but not stifling limitation in that the route of discussion was suggested by the sponsors. Obviously, discussion was not absolutely free at any conference; every administrative decision imposed some limitation, as of course did every prepared paper. The degree of freedom is germane because free inquiry and comment are essential to innovation. A builder ordered to innovate with stone is less likely to find new forms than an innovative builder who has his choice of materials.

That helps focus attention on a dilemma of parties. Just as they require innovation to succeed, they have required preconceptions to survive. Partisanship is based on the preconceived view that "your" party will be right on an issue and its opponent wrong; because of such preconceptions, there are people to man polls in an election, or to respond with skepticism to plausible panaceas when an opponent offers them. The dilemma derives not only from the necessity of weaning your partisans from their preconceptions very gently. A habit develops, of imposing preconceptions, in such a way that policy conferences are policed at Harrison Hot Springs, or directed towards pre-ordained topics at Niagara Falls. Institutions become socialised too and it is significant that, in both parties, the first conferences were the freer. Perhaps the innovative policy conference is already a whooping crane, being extinguished by people who claim to prize it.

4. Innovation and Third Parties.

By focussing upon formal policy conferences this paper has excluded consideration of the CCF-NDP which

did not have policy conferences *per se*. That omission should not suggest that the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties innovate in ways basically different from the CCF-NDP. Such an interpretation would not only be wrong, but would contribute to the mistaken view that they are significantly different kinds of parties. A great deal more attention should be paid to the open-ness of *all* the national parties, and to their service in seeking interests and aspirations which, if left untended, might explode into conflict particularly destructive to a country as loosely-bound as Canada. It is understandable that the "third-party" phenomenon, with its roots in ideology and eccentricity, should attract more attention than the conventional parties--particularly from academic observers. However that has contributed to the false impression that innovation is a particular function of third parties and is performed only irregularly by the major parties.

A similar misconception prevailed about the British parties, deriving from an assumption that a left-wing party is somehow, naturally, more responsive. Robert McKenzie[189] observes that

189. *British Political Parties*, *op cit*, p. 15.

Robert Michels, who originated the "mass-cadre" distinction and inspired the confusion that causes, assumed right wing parties were by definition undemocratic and that left wing parties, because of their natal association with "mass" movements were democratic, indigenously and indestructibly. McKenzie has shown that as the British Labour party grew beyond its populist origins and became competitive it became organizationally almost indistinguishable from the Conservative party. McKenzie particularly emphasises that the similarities persist despite their denial by Labour party spokesmen and despite the appearance of greater constituent participation in the Labour party--an appearance probably sustained because Labour partisans believe they are more effective, not because they are in fact.[190] Clearly there is membership influence in both British parties, in that only at its peril would either party ignore the strong opinion on an issue of its

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190. The Labour party Blackpool conference of 1970 voted, over the direct objection of Harold Wilson, to instruct the parliamentary party to pay more attention to Labour party resolutions. That the conference should vote confidence in itself is hardly surprising; Mr. Wilson's attitude was much more significant, reflecting the reality that was and will be.

constituents. Just as clearly, in any crunch the leadership decides. That can be called "oligarchy" or not, but it is as much a feature of so-called "mass" as of so-called "cadre" parties, and as much a feature of Canada as of Britain. The former national leader of the Canadian CCF, Mr. M. J. Coldwell, acknowledged as much when he told the party's 1948 national convention:

> [The electoral promises], and the manner of fulfillment, must be left to the judgement of the Parliamentary group whose activities will be assessed by the Canadian electorate to whom in the final analysis under our democratic and parliamentary system they must always be responsible.[191]

McKenzie uses a similar argument, of responsibility to electorate and Parliament, to justify the limits on membership control.[192] While that justification seems to involve another fiction[193] it is beside the point. What is important is to recognize that the claim that responsiveness of parties varies directly with their origin or form of organization is no more than a myth. The determinants of innovation are elsewhere, and should be examined.

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191. Quoted in F. C. Engelmann, "Membership Participation in Policy-Making in the CCF", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, vol. 22, no. 2, p. 173.

192. McKenzie, op cit, pp. 587-588.

193. It is difficult to determine the extent to which a sense of "responsibility" to the electorate impinges on practicing parliamentarians. The writer's impression

5. Innovation and Party Competition.

Necessity is the mother of innovation. Parties accept or propose changes because that is the best way to win or keep office. When the party system is imbalanced, between one strong party and one or several weak parties, there is often less incentive to innovate. That can be for three reasons. First, the majority party can consider itself safe without innovation. Second, the minority parties can think they are so far behind nothing will help. Third, minority parties accustomed to losing sometimes develop goals other than competition for office; by draining off part of the vote against the government they can in effect protect the majority party and relieve it of the necessity to innovate. It would be very useful to have an objective study of the effect upon innovation of third parties whose existence makes the system uncompetitive.

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is that it is an argument to be used when it serves, but not an article of faith, and that not many practicing parliamentarians exert themselves to know what "the public" wants on ordinary issues. They consult their friends and partisan advisors rather more closely, or they consult their conscience, or nothing at all. That impression is generally confirmed by the interviews reported in Allan Kornberg: Canadian Legislative Behaviour: A Study of the 25th Parliament, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, pp. 126-129. The motive for heeding public attitudes is probably more often an interest in re-election, rather than a belief the public is, or has a right.

6. Innovation and Federalism.

Whenever power is shared, something must force the sharing. The most significant influence in Canada is federalism, which requires a division of official powers and functions, and reflects a diversity of interests which must constantly be mediated. The form of federalism imposes decentralization on national parties and accustoms parties and governments to living with a knowledge of their formal limitations. The fact of federalism, or diversity, means there will always be a demand for modification, at least, of some national policies. Both conditions encourage innovation. Decentralization means there are other avenues to reform than through the parliamentary caucus or party leadership. Dissatisfaction with existing policy means there is always an incentive for parties or governments to consider changing policy.

7. Innovation and the Parliamentary System.

In practice in Canada innovation has been a particular function of opposition parties. Government parties also innovate, but they tend naturally to be less critical of policies enacted in their name. Their innovative role tends to become incidental both to the innovative activities of the formal institutions of government and to the educative and affirmative activities of a party in power.

A party in opposition, on the other hand, is usually preoccupied with the necessity of winning new support. In addition, the parliamentary system encourages innovation in opposition parties, by isolating them from power, by requiring them to criticize every proposal and by ranging them generally "against" official policy. Further the requirement of immediate and reasoned response to government initiatives, and the pay-offs in morale and publicity for catching the government out, require that opposition parties anticipate developments, a process which increases their reliance on dissident or expert opinion in the community.

8. Conferences and Internal Conflict.

Parties are not monoliths. They contain most of the factions and divisions of the larger society. Conflict is as natural and continuous within a national party as it is within the nation. From one perspective, each policy conference can be seen as the instrument of one side in a factional dispute. Sometimes it was an instrument against the constituted authority in the party, sometimes an instrument employed by that authority. In each case, however, the conference was an instrument of an innovative

faction in conflict with a consolidative faction. The conferences were extraordinary instruments resorted to when traditional instruments of innovation needed bolstering or else were controlled by consolidators. In effect, they were born to innovate.

What is important to emphasise is that the conferences are symbols of a conflict that is always going on in a dynamic party. There have always been, in all dynamic Canadian parties, partisans outside Parliament who influenced the course of the party. In other words, the parliamentary caucus has always shared influence with groups outside caucus. The one special and distinguishing power of the leader and caucus is the formal right to declare party policy; that was consistently respected and never disputed by the policy conferences. A useful analogy is to compare the party to Parliament. The caucus is the "government" and has the power to decide. The other faction, represented in policy conferences, the national association and elsewhere, is the "official opposition" with the right to discuss, the ability to influence and the power, ultimately, to change its governors.

9. A Note on the New Limitations of Opposition.

Certain serious electoral disadvantages attach to the role of Official Opposition in the Canadian parliamentary system. There are undeniable advantages as well, involved in the status and visibility of some parliamentary leaders, but probably too little attention has been given to the institutional disabilities of that role, and their implications for the party in the role and for the system. It is, for example, difficult to cite a single case, in any of the eleven jurisdictions of Canada, where the performance by a party of its responsibilities as Official Opposition was the primary source of its success in forming the government in a subsequent general election. So far as parliamentary performance is concerned, the truism holds that office has been often lost but seldom won. This is not to deny that the campaigns conducted by former Opposition parties have sometimes been the critical factor in changing governments, but those have been campaigns in which the parliamentary performance of the challenger has been largely irrelevant. An inept performance in Official Opposition might

prejudice a party seeking to mount a successful campaign outside Parliament, but there is little evidence to suggest that the effective performance of the role of Official Opposition has had any more than a marginal influence in campaigns which succeeded in changing governments. This does not deny the importance of an effective Official Opposition in parliament or legislature, but is simply to affirm that the importance of that role is institutional, not electoral; its effect is to criticize governments but not to change them. The important point is that the very effectiveness of the Official Opposition party in parliamentary politics can inhibit its effectiveness in electoral politics. Classically, the Official Opposition has two roles in Parliament, as critic and alternative. In practice in Parliament, the role of critic is paramount. The idea that the Governor-General could call upon the Official Opposition party to form an "alternative" government had little life after King-Byng, and virtually none after Mr. Pearson's retroactive

redefinition of the nature of non-confidence in 1968. It offends notions of popular democracy anyway. Any government which came to office in that way would meet immediate and virtually irresistible pressures to have the judgement of Her Majesty's representative confirmed or rejected by that of the people. The limitations inherent in the role of critic are two, one traditional and one emerging. The traditional limitation is that the party is habitually off-balance, responding and bound to the initiatives and priorities of the Government. It can occasionally flush a hare and chase it, but that is more diverting than decisive. Not only is the Official Opposition party precluded from making its own issues, it is often so preoccupied with Parliament that it fails to see the issues developing in the country.

The other limitation is that the stance of a critic is necessarily negative. This is a particular burden in modern circumstances, when developments in education, information and the scope and complexity of public business have changed public perceptions and expectations of Parliament and parties. There is reason to believe that an increasing proportion of the Canadian electorate

perceives the function of Parliament to be legislative and the function of parties to be the proposal of "positive" policy for public consideration. That change, from classical perceptions of Parliament as a place of debate and parties as the major participants in debate, creates particular problems for Opposition parties, whose institutional role is to be critical or "negative". Changes in the scope of public business and the rate and speed of media transmission to the public also squeeze the Opposition, who must counter considered statements of Government policy, often with little warning, preparation or assistance, first in Parliament, and immediately thereafter in capsule form on national television. The traditional "negative" requirements of the system are reinforced by the instinct to be cautious and critical in short-notice response to complex announcements. So each night on television, the image goes forth of well-prepared ministers trying valiantly to act, and uninformed Opposition leaders trying stubbornly to stop them. It is like a formula Hollywood Western, with the Opposition playing Indian.

Devices are available to help Opposition parties balance some of the disadvantages inherent in the parliamentary role: speeches, publications, tours and television outside Parliament, "Opposition days" and general debate inside Parliament. These devices are ineffective, in electoral terms, to a party locked in to Parliament by the parliamentary preoccupation of its leadership, as was the case with the parliamentary leadership of the Conservative party in 1942 and the parliamentary leadership of the Progressive Conservative party in 1964. In such cases the devices of balance are used to confirm, not countervail, the image established in Parliament. Even when the parliamentary leadership seeks to be effective in the country as well as in Parliament, the cumulative effect of these devices of balance is seldom sufficient to offset the "negative" impression communicated by the media covering Parliament daily, and cultivated by traditionalist members of the party's parliamentary elite. A more dramatic device is required to demonstrate the positive or progressive commitment of the party. It is the argument here that the most

significant function performed by the five policy conferences considered was as such a device. Although other important functions were also performed--recruitment, policy development, maintenance of morale--none had the independent significance of this demonstration of a progressive dimension capable of attracting previous non-supporters.

APPENDICES

The following appendices are the official lists of persons registered as attending the five policy conferences. Inevitably, such lists miss some participants and designate as attending persons who were expected but didn't appear. A rough attempt has been made to indicate the auspices under which each participant came. Those who were known partisans when they came, or quickly identified as partisans, are identified by a "P" for partisan. Those who came as resource people or invited program participants are designated "R" for resource. Those who came as journalists or other observers are designated "O". Where there is no designation, the writer does not know the appropriate category. There is no attempt to apply this designation to the Port Hope Conference, because of its distance in time, although it is understood that all participants were active in the party and could be designated "P" by this system. The designation is based only upon the impressions of the writer, which are least reliable for the Kingston Conference. The participants are listed alphabetically by province.

APPENDIX A:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE PORT HOPE CONFERENCE

Alberta

A. L. Burrows	Edmonton
Hugh C. Farthing	Calgary
H. A. Friedman	Edmonton
M. E. Manning	Calgary
R. Martland	Edmonton
H. R. Milner	Edmonton
F. J. Mitchell	Edmonton
Dr. G. D. Stanley	Calgary
Andrew Stewart	Edmonton
John Sydie	Edmonton
Mrs. W. H. A. Thomas	Olds
W. H. A. Thomas	Olds

British Columbia

A. C. DesBrisay	Vancouver
C. B. Garland	Nelson
A. E. Jukes	Vancouver
R. H. Tupper	Vancouver

Manitoba

E. G. Phipps Baker	Winnipeg
Lieut. Col. L. D. M. Baxter	Winnipeg
Ald. James Black	Winnipeg
R. K. Finlayson	Winnipeg

Manitoba (Cont.)

J. D. Henderson	Winnipeg
Ald. Hilda Hesson	Winnipeg
Harley M. Hughes	Winnipeg
W. W. Kennedy	Winnipeg
G. W. Northwood	Winnipeg
Charlie D. Roblin	Winnipeg
Dr. Sidney E. Smith	Winnipeg
G. S. Thorvaldson	Winnipeg

New Brunswick

K. B. Carson	Saint John
Hugh John Flemming	Juniper
Senator G. B. Jones	Apohaqui
Hugh Mackay	Rothesay
Mrs. Hugh Mackay	Rothesay
C. F. Phinney	Saint John
Mrs. C. F. Phinney	Saint John
D. G. Robertson	Plaster Rock
W. J. West	Fredericton

Nova Scotia

D. J. Buckley	Sydney
George S. Dickie	Middle Stewiacke
L. W. Fraser	Halifax
D. G. Grant	Sydney
F. H. Patterson	Truro
A. S. Pattillo	Halifax
C. B. Smith	Halifax
C. W. Stairs	Halifax
Frank T. Stanfield	Truro

Ontario

George Atkins	Oakville
John Alton	Lorneville
William Broder	Ottawa
A. L. Brooks	Welland
Robert A. Bryce	Toronto
R. A. Bell	Ottawa
Ed. W. Bickle	Toronto
L. E. Blackwell	Toronto
J. Talmadge Bryan	Sunderland
Floyd S. Chalmers	Toronto
W. S. Christie	Ottawa
Lt. Col. Alan Cockeram	Toronto
Mrs. C. Cockshutt	Brantford
C. R. Conquergood	Toronto
T. K. Creighton	Oshawa
J. H. Dempsey	Stratford
T. R. Dent	Woodstock
M. Desbrisay	Toronto
G. M. Dix	Toronto
A. R. Douglas	London
N. S. Dowd	Ottawa

Ontario (Cont.)

R. R. Evans	Hamilton
Stanley E. Fennell	Cornwall
Ald. Donald M. Fleming	Toronto
Dr. D. R. Fleming	New Liskeard
C. G. Frost	Lindsay
Professor Grenville B. Frost	Kingston
F. G. Gardiner	Toronto
K. C. Gray	Kirkland Lake
John Grudeff	Toronto
Mrs. E. J. Hallett	Oakville
John C. Halliday	Thorold
Mrs. W. S. Haney	Sarnia
Thomas J. Hannon	Kitchener
W. I. Hearst	Toronto
Sydney Hermant	Toronto
Bert Hicks	Lindsay
Douglas G. Higgins	Toronto

Ontario (Cont.)

G. M. Hobart	London
Harry Hopper	Hamilton
Clifford H. Howard	Toronto
A. H. Humble	Port Hope
John A. Huston	Toronto
Alfred Kennard	Bartonville P.O.
T. Ashmore Kidd	Kingston
Watson Kirkconnell	Carnarvon
Robert A. Laidlaw	Toronto
John L. Lang	Sault Ste. Marie
Dr. H. A. Logan	Toronto
Dr. James McClinton	Timmins
Spencer McConnell	Port Burwell
Miss Evelyn McDonald	Toronto
A. D. McKenzie	Toronto
J. M. Macdonnell	Toronto
Major Alexander MacKenzie	Woodbridge
Argue Martin	Hamilton
N. R. Martin	St. Thomas

Ontario (Cont.)

Mrs. R. J. Meggs	Gore's Landing
D. R. Michener	Toronto
W. K. Molson	Port Hope
T. H. Moorehead	Brampton
Hon. Dr. Raymond D. Morand	Windsor
D. R. Morand	Windsor
Mayor William Morrison	Hamilton
W. R. Milton	Port Hope
Thomas Oakley	Toronto
Mrs. George Otton	Woodstock
Dana H. Porter	Toronto
Rev. Norman Rawson	Hamilton
Frank O. Reeves	Weston
Ernest Reynolds	Brantford
Dr. John M. Robb	Blind River
A. Kelso Roberts	Toronto
R. C. Rowland	Toronto
James A. Sanderson	Oxford Station
Dr. H. A. Skinner	London
George D. Stevens	North Bay

Ontario (Cont.)

J. H. Stevens	London
T. H. Stinson	Lindsay
W. R. Strike	Bowmanville
Dr. R. Hobbs Taylor	Dashwood
R. H. Thomson	Toronto
Peter Tully	Hamilton
W. Merion Vickers	Toronto
Dr. R. P. Vivian	Port Hope
David J. Walker	Toronto
George E. Wallace	North Bay
O. M. Walsh	Hamilton
A. G. Walwyn	Toronto
Howard R. White	London
G. W. Wigle	Hamilton
A. R. Willmott	Cobourg
R. F. Wilson	Toronto
H. Kennedy Wood	Hamilton

Prince Edward Island

Quebec

J. H. Bender	Outremont
J. C. H. Dussault	Montreal
John Farthing	Lennoxville
Hon. Lucien Gendron	Outremont
Hon. Sam Gobeil	Gatineau
John T. Hackett	Montreal
D. H. McDougall	Montreal

Quebec (Cont.)

Leon Methot	Three Rivers
G. Monette	Outremont
J. O. Montplaisir	Drummondville
J. Panneton	Montreal
Philias Pare	Montreal
J. G. Porteous	Montreal
B. Panet Raymond	Montreal
Ivan Sabourin	Montreal
G. S. Stairs	Montreal

Saskatchewan

Mrs. J. O. Begg	Swift Current
Mrs. J. H. Currie	Vonda
Cecil G. Schmitt	Saskatoon

Territories

Foreign Addresses

APPENDIX B:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE KINGSTON CONFERENCE

Alberta	
Professor Grant Davy	Edmonton (P)
James H. Gray	Calgary
J. M. Hope	Edmonton
Mrs. Faith King	Edmonton
D. N. McColl	Edmonton
British Columbia	
Dean G. C. Andrew	Vancouver (P)
John Davis	Vancouver (P)
Donald Moir	Vancouver
Nathan Nemetz	Vancouver
Hume Wright	West Vancouver
Professor John Young	Vancouver (R)
Manitoba	
J. Comeau	Winnipeg
Lorne W. J. Hurd	Winnipeg (O)
Dr. Alan Klass	Winnipeg
Barrie Knight	Winnipeg
John Lamont	Winnipeg
Shane Mackay	Winnipeg (O)
J. F. O'Sullivan	Winnipeg
Stewart A. Searle, Jr.	Winnipeg
Alan Sweatman	Winnipeg
New Brunswick	
David M. Dickson	Fredericton
Professor A. L. Levine	Fredericton
Newfoundland	
John C. Crosbie	St. Johns (P)
Hon. J. W. Pickersgill, MP	Ottawa (P)

Nova Scotia

Professor John Graham	Halifax	
Guy Henson	Halifax	
Professor Walter Kontak	Antigonish	(R)
O. J. T. Troy	Halifax	

Ontario

Anthony Abbott	Oakville	(P)
John Aird	Toronto	(P)
David A. Anderson	Toronto	(P)
A. Andras	Ottawa	(R)
George Bain	Toronto	
Michael Barkway	Ottawa	(O)
Mayor Vincent Barrie	St. Thomas	
Allen Beckett	Toronto	
Fred Belaire	Ottawa	(P)
Russell Bell	Ottawa	(R)
Mrs. Anne Francis Bird	Ottawa	(O)
John Bird	Ottawa	(O)
Gordon Blair	Ottawa	(P)
W. Buchanan	Ottawa	
Robert H. Carley	Peterborough	
Miss E. S. Carscallen	Ottawa	
William J. Cheesman	Ancaster	
Hon. Lionel Chevrier	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. John J. Connolly, Senator	Ottawa	(P)
Professor C. A. Curtis	Kingston	
Arthur Davies	Kingston	(P)
Kildare Dobbs	Toronto	
Gordon Dryden	Toronto	
A. Davidson Dunton	Ottawa	(P)
Professor James Eayrs	Toronto	(R)
Marvin Farrell	Hamilton	
David Ferguson	Toronto	
Alistair Fraser	Ottawa	(P)
Professor G. French	Hamilton	
Royce Frith	Toronto	(P)
H. F. Gibson	Kingston	
Alastair Gillespie	Toronto	(P)
Marcel Gingras	Ottawa	(O)

Ontario (Cont.)

Walter Gordon	Toronto	(P)
Miss Therese Goulet	Toronto	
David B. Greenspan	Toronto	(P)
Harold Greer	Toronto	(O)
D. Hardtman	Kingston	
Hon. Walter Harris	Markdale	(P)
Mark Harrison	Toronto	(O)
Dr. R. H. Hay	Kingston	
Hon. Paul Hellyer, MP	Toronto	(P)
W. J. Henderson	Kingston	
Larratt T. Higgins	Toronto	
Professor W. C. Hood	Toronto	
Alan Jarvis	Ottawa	
Roger Jeanty	Toronto	
Professor Pauline Jewett	Ottawa	(P)
G. B. Johnston	Ottawa	
L. F. Jones	Ottawa	(P)
Franc Joubin	Toronto	
H. E. Kidd	Ottawa	(P)
Professor William Kilbourn	Hamilton	(P)
Mrs. R. A. Kinnear	Port Colborne	(P)
Archibald Laidlaw	Ottawa	
Miss Julia V. LaMarsh	Niagara Falls	(P)
Maurice Lamontagne	Ottawa	(P)
D. A. Lang	Toronto	(P)
J. D. Leitch	Toronto	
Douglas LePan	Kingston	
Professor Marcus Long	Toronto	
Professor Peyton Lyon	London	
William Mahoney	Toronto	(R)
Frederic S. Martin	Ottawa	
Hon. Paul Martin, MP	Windsor	(P)
Victor V. Mason	Burlington	
General A. Bruce Matthews	Toronto	(P)
Vladan Milic	Toronto	
Jim Moore	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John Morgan	Toronto	
William J. Morris	Toronto	
W. A. Macdonald	Toronto	
R. A. MacDougall	Woodstock	

Ontario (Cont.)

Allan MacEachen	Ottawa	(P)
Michael Mackenzie	Toronto	(P)
R. M. MacIntosh	Toronto	
W. A. Mackintosh	Kingston	
Gordon MacLeod	Downsview	
D. K. MacTavish	Ottawa	
Dr. E. A. McCulloch	Toronto	
Miss Alice McKeown	Kingston	
Miss Catherine McLean	Toronto	
A. N. McLeod	Toronto	
Father Peter Nearing	Ottawa	
Professor E. P. Neufeld	Toronto	
Peter C. Newman	Ottawa	(O)
R. O'Hagan	Toronto	(P)
Earl Orser	Toronto	
John C. Parkin	Don Mills	
Professor John Paul	London	
Hon. L. B. Pearson, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Miss Annette Perron	Ottawa	
Harvey Perry	Toronto	
Bruce Powe	Toronto	(P)
Morgan Reid	Toronto	
James Renwick	Toronto	
Ronald S. Ritchie	Toronto	
Edward Roberts	Toronto	(P)
Professor Albert Rose	Toronto	
Douglas C. Rowland	Toronto	
Edward Saunders	Toronto	
Miss Mildred Schwartz	Toronto	
James Scott	Ottawa	(P)
Mitchell Sharp	Toronto	(P)
Vern Singer, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Nancy Sleeswijk	Toronto	
David Stanley	Toronto	
Stefan Stykolt	Toronto	
R. A. F. Sutherland	Toronto	
Kurt Swinton	Toronto	
Andrew Thompson, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor Frank Underhill	Ottawa	(R)
Boyd Upper, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Dr. Claude Vipond	Oshawa	
William Wilder	Toronto	
Hon. Robert Winters	Toronto	(P)
Harry Wolfson	Toronto	

Prince Edward Island

Quebec

Andre Bachand	Montreal	
Marc Briere	Montreal	
Jacques Brillant	Rimouski	
Lucien Cardin, MP	Sorel	(P)
John Claxton	Montreal	(P)
F. E. Cleyn	Huntington	
Mrs. Dian Cohen	Montreal	
Dean Maxwell Cohen	Montreal	
Jean David	Montreal	(O)
Jean de Grandpre	Montreal	
Monteath Douglas	Montreal	
Brig. C. M. Drury	Montreal	(P)
Yves Dube	Quebec	(P)
George Ferguson	Montreal	(P)
R. M. Fowler	Montreal	(P)
L. -G. Giguere	Montreal	
Carl Goldenberg	Montreal	
Jean-Paul Gregoire	Montreal	
Hubert Guindon	Montreal	
T. W. Kent	Montreal	(P)
Leon Lalande	Montreal	
Andre Laurendeau	Montreal	(O)
Jean Marchand	Quebec	
Hon. George Marler	Montreal	(P)
Roy Matthews	Montreal	
Francois Mercier	Montreal	
Claude Morin	Quebec	
David L. MacFarlane	Montreal	
R. B. MacPherson	Montreal	
Jean-Marie Nadeau	Montreal	
John Payne	Montreal	
Mme. Jeanne Sauve	Montreal	(P)
Maurice Sauve	Montreal	(P)
Rt. Hon. Lord Shaughnessy	Montreal	
Arthur Smith	Montreal	
Edward Stamp	Montreal	
James L. Thom	Montreal	
Douglas Thomas	Montreal	
P. N. Thorsteinsson	Montreal	
John Turner	Montreal	(P)
Mr. H. P. van Ginkel	Montreal	
Mrs. H. P. van Ginkel	Montreal	
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	

Saskatchewan

Charles Gibbings	Regina	
Alfred Gleave	Saskatoon	(R)
Otto Lang	Saskatoon	(P)
Dean J. Wendell Macleod, MD	Saskatoon	(R)
F. Von Pilis	Saskatoon	

Territories

Foreign Addresses

Dr. Doris Boyle	Baltimore
Professor Harry G. Johnson	Chicago
Peter Regenstreif	Ithaca

APPENDIX C:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE FREDERICTON CONFERENCE

Alberta

Senator J. A. Buchanan	Edmonton	(P)
Mrs. J. A. Buchanan	Edmonton	(P)
Joe Clark	High River	(P)
Neil Crawford	Edmonton	(P)
Jack Davis	Calgary	(P)
Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Hon. Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton	(P)
William McVeigh	Drumheller	(P)
Dr. John Porter	Calgary	(P)
Miss Lynn Smith	Calgary	(O)

British Columbia

Dr. E. R. Black	Vancouver	(P)
Gary Boyd	Victoria	(P)
Dr. H. A. C. Cairns	Vancouver	(R)
Stuart Fleming, MP	Vernon	(P)
Mrs. E. D. Fulton	Kamloops	(P)
Hon. E. D. Fulton	Kamloops	(P)
Bill Macadam	Campbell River	(P)
Harold Marshall	Winfield	(P)
Mrs. Dorothy Smith	Kelowna	(P)
Miss Mary Southin	Vancouver	(P)
John Taylor	West Vancouver	(P)
Malcolm Wickson	Vancouver	(P)

Manitoba

Mrs. Alta Atkinson	Lac du Bonnet	(P)
Charles Birt	Winnipeg	(P)
James Burns	Winnipeg	(P)
James Doak	Virden	(P)
Mrs. James Doak	Virden	(P)
S. J. Enns, MP	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Hon. Olive Irvine	Winnipeg	(P)
Duncan Jessiman	Winnipeg	(P)
Remi Lafreniere	St. Boniface	(P)

Manitoba (Cont.)

G. Campbell MacLean	St. Boniface	(P)
Joe Martin	Winnipeg	(P)
Arthur V. Mauro	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor W. L. Morton	Winnipeg	(R)
James Shore	Winnipeg	(P)
Robert A. Steen	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Robert A. Steen	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor T. S. Webster	Winnipeg	(P)

New Brunswick

Fred J. Arsenault	Bathurst	(P)
Tom Bell, MP	Saint John	(P)
Mrs. Russell Bennett	Moncton	(P)
Ian Brown	Fredericton	(O)
Paul Creaghan	Moncton	(P)
Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay	(P)
Mrs. Gordon Fairweather	Rothesay	(P)
Hon Hugh John Flemming, MP	Fredericton	(P)
Wendell Fulton	Fredericton	(O)
Graham Galloway	Fredericton	(O)
Dr. W. E. Hale	Fredericton	(P)
Roger Harley	Fredericton	(P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland	(P)
Ralph Hay	Fredericton	(P)
Don Hoyt	Fredericton	(O)
Larry Knowles	Fredericton	(O)
Alfred Landry	Shediac	(P)
Euclide Leger	St. Anthony	(P)
Frank E. Lutes	Berry Mills	(P)
J. Chester MacRae, MP	Fredericton	(P)
Professor George McAllister	Fredericton	(P)
Lorne McGuigan	Saint John	(P)
Fred Nicholson	St. Stephen	(P)
Donald Patterson, MLA	Saint John	(P)
Bernard Poirier	Moncton	(O)
Roger Savoie	Rogersville	(P)
C. B. Sherwood, MLA	Norton	(P)
Mrs. Owen Smith	Fredericton	(P)
Richard Steeves	Saint John	(P)
Wallace Turnbull	Rothesay	(P)
Brig. Michael Wardell	Fredericton	(O)
Professor Aurele Young	Moncton	(R)

Newfoundland

Hon. W. J. Browne, MHA	St. Johns	(P)
A. B. Butt	St. Johns	(P)
W. S. Perlin	St. Johns	(P)

Nova Scotia

Norville Balch	Halifax	(O)
Dave Bazay	Halifax	(O)
John O. Bower	Shelburne	(P)
Dr. William Dalton	Dartmouth	(P)
Art Donahoe	Halifax	(P)
Hon. R. A. Donahoe, MLA	Halifax	(P)
Maurice Flemming	Shelburne	(P)
Professor Duncan Fraser	Wolfville	(R)
Walter Goodfellow	Halifax	(P)
John Kerr	Halifax	(O)
Dr. Paul Kinsman, MLA	Aylesford	(P)
Professor Walter Kontak	Antigonish	(R)
Mrs. Alex MacAulay	Halifax	(P)
Finlay MacDonald	Halifax	(P)
Ronald MacDonald	Halifax	(O)
Dr. Lewis Matheson	Sydney	
Lowell Murray	Dartmouth	(P)
Hon. George Nowlan, MP	Wolfville	(P)
Miss T. Pullen	Halifax	(O)
Hon. Robert Stanfield, MLA	Halifax	(P)
R. J. Thornhill	Dartmouth	(P)

Ontario

Professor John Abrams	Toronto	(R)
Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst	(P)
Bruce Alexander	Toronto	(O)
Norman Atkins	Toronto	(P)
Douglas Auld	Toronto	(P)
Miss Bonnie Bayne	Toronto	(P)
Jack Beal	Ottawa	(O)
Gilles Belanger	Ottawa	(O)
Elmer D. Bell	Exeter	(P)
Hon. R. A. Bell	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Ruth Bell	Bell's Corners	(P)
Kenneth C. Binks	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Kenneth C. Binks	Ottawa	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

John Bird	Ottawa	(O)
Marcel Bureau	Ottawa	(P)
John Buss	Ottawa	(O)
Duncan Cameron	Ottawa	(O)
Dalton K. Camp	Toronto	(P)
Grant Campbell	Almonte	(P)
Dr. Daniel Cappon	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Robert M. Clark	Toronto	(P)
Ron Collister	Ottawa	(O)
Greg Connolly	Ottawa	(O)
Dr. John Conway	Toronto	(R)
Kenneth Cork	Toronto	
David Crane	Toronto	(O)
Fred Dawes	Chatham	
Norman DePoe	Ottawa	(O)
Dean Richard Dillon	London	(P)
Dean A. R. C. Duncan	Kingston	(R)
E. A. Dunlop, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. E. A. Dunlop	Toronto	(P)
Roy Faibish	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Laura Ferrier	York Mills	(P)
Douglas Fisher, MP	Ottawa	(O)
Meredith Fleming	Toronto	
W. W. Foot	Kitchener	
Mrs. W. W. Foot	Kitchener	
Tom Ford	Toronto	(O)
Dr. Eugene Forsey	Ottawa	(R)
E. A. Goodman	Toronto	(P)
Cameron Graham	Ottawa	(O)
Hon. Allister Grosart	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. J. R. W. Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Mrs. J. R. W. Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Dr. Phyllis Hanley	Toronto	(P)
David M. Harley	Toronto	
Hon. Irwin Haskett, MPP	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Irwin Haskett	Ottawa	(P)
Alan Heisey	Don Mills	(P)
George Hogan	Toronto	(P)
John W. Holmes	Toronto	(R)
Warren Hurst	Toronto	(P)
H. N. R. Jackman	Toronto	(P)
Don Johnston	Port Credit	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Ken Kelly	Ottawa	(O)
Claude Lajeunesse	Ottawa	(O)
Peter Leslie	Kingston	(O)
Charles Lynch	Ottawa	(O)
Flora MacDonald	Ottawa	(P)
H. Ian Macdonald	Toronto	(P)
Professor D. C. MacGregor	Toronto	
Mrs. Ward Markle	Willowdale	(P)
Ed Maynerick	Toronto	(P)
Jim McCook	Ottawa	(O)
Mrs. Jim McCook	Ottawa	(O)
Fred McCord	Ottawa	(O)
Hon. M. W. McCutcheon	Toronto	(P)
Clyde McDonald	Toronto	(R)
Mrs. Clyde McDonald	Toronto	(O)
Kaye McFarland	Napanee	(P)
Dr. A. N. McLeod	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Marshall McLuhan	Toronto	(R)
David B. Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. David B. Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Francois Morriset	Ottawa	(O)
W. B. Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor David Nowlan	Toronto	(R)
Del O'Brien	Westmeath	(P)
B. T. Richardson	Ottawa	(P)
E. S. Rogers	Toronto	(P)
Richard Rohmer	Toronto	(P)
Gordon Ross	Toronto	(P)
Lionel Schipper	Toronto	(P)
Douglas S. Scott	Hamilton	
A. E. Sheppard	London	(P)
Sant Singh	Ottawa	(P)
Alan Smith	Ottawa	(P)
D. S. Stephens	Hamilton	
Mrs. D. S. Stephens	Hamilton	
Professor Alastair Taylor	Kingston	(R)
Jim Taylor	Ottawa	(O)
Dr. E. Llewellyn Thomas	Toronto	(R)
William Thomson	Oakville	(P)
R. D. Thrasher	Ottawa	(P)
Professor S. G. Triantis	Toronto	(R)
Warner Troyer	Ottawa	(O)
John Vivash	Oshawa	(P)
Mrs. Jean Wadds, MP	Prescott	(P)
Robert Welch, MPP	St. Catharines	(P)
Anthony Westell	Toronto	(O)
Bill Whiteacre	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Mrs. Bill Whiteacre	Toronto	(P)
James Williams	Ottawa	(O)

Prince Edward Island

Fred Arsenault	Mount Carmel	(P)
Bennett Carr	Charlottetown	(P)
Hon. L. G. Dewar, MLA	O'Leary	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Victoria	(P)
Arthur McInnis	Charlottetown	(P)
Dr. Cyril Sinnott	Charlottetown	(P)
Arthur Wright	Charlottetown	(P)

Quebec

Maurice Allard	Sherbrooke	(P)
W. David Angus	Westmount	(P)
Hon. Leon Balcer, MP	Trois-Rivieres	(P)
Marcel Belanger	Montreal	(O)
Claude Bigue	Amos	(P)
Arthur Blakely	Montreal	(O)
Joyce Blond	Montreal	(P)
Jacques Bouchard	Amos	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Mrs. Gretta Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Rosario Cousineau	Sherbrooke	(R)
Dr. Edward English	Montreal	(R)
Marcel Faribault	Montreal	(R)
Bernard Flynn	Baie Comeau	(P)
Hon. Jacques Flynn	Quebec	(P)
Howard Grafftey, MP	Knowlton	(P)
Peter V. Gundy	Montreal	(P)
Richard B. Holden	Montreal	(P)
Ernest Kockeritz	Montreal	(R)
Marc Lacoste	Outremont	(P)
Paul-E. Lafontaine	Montreal	(P)
Marc Lalonde	Montreal	(R)
Mme. J.-Rene Lessard	Montreal	(P)
Claude Leveille	Granby	(P)
Ronnie Luttrell	Montreal	(O)
William J. Mandzia	City of St. Laurent	(P)
Max McMahon	Montreal	(R-O)

Quebec (Cont.)

David Nathanson	Montreal	(O)
Hon. Josie Quart	Sillery	(P)
Claude Ryan	Montreal	(R-O)
Tom Van Dusen	Alymer	(P)
Mike Vineberg	Montreal	(P)
B. A. Warkentin	Montreal	(P)
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	(R)
W. A. Wilson	Montreal	(O)

Saskatchewan

Hugh Arscott	Saskatoon	(P)
Dr. Lewis Brand	Saskatoon	(P)
Rt. Hon. John G. Diefenbaker, MP	Prince Albert	(P)
Fred Dunbar	Meadow Lake	(P)
Professor Roger Graham	Saskatoon	(P)
Hon. Alvin Hamilton, MP	Fort Qu'Appelle	(P)
Orris Keehr	Regina	(P)
Dr. J. B. Leishman	Regina	(P)
Don McGowan	Swift Current	(P)

Territories

Mark de Weerdt	Yellowknife	(P)
Gene Rheaume, MP	Yellowknife	(P)

Foreign Addresses

Tom Hockin	Cambridge, Mass.	(R)
Professor William Hull	Durham	(R)
Dr. Burton Weisbrod	Madison	(R)

APPENDIX D:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE MONTMORENCY CONFERENCE

Alberta		
G. W. Baldwin, MP	Peace River	(P)
Jack Davis	Calgary	(P)
Jack Horner, MP	Pollockville	(P)
Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton	(P)
Peter Lougheed, MLA	Calgary	(P)
B. D. Patterson	Calgary	(P)
Erick Schmidt	Edmonton	(O)
Eldon Woolliams, MP	Calgary	(P)
British Columbia		
Professor Robert Clark	Vancouver	(P)
John de Wolf	Vancouver	(P)
Dr. R. M. Kaplan	Burnaby	(R)
Richard B. Simmins	Vancouver	
Professor Donald Smiley	Vancouver	(R)
Mary Southin	Vancouver	(P)
Professor Neil Swainson	Victoria	(R)
Manitoba		
Hon. Walter Dinsdale, MP	Brandon	(P)
S. J. Enns, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. Gurney Evans, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)
Hon. Thelma Forbes, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)
Hon. Sterling Lyon, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)
L. R. Sherman, MP	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor Norma Walmsley	Brandon	(R)
New Brunswick		
Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay	(P)
Dr. W. E. Hale	Fredericton	(P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland	(P)
Alfred Landry	Moncton	(P)
D. D. Patterson, MLA	Saint John	(P)
Newfoundland		
Gerald Ottenheimer, MLA	St. Johns	(P)

Nova Scotia

Hon. Gerry Doucet, MLA	Halifax	(P)
Professor D. Hugh Gillis	Antigonish	(P)
J. M. Forrestall, MP	Dartmouth	(P)
Professor Duncan Fraser	Wolfville	(P)
Mrs. Ray Jefferson	Wolfville	(P)
R. J. McCleave, MP	Halifax	(P)
Hon. T. McKeough, MLA	Halifax	(P)

Ontario

Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst	(P)
Professor Bill Baker	Ottawa	(R)
Professor Eric Beecroft	London	(R)
Richard Bell, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. W. A. Benson	Victoria	
Professor Henry Best	Toronto	(P)
Professor R. M. Burns	Kingston	(R)
Robin Bush	Don Mills	(R)
Dalton Camp	Toronto	(P)
Professor Dan Cappon	Toronto	(P)
Dr. D. W. Carr	Ottawa	
C. D. Crenna	Guelph	(P)
Walter Currie	Willowdale	(R)
Harold Danforth, MP	Ottawa	(P)
A. E. Diamond	Toronto	
Mrs. Edward A. Duplop	Toronto	(P)
Edward A. Dunlop, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor Stephen Dupre	Toronto	(R)
Professor Donald Eldon	Peterborough	(P)
Mrs. Laura Ferrier	Willowdale	(P)
Professor Jack Granatstein	Ottawa	(R)
Professor John Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Alfred Hales, MP	Guelph	(P)
Albert Hearne	Toronto	(R)
Professor Tom Hockin	Toronto	(R)
Mr. D. M. Johnston	Toronto	(P)
Mark Kellow	Peterborough	
Professor William Kilbourn	Toronto	(R)
Jules Kronis	Toronto	(P)
Professor Arthur Kruger	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Dorothy C. H. Ley	Toronto	
M. T. McCutcheon, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John C. MacDonald	Peterborough	(R)
E. R. McEwen	Toronto	(R)
Hon. C. S. MacNaughton, MPP	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

David Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Phil Mitches	Toronto	(P)
J. H. Moore	London	(P)
Wallace Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor G. Pacquet	Ottawa	(R)
Mrs. Ada Pritchard	Hamilton	(P)
Richard Rohmer	Toronto	(P)
Rev. Gordon Ross	Toronto	(P)
Ald. David Rotenberg	Toronto	(P)
Lionel Schipper	Toronto	(P)
Sheldon Silvers	Toronto	(P)
Alex Sim	North Gower	
Heber Smith, MP	Barrie	(P)
L. A. Soden	Sudbury	(R)
Dr. P. D. Stevens	Manotick	(R)
Hon. William A. Stewart, MPP	Toronto	(P)
Professor T. H. B. Symons	Peterborough	(P)
Professor S. Triantis	Toronto	(R)
Gerald Townsend	Toronto	
Mrs. Jean Wadds, MP	Prescott	(P)
Patrick Watson	Toronto	(R)
Hon. Thomas Wells, MPP	Toronto	(P)
John White, MLA	London	(P)

Prince Edward Island

David MacDonald, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Ottawa	(P)

Quebec

Martial Asselin, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Jean Bazin	Montreal	(P)
Paul Beaulieu, MP	St. Jean	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Marcel Faribault	Montreal	(R)
M. Gerald Filion	Montreal	(R)
Professor Jacques Gagne	Sherbrooke	(R)
Heward Grafftey, MP	Knowlton	(P)
Hubert Guindon	Montreal	(R)
Russell Keays, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Dean Mordell	Montreal	(R)

Quebec (Cont.)

D. A. H. Newman	Montreal	(R)
T. J. Plunkett	Montreal	
Theo Ricard, MP	St. Hyacinthe	(P)
Tom Sloan	Montreal	(O)
Paul O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Georges Valade, MP	Montreal	(P)
Peter G. White	Knowlton	(P)
Bruce Whitestone	Montreal	

Saskatchewan

Dr. Lewis Brand, MP	Saskatoon	(P)
Reg Cantelon, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Jack McIntosh, MP	Swift Current	(P)
Dean T. H. MacLeod	Regina	(R)
Edward Nasserden, MP	Saskatoon	(P)
Lawrence Watson, MP	Abonlea	(P)

Territories

Erik Nielsen, MP	Whitehorse	(P)

Foreign Addresses

A. N. McLeod	Trinidad	(R)
Professor Michael Stein	Princeton	(R)

APPENDIX E:

PARTICIPANTS IN THE NIAGARA FALLS CONFERENCE

Alberta

Elmar Abele	Edmonton	(P)
Professor Harvie Andre	Calgary	(P)
G. W. Baldwin, MP	Peace River	(P)
Len Berg	Sedgewick	(P)
G. M. Burden	Calgary	(P)
Vincent Dantzer	Edmonton	(P)
Roy Deyell	Calgary	(P)
Cliff Downey, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. D. S. Harkness, MP	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Roy Henderson	High River	(P)
Peter Horcica	Edmonton	(P)
Jack Horner, MP	Pollockville	(P)
David Jenkins	Calgary	(P)
Hon. Marcel Lambert, MP	Edmonton	(P)
Larry Lang	Lethbridge	(P)
Dan A. Lawrence	Red Deer	(P)
Peter Lougheed, MLA	Calgary	(P)
Ken Lutes	Brooks	(P)
Hugh Lynch-Staunton	Lundbreck	(P)
D. R. Matheson	Edmonton	(P)
Don Mazankowski, MP	Vegreville	(P)
Donald McDougall	Edmonton	(P)
Donald McKenzie	Edmonton	(P)
Charles McMillan	Edmonton	(P)
C. J. Meagher	Medicine Hat	(P)
Carl O. Nickle	Calgary	(P)
Steve Paproski, MP	Edmonton	(P)
David Parsons	Calgary	(P)
W. D. Piechotta	Calgary	(P)
Ronald Powell	Calgary	(P)
Mrs. Jean Roen	Duchess	(P)
Professor Rodney Schneck	Edmonton	(R)
Stan Schumacher, MP	Drumheller	(P)
Anthony A. Taylor	Calgary	(P)
Robert Thompson, MP	Red Deer	(P)
W. R. Watson	Edmonton	(P)
Ed Wensell	Camrose	(P)
Eldon Woolliams, MP	Calgary	(P)
Professor Peter Woolstencroft	Edmonton	(P)
Dr. Paul Yewchuck, MP	Lac La Biche	(P)
Carl Youngren	Calgary	(P)
William J. Yurko, MLA	Edmonton	(P)

British Columbia

Professor H. A. Cairns	Vancouver	(R)
Professor Robert Clark	Vancouver	(P)
D. Denholm	North Vancouver	(R)
Mrs. Lorraine Devries	Kamloops	(P)
John de Wolf	Vancouver	(P)
Mrs. John de Wolf	Vancouver	(P)
Mrs. N. M. Drysdale	Vancouver	(P)
Chris Dumfries	Vancouver	(P)
J. A. Fraser	Vancouver	(P)
Gordon Hall	Sardis	(P)
Roff Johannson	Vancouver	(P)
Tom Johnstone	Port Alberni	(P)
L. P. Linstead	Comox	(P)
M. A. Lundeen	Dawson Creek	(P)
William Macadam	Campbell River	(P)
Professor Bruce Nesbitt	Burnaby	(R)
Winston Newman	Vancouver	(P)
John Pearkes	Vancouver	(P)
Miss Jane Ritchie	Victoria	(P)
J. T. Saxelby	West Vancouver	(P)
John M. Sherman	West Vancouver	(P)
Professor Donald Smiley	Vancouver	(R)
Douglas Smith	Victoria	(P)
Malcolm Wickson	Vancouver	(P)
Sam W. Wilson	Dawson Creek	(P)

Manitoba

Don Baizley	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Joan C. M. Campbell	Transcona	(P)
Rev. Adam Cuthand	Winnipeg	(R)
Hon. Walter Dinsdale, MP	Brandon	(P)
Leonard Domino	Transcona	(P)
Floyd Evenson	Winnipeg	(P)
Professor W. Fox-Decent	Winnipeg	(P)
Morley Greene	Winnipeg	(P)
Duncan Jessiman	Winnipeg	(P)
Dr. George Johnson	Winnipeg	(P)
Warner Jorgenson, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)

Manitoba (Cont.)

Robert E. Lane	Winnipeg	(P)
Jay Livingstone	Swan River	(P)
Mrs. D. McConnell	Hamiota	(P)
David McCormick	Winnipeg	(P)
Bruce Miller	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Mrs. Bruce Miller	Portage la Prairie	(P)
Nathan Nurgitz	Winnipeg	(P)
Dr. Gordon Ritchie, MP	Dauphin	(P)
Walter Ritchie	Winnipeg	(P)
Mrs. Annis Shaddy	Winnipeg	(P)
Lee Southern	Winnipeg	(P)
Sidney Spivak, MLA	Winnipeg	(P)
Craig Stewart, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Roy Vogt	Winnipeg	(R)
John Williamson	Sinclair	(P)
Don Zizzi	Brandon	(P)

New Brunswick

John Baxter, MLA	Easter Riverside	(P)
Mrs. John Baxter	Easter Riverside	(P)
T. M. Bell, MP	Saint John	(P)
Guy Charest	Edmundston	(P)
Gordon Fairweather, MP	Rothesay	(P)
Edward Harley	Kinghurst	(P)
Richard Hatfield, MLA	Hartland	(P)
Professor Robert Kerr	Fredericton	(P)
Charles E. Leger	Moncton	(P)
Paul McIntyre	Bathurst	(P)
David C. Nicholson	Fredericton	(P)
D. D. Patterson, MLA	Saint John	(P)
Mrs. D. D. Patterson	Saint John	(P)
Dr. John E. Rigby, MLA	St. Andrews	(P)
Mrs. John E. Rigby	St. Andrews	(P)
C. B. Sherwood, MLA	Norton	(P)
Jean Maurice Simard	Edmundston	(P)
Horace B. Smith	Fredericton	(P)
John Smith	Hillsborough	(P)
Ralph Sykes	Bathurst	(P)
Claude Taylor, MLA	Riverview	(P)

New Brunswick (Cont.)

Mrs. Wynnifred Taylor	Riverview	(P)
Charles Thomas, MP	Moncton	(P)
Mark Yeoman	Moncton	(P)

Nova Scotia

Professor Agar Adamson	Wolfville	(R)
Mrs. Douglas Bowen	New Glasgow	(P)
John O. Bower	Shelburne	(P)
Robert Coates, MP	Amherst	(P)
Louis R. Comeau, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor John Connor	Wolfville	(R)
George T. H. Cooper	Halifax	(P)
David Covert	Halifax	(R)
A. William Cox	Halifax	(P)
Lloyd R. Crouse, MP	Lunenberg	(P)
Arthur Donahoe	Halifax	(P)
C. Hanson Dowell	Middleton	(P)
Hugh Farin	Wolfville	(P)
Maurice Flemming	Shelburne	(P)
Donald Haggert	New Glasgow	(P)
Charles Haliburton	Digby	(P)
Robert Levy	Halifax	(P)
Mrs. Isobel MacAulay	Halifax	(P)
R. L. MacDougall	Truro	(P)
Professor A. H. MacLean	Wolfville	(R)
Robert McCleave, MP	Halifax	(P)
Robert Muir, MP	Ottawa	(P)
J. Patrick Nowlan, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Harpell Power	East Jeddore	(P)
James Russell	Halifax	(P)
Chris Sabean	Halifax	(P)
J. B. Sawyer	Halifax	(P)
Mrs. Monica Scott	Lower Sackville	(P)
C. William Singer	Yarmouth	(P)
Hon. G. I. Smith, MLA	Truro	(P)
T. W. Sommerville	Halifax	(P)
Hon. Robert Stanfield, MP	Halifax	(P)
Kenneth Streatch	Elderbank	(P)
David Stuewe	Halifax	(P)
Robert James White	Stellarton	(P)
Dr. Russell Zinch	Lunenburg	(P)

Newfoundland

R. J. Greene	St. Johns (P)
Frank D. Moores, MP	Ottawa (P)
Bob Nutbeem	Harbour Grace (P)
Gerald Ottenheimer, MHA	St. Johns (P)

Ontario

John Adams	Toronto (P)
Mrs. John Adams	Toronto (P)
Michael Adams	Toronto (P)
Gordon Aiken, MP	Gravenhurst (P)
Bruce Alexander	Toronto (R)
Lincoln Alexander, MP	Hamilton (P)
Miss Georgia Allen	Ottawa (O)
J. R. Allan	Toronto (R)
Robert Amaron	Renfrew (P)
Jill Armstrong	Toronto (P)
J. E. Armstrong	Cobalt (P)
Ronald Atkey	London (P)
Professor A. D. Auld	Guelph (P)
Reuben C. Baetz	Ottawa (R)
Robert Baksi	Windsor (P)
John Barker	Scarborough (P)
Leonard Beaton	Toronto (R)
Robert Bedard	Ottawa (P)
Professor Eric Beecroft	London (R)
Miss M. Beer	Peterborough (O)
Elmer Bell	Exeter (P)
Hon. R. A. Bell	Ottawa (P)
Mrs. R. A. Bell	Ottawa (P)
Harold Berry	Toronto (P)
Mrs. Peggy Berton	Ottawa (P)
Professor Henry Best	Toronto (P)
Dr. Ed Black	Ottawa (P)
Professor Ronald Blair	Toronto (R)
Professor Marvin Blauer	St. Catharines (R)
Donald A. Blenkarn	Port Credit (P)
Stan Boivin	Hanmer (P)
Richard Boraks	Toronto (P)
Mrs. G. Bower-Binns	Ottawa (O)
Mrs. Joyce E. Bowerman	Oshawa (P)
Professor Alexander Brady	Toronto (R)
Bruno Bragoli	Hamilton (P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Mrs. N. Buchanan	Peterborough	(O)
Barbara Buck	Toronto	(R)
Macdonald Campbell	London	(P)
Mrs. Leslie Campbell	London	(P)
John Canning	Willowdale	(P)
Dr. Daniel Cappon	Toronto	(P)
Professor Glen Carroll	Waterloo	(R)
Mrs. Glen Carroll	Waterloo	(O)
Murray Chercover	Toronto	(R)
Dr. D. A. Chisholm	Ottawa	(R)
Joe Clark	Ottawa	(P)
Professor R. T. Clippingdale	Ottawa	(R)
Dr. Bruce Connell	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Bruce Connell	Ottawa	(P)
Professor G. E. Connell	Toronto	(R)
Clare Copeland	Toronto	(R)
Professor David Cox	Kingston	(R)
Vicki Cripps	Guelph	(P)
Professor R. W. Crowley	Kingston	(R)
Walter Currie	Toronto	(R)
Professor J. W. Daly	Hamilton	(R)
Harold Danforth, MP	Ottawa	(P)
George F. Davidson	Ottawa	(R)
Ross Degeer	Toronto	(P)
Hugh Doig	Sudbury	(P)
Mrs. Jean Douglas	Chippawa	(P)
Mrs. Fred Dreger	Breslau	(P)
Edward A. Dunlop, MLA	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Edward A. Dunlop	Toronto	(P)
R. Alan Eagleson	Toronto	(P)
Joe Eisenberg	Toronto	(O)
Stuart Ellis	St. Catharines	(P)
Maurice English	Ottawa	(P)
Professor K. B. Farquhar	London	(R)
Eugene Fedak	Hamilton	(P)
Donald M. Findlay	King City	(P)
Mrs. Donald M. Findlay	King City	(P)
Ron Fisher	Windsor	(P)
Eric Ford	Toronto	(P)
L. D. Foreman	Toronto	(R)
William C. Frank	Hyde Park	(P)
Mrs. William C. Frank	Hyde Park	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Dexter Geddes	Toronto	(P)
Dr. W. H. Gerhart	Parry Sound	(P)
Mrs. G. M. Gerrie	Hamilton	(O)
Dr. James Gillies	Downsview	
E. A. Goodman	Toronto	(P)
Lee Grills, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Senator Allister Grosart	Ottawa	(P)
H. Donald Guthrie	Toronto	(P)
Professor John Gwynne-Timothy	London	(P)
Alfred Hales, MP	Guelph	(P)
Hon. Alvin Hamilton	Manotick	(P)
S. B. Handleman	Bells Corners	(P)
Arthur Harnett	Toronto	(P)
Dr. J. E. F. Hastings	Toronto	(R)
Dr. Lionel E. Hastings	Fort William	(P)
Paschal Hayes	Toronto	(P)
Jack Heath	Toronto	(O)
Hon. George Hees, MP	Ottawa	(P)
G. R. Heffernan	Whitby	(R)
Alan Heisey	Don Mills	(P)
Kenneth Higson	Grimsby	(P)
Mrs. Maurice Holt	Peterborough	(P)
Ted Horton	Weston	(P)
R. Michael Huckson	Waterloo	(P)
Joe Hueglin	Niagara Falls	(P)
Professor W. N. H. Hull	St. Catharine	(R)
Professor C. W. Humphries	Toronto	
G. Gordon Hurlburt	Willowdale	(P)
Warren Hurst	Toronto	(P)
W. W. Ince	Kitchener	(P)
Jack Ireland	Belleville	(P)
H. N. R. Jackman	Toronto	(P)
D. M. Johnston	Toronto	(P)
Douglas Jure	Islington	(O)
Brian Kappler	Windsor	(P)
Allan B. Kennard	Kingston	(P)
John Ker	Fingal	(P)
Graham Kidlark	Toronto	(P)
Edward Kowal	Toronto	(P)
Orest M. Kruhlak	Toronto	(R)
Dr. P. A. Lapp	Malton	(R)
A. B. R. Lawrence, MPP	Ottawa	(P)
Allan P. Lawrence, MPP	Toronto	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Bob Lee	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Glenda Lewe	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Dorothy Lichty	Welleby	(P)
Professor I. A. Litvak	Hamilton	(R)
Professor Colin Lock	Hamilton	(R)
Barry G. Lowes	Toronto	(P)
D'Arcy Luxton	Hamilton	(P)
Flora MacDonald	Kingston	(P)
Mrs. K. E. MacIntosh	Kitchener	
Elwood Madill	Orangeville	(P)
Arthur Maloney	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Karl Manner	Sudbury	(O)
Lauren Marshall	Waterloo	(P)
Dennis Martin	Don Mills	(P)
Joe Martin	Toronto	(P)
Donald Martyn	Sutton	(P)
Miss Deb Matthews	London	(O)
Miss Joyce Matthews	London	(O)
Mr. Don Matthews	London	(O)
Professor C. J. Maule	Hamilton	(P)
Murray Maynard	Toronto	(P)
Ernie McCullough	Willodale	(P)
Vera McCullough	Willowdale	(P)
Robert McKinnell	Binbrook	(P)
Robert McKinley, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Robert McKinley	Ottawa	(P)
Roy McLaren	Toronto	(O)
Ian McPhail	Willowdale	(P)
John McPhail	Sault Ste. Marie	(P)
Peter McWilliams	Oakville	(P)
David Meynell	Toronto	(P)
Professor T. Miljan	Waterloo	(R)
Philip Mitches	London	(P)
Ralph S. Misener	St. Catharines	
Dr. S. F. Monestime	Mattawa	(P)
Professor W. L. Morton	Peterborough	(R)
Clark Muirhead	Claremont	(P)
Robert Mummery	Port Lambton	(P)
Donald Munroe	Renfrew	(P)

Ontario (Cont.)

Brian Near	Kingston	
Wallace Nesbitt, MP	Woodstock	(P)
Professor W. F. W. Neville	Peterborough	(R)
G. E. Nori	Sault Ste. Marie	(P)
George C. Norrie	Oakville	(P)
Wayne Nyomtato	St. Catharines	(P)
Del O'Brien	Pembroke	(P)
Mrs. Del O'Brien	Pembroke	(P)
Liam S. O'Brien	Waterloo	(P)
Peter O'Rourke	London	(P)
Professor Robert J. D. Page	Peterborough	(R)
T. R. Parker	Ingersoll	(P)
Professor J. C. Parr	Windsor	(R)
Mrs. Dorothy Patterson	Ottawa	(R)
H. R. Patterson	Toronto	(P)
Ed Paul	Kingston	(P)
R. Penney	Toronto	(P)
John Pentall	Peterborough	(P)
Professor George Perlin	Kingston	(P)
Mrs. E. H. Phinn	Ancaster	(P)
Rodney Pinkney	Mississauga	(P)
Alan Pope	Toronto	(P)
Mrs. Nancy Powis	Toronto	(P)
Joseph L. Reid	St. Catharines	(P)
Professor J. A. Rendall	London	(R)
Bob Richardson	Toronto	(P)
Burt Richardson	Toronto	(P)
Garnet B. Rickard	Bowmanville	(P)
Lynda Rivington	Ottawa	(P)
Jean-Paul Roberge	Ottawa	(P)
Dr. Hedley Roy	Toronto	(P)
Clayton Ruby	Toronto	
Professor D. E. Sanders	Windsor	(R)
William J. Saunderson	Toronto	(P)
Dan Scott	Toronto	(R)
Graham Scott	Toronto	(P)
William Scott, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Gordon Sedgewick	Toronto	(P)
C. E. Shand	Toronto	(P)
Sheldon Silver	Toronto	(P)
Professor Richard Simeon	Kingston	(R)

Ontario (Cont.)

Professor George Sinclair	Toronto	(R)
Professor David Slater	Kingston	(R)
David E. Smith	Burlington	(P)
Professor Denis Smith	Peterborough	(R)
Professor David Staeger	Toronto	(R)
William D. Stowe	Dunnville	(O)
David Surplis	Toronto	(P)
John W. Sutton	Simcoe	(P)
James R. Swanborough	Burlington	(P)
Mrs. Yvonne Szilagyi	Welland	(P)
Professor Alastair Taylor	Kingston	(R)
Professor F. M. Tierney	Ottawa	(R)
B. Treister	Hamilton	(O)
Professor V. F. Valentine	Ottawa	(R)
Patrick Vernon	Toronto	(P)
Audrey Voice	Ottawa	(P)
Mrs. Jean Wadds	Prescott	(P)
David Ward	Toronto	(R)
Joseph Wearing	Peterborough	(O)
Harry Weihs	Don Mills	(R)
Mrs. Ronald P. Williamson	Peterborough	(P)
Jack K. White	Brantford	(P)
Professor J. W. Wilson	Waterloo	(R)
L. R. Wilson	London	(R)
Professor David Winch	Hamilton	(R)
David Wood	Thamesford	(P)
Robert Wood	London	(P)
Larry Zolf	Toronto	(O)

Prince Edward Island

Ben J. Gallant	Charlottetown	(P)
Claude Ives	Summerside	(P)
George Key	Charlottetown	(P)
Rev. David MacDonald, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Hon. J. Angus MacLean, MP	Charlottetown	(P)
Heath Macquarrie, MP	Charlottetown	(P)
Professor Saul Silverman	Charlottetown	(R)

Quebec

John Aimers	Montreal	(P)
Fernand Alie	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Martial Asselin, MP	La Malbaie	(P)
K. G. Bernhardt	Lennoxville	(P)

Quebec (Cont.)

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Fernand Bouchard	St. Felicien	(P)
Eugene Boudreault	Westmount	(P)
Pierre Boutin	Quebec	(P)
J. Patrick Boyer	Montreal	(P)
Michael Caren	Quebec	(P)
Egan Chambers	Montreal	(P)
Professor Michel Chevalier	Montreal	(R)
Michel Cogger	Montreal	(P)
George Daigle	Levis	(O)
Mme. Germaine Daigle	Levis	(P)
Roma Dauphin	Sherbrooke	(R)
Marc DeGoumois	Quebec	
Jacques Desroches	Laval-des-Rapides	(P)
Rev. Gerard Dion	Quebec	(R)
Dr. John H. Dirks	Montreal	(P)
Jacques Dufresne	Montreal	
Roland Dugre	Asbestos	
Claude Dupras	Montreal	(P)
Bernard Flynn	Dorval	(P)
Hon. Jacques Flynn	Ottawa	(P)
Andre Gagnon	Montreal	(P)
Michel Gagnon	Montreal	(P)
Heward Grafftey	Knowlton	(P)
D. C. Hannaford	Town of Mount Royal	(P)
Claude Harari	Montreal	(P)
Professor Benjamin Higgins	Montreal	(R)
Richard Holden	Montreal	(P)
Mrs. Richard Holden	Montreal	(P)
Henry Horner	Shawville	(P)
Margaret Jones	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Alexandre Kindy	Sherbrooke	(P)
Mme. Irene Laflamme	Montreal	(P)
Dr. Gilles Lalande	Montreal	(R)
Andre Lalonde	St. Bruno	(P)
Victor Lambert	Ottawa	(R)
Dr. Levis Larocque	Pointe Gatineau	(P)
Roch Lasalle, MP	Crabtree Corners	(P)
Clement Lauziere	Quebec	(R)

Quebec (Cont.)

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Jean Yves Lortie	Montreal	(P)
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Hon. Paul Martineau	Lucerne	(P)
Jean-Baptiste McLeod	Montreal	(P)
Michael Meighen	Montreal	(P)
Armand Miron	Valleyfield	(P)
David A. H. Newman	Montreal	(P)
Gary Quart Ouellet	Quebec	(P)
Donat Piette	Joliette	(P)
Paul Pouliot	Sherbrooke	(P)
Mme. Paul Pouliot	Sherbrooke	(P)
John R. Pratt	Dorval	(P)
Andre Prud'homme	Montreal	(P)
Mme. Andre Prud'homme	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Josie D. Quart	Quebec	(P)
Professor Serge Racine	Sherbrooke	(R)
Keith Randall	Montreal	(P)
Hon. Theo Ricard, MP	St. Hyacinthe	(P)
Roland Richer	Quebec	(P)
James W. S. Saunders	Ste. Foy	(P)
John Sedley	Montreal	(P)
Gordon Simons	Pointe Claire	(P)
Mrs. Sue Simons	Pointe Claire	(P)
Gord Sinclair	Montreal	(P)
Mme. Paul-O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Paul-O. Trepanier	Granby	(P)
Bob Valcov	Baie d'Urfe	(P)
Miss Cornelia Vaughan	Montreal	(P)
Lawrence I. Weiser	Place d'Armes	(P)
George Wright	Pointe Claire	(P)

Saskatchewan

Ken Black	Regina	(P)
Bert Cadieu, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Professor J. C. Courtney	Saskatoon	(R)
Walter Deiter	Regina	(R)
Charles Irving	Wadena	(P)

Saskatchewan (Cont.)

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Stanley Korchinski, MP	Ottawa	(P)
Larry Kyle	Regina	(P)
Dr. Alan Matthews	Fort Qu'Appelle	(P)
Jim Ormiston	Cupar	(P)
Ernie Pascoe	Moose Jaw	(P)
Peter Russel	Saskatoon	(P)
Ken Sunquist	Regina	(P)
Lawrence Watson	Avonlea	(P)

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Foreign Addresses

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Professor James Duran	Buffalo	(R)
Gordon Galbraith	New Haven	(P)
L. I. Golden	New York	(R)

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Robert L. Stanfield	Speech to the Progressive Conservative constituency associations of Vegreville, Battle River, Battleford-Kindersley and Meadow Lake constituencies, Lloydminster, Sask., September 8, 1969.
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